British and French Cavalry

1808-1814

Introduction

by Philipp J.C. Elliot-Wright


A study of various aspects of British and French Cavalry, 1808-14; with specific reference to their respective development prior to 1808, and how this related to their performance in the Peninsula.

Officers, chasseurs a cheval and hussars 1805

A few years ago I wrote a small article on this subject in LE MONITEUR. I was overwhelmed by the letters and comments on it, both critical and supportive. I hope that the following more substantial article will both answer my previous critics and develop the questions about Peninsula cavalry. I look forward to the response it will no doubt generate; all I ask is that readers withhold comment until they have read the whole article as I suspect it will not be published in one piece.

The aim of this work is to look at the performance of the British and French cavalry in the Peninsula, 1808-14, having specific regard to their development to that date. The underlying thesis of the essay is that the semi-professional French officer corps and conscripts drawn from a wide social background produced a superior body of cavalry when compared to the still mainly traditional 18th century style British cavalry with its purchase of commissions and mainly peasant volunteer troopers. The "unique" campaigning conditions of the Peninsula are looked at in relation to the problems they presented to both sides, and how the strengths and weaknesses of each side coped and failed to cope, emphasis being placed on a comparison of the British system of l8th century supply lines and depots and the French system of living off the land. Finally, specific reference is made to how, despite learning to overcome most of their glaring operational deficiencies, British cavalry continued throughout to deserve their reputation for headlong, uncontrolled charges, and why this failing was never overcome.

Introduction and General Comments

Due to the terrain, the campaign and battles of the Peninsula War between Wellington and his French opponents were primarily infantry and artillery engagements; on the battlefields, cavalry had few opportunities for decisive contributions excluding a few notable exceptions such as Albuera, Salamanca and Fuentes de Onoro. Unfortunately, history tends to concentrate on the battlefield, largely glossing over the less dramatic marches, foraging, patrolling and general manoeuvring. Yet, especially in the Peninsula, this is where cavalry comes into its own. In anything from a file up to a Brigade of several squadrons, cavalry performed vital functions such as reconnaissance, covering screen for the main army, gathering food and other supplies, keeping the enemy off balance etc.

Basically, between the one or two major battles each year, cavalry, especially light cavalry, performed vital functions, without which few major campaigns or battles could be undertaken. Even in the mountains, such as Wellington's 1810 retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras, cavalry performed vital functions such as preventing straggling, holding rear-guard positions till the last minute and general outpost work.

The British and French present a fascinating confrontation between the traditional l8th century volunteer recruited/gentleman officered British army, most pronounced in its cavalry army, and the French, with the first ever largely professional army, with its conscripted soldier and promotion generally by merit and ability. Man to man, neither side displayed any marked superiority, the one major exception being the performance of the British regimental officers, for they proved unable and unwilling to learn the lesson of control and discipline in the charge. The belief consequently grew that British cavalry had no discipline in action and would gallop for miles in pursuit of a broken enemy, with fatal results if the exhausted and dispersed troopers came upon formed French reserves. This uncontrolability will be seen to be due to a mixture of little real officer training, and the very powerful myth that dominated British cavalry that the charge was the one and only function of cavalry. Even experienced units that had been in the Peninsula since 1809, who were expert at outpost work etc., were, as late as 1812 and 1813, still charging headlong and pursuing for miles.

The French cavalry came to the Peninsula with years of experience behind them. While they also viewed the charge as the height of a cavalryman's ambitions, the tradition of "Arms Blanche", they also had a realistic appreciation of its limits and knew cavalry had many other vital functions. Their main fault, though also shared by their British counterparts, was the preservation of mounts. Due to a good supply of remounts, the British were able to maintain an edge over their more experienced opponents.

More British and French Cavalry

More British and French Cavalry Part 2

Letter to Editor (AoN13)


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