By 1808, Napoleonic cavalry roles had clearly developed. Some of these had no application in the often rough terrain of the Peninsula and the limited scale of the campaign compared to Central Europe. The great charges of Austerlitz, Hoff and Eylau had no place; Wellington never faced a charge of massed French heavy cavalry in the Peninsula, and until 1811/12 Wellington possessed few cavalry units, and only a handful of these were "heavies". The following were the basic recognised roles of medium and light cavalry applicable to the Peninsula: 

1) Medium Cavalry (Dragoons)

Originally a mounted infantryman, by the Napoleonic period he was regarded as a true cavalryman; although they were still sometimes employed in a dismounted role, especially as by 1812, many French dragoon regiments had up to 50% of their established dismounted due to the loss of mounts. The British Dragoons were not noted for their dismounted role. Armed with a sword, pistols, dragoon musketeers and bayonet, they were expected, especially in the French army, to perform all roles, from screening, patrolling, escorting and foraging, to making full blown charges on the battlefield. For the French in reality and the British in theory, the Dragoon was the maid of all work.

2) Light Cavalry
(Chasseur and Hussars for the French; Light Dragoons and Hussars for the British).

There had originally been only heavy battlefield cavalry in the 17th century, but as armies developed into established institutions, and with the l8th century emphasis on manoeuvre rather than pitched battles, large formations of regular light cavalry developed from the irregular Hungarian and Polish hussars and lancers. Light cavalry had to be capable of swift movement over difficult ground and trained for skirmishing, reconnaissance, patrolling and pursuit (as light cavalry formed the bulk of the mounted units in the Peninsula it predominates in this account). The role of light cavalry is well summarised by T. Simes in his Military Guide for Young Officers 1776:

Light cavalry are to be amployed in reconnoitring the enemy, and discovering his motives ... they are also, as such parties, to avoid engaging with the enemy, or being sent out for a different purpose ... Light cavalry are also to be made use of for distant advanced posts, to prevent the army from being falsely alarmed, or surprised by the enemy ... Parties are also to be sent out to distress the anemy, by depriving them of forage and provisions; by surprising their convoys, attacking their baggage, harrassing them on their march, cutting off foraging parties; in short of seizing all opportunities to do them as much damage as they possibly can.... and, when the army marches, they may compose the advance guard; reconnoitring the front and flanks carefully, and sending intelligence to the Commander in Chief. (1)

It should be noted Simes does not mention the charge and in fact stresses it should not engage the enemy unless forced to on outpost work.

The purpose of this study is to determine how near each side comes in the Peninsula to the above ideal.

First though, mention must be made of the "Charge". All regular cavalry, regardless of nation or type, viewed the charge as the height of glory and the true fulfilment of the cavalry spirit, the "Arms Blanche". In the central European campaigns, cavalry had many opportunities to fulfil their ambition, but the Peninsula offered no such opportunities for glorious mass charges. While the British despite practical limitation, continued to be dominated by this aim, the French tempered their ambition to more realistic proportions, appreciating the limits and tactical requirements of the charge, although they too performed some reckless exploits. It was not that the French hesitated to charge, it was their professional approach that distinguished them from their British counterparts.

Control, both of the trooper and the overall formation was the key to success. French officers generally maintained a tight rein over their units, stressing rallying after a combat and always maintaining a formed reserve. The British, having made the charge their almost sole aim, neglected vital training and doctrine, and even vital experience. The two most basic requirements of a formed reserve and of rallying immediately after any combat were ignored in favour of stressing immaculate straight lines and a firm seat, all aimed solely at a straight, headlong charge.

The Practical Needs for a Successful Charge

The French cavalry manual of 1801 explained what an ideal charge of mounted men in straight and compact lines should be. It would consist of not less than two successive shocks upon the enemy, no matter whether the unit employed was a squadron or a division.

In a good regimental charge the men should be halted 200-300 metres distant from the target. On the command 'Escadrons en avant­marche!' the advance would begin at walking pace; then the colonel would order 'Au trot After trotting for half the distance towards the enemy and on the command 'Charge!' the horses would be thrown into the Full of Triple Gallop. If this was properly carried out, the horse did not tire before the impact and the lines were kept straight. The first rank had to split up on reaching the objective allowing a further shock. (2)

The classic method of attack for a regiment was by successive squadrons, each squadron formed of two long lines, each line representing one company. Thus a regiment of four squadrons would charge in eight successive lines, each line with a frontage of 40 to 48 men. However (especially in the Peninsula due to very weak squadrons) if the ground was suitable and space allowed, a regiment might charge with all its squadrons in line abreast, making two lines, each of two squadrons.

There were several overriding requirements for a successful charge. W. Muller (3) outlined these:

1) Cavalry units engaged in a charge had to be well led and disciplined. They had to be restrained from breaking into a gallop too soon. They had to maintain the tactical deployment chosen for the particular attack, regardless of casualties, and present a solid front to the enemy at all times. The attitude and example of the officers was of crucial importance here, for, as Muller says 'the best troops will crowd and fall into disorder if badly led.'

2) The attack had to be stopped as soon as success had been achieved or failure made obvious. If the troops were not rallied quickly for further attack, defence or withdrawal, they would split into small groups, chasing fugitives far and wide, and would easily succumb to the slightest opposition.

3) Regardless of the formation deployed, some form of reserve was essential, either to exploit success or cover repulsed troops as they withdrew to safety.

4) Whenever a charge was ordered, the ground to be covered had to be reconnoitred for possibly obstacles.

Basically, Muller made it clear that the charge was not a tactic to be employed lightly. It required a significant degree of specialised training, military skill and basic preparation. There is little evidence to suggest that British cavalry possessed these essential attributes. The French and German units (on both sides) displayed a far higher "professional" approach than the British. But why? The background to the two sides provides the answer: the recruiting and training of officers and men and the prevalent doctrines and beliefs. How well prepared were the two sides when they entered the Peninsula? Is it true that the French were "professionals" as opposed to the British "amateurs"?

More British and French Cavalry

Introduction
General Background
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: British
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: French
Comparative Performance

More British and French Cavalry Part 2

Comparative Performance
The Charge
Comparison of Swords and Swordsmanship
Conclusion, Notes, and Bibliography

Letter to Editor (AoN13)