The French present a decidedly different picture. Their army was a product of the Revolution, with a few additions by Napoleon. Its troops were raised by conscription, which, introduced originally in 1793, had been modified and extended later. All bachelors aged between twenty and twenty-five were potential conscripts. They had to present themselves at the depot when their "Bann" was called, for the draw, a "lucky-dip" designed to select one in seven of the prospective candidates. While substitutes could be purchased, only the rich few could afford to, hence a fair crosssection of French society in general served the ranks, and untill 1813, there was little visible opposition to the system. (16)

The tallest conscripts entered the cavalry, and after innoculation against smallpox, they proceeded to their respective regimental depots. Unlike the British trooper who received a minimum of six months' training, most French troopers received after 1805 a bare two to three weeks, being lucky if they were taught basic horsemanship and drill. Still unsteady in the saddle, they proceeded to join their regiment in the field. Yet, in 1809, the French cavalry had a formidable reputation, for, between 1805-9 they had fought in five major campaigns. Losses for the cavalry had been relatively light (even after Eylau, the average regiment had only 15% dead or disabled).(17)

The cavalry regiments in Spain in 1808 were mainly composed of battle hardened veterans. Throughout the Peninsula War, this situation remained generally unchanged, for while there was a steady average loss of approximately 15% per annum, the remaining 85% were able to absorb new drafts without undue loss to overall efficiency. By 1813/14 the French armies in Spain became Napoleon's only source of veteran troopers after the immense losses in Russia and Germany. (18)

The battle hardened ranks were complemented by a recognisable professional officer corps, although obviously primitive by later 19th century standards. Entrance was possible in a number of ways:

1) Promotion on the field of battle. After an action, subaltern casualties were replaced at once, usually by the colonel recommending the most deserving and experienced N.C.O's. Apart from a basic requirement of reading, writing and numeracy, no promotion was ever confirmed until Napoleon or the Minister of War had checked their record for length of service, wounds, awards, character, etc. By 1809, 50% of all junior officers were ex-rankers, (19) merit and experience being the key requirement.

2) Military colleges. These produced several hundred subalterns per year. Although demand for subalterns forced two-year courses to be telescoped to six months, until 1813, competent officers were produced. They received a basic training in drill, tactics and administration. The Guard Velite squadrons also produced competent officers. The velite units were attached to each guard regiment and were composed of young men from middle and upper class families. They served one to two years as troopers, receiving a college education when not serving in the field (between 1805-13 the velites did not normally go on campaigns). Once judged proficient, they were promoted subalterns in a line regiment. One quarter of all subalterns were from colleges or velite units. (20)

3) Transfer from a foreign regiment. Some one fifth of officers were transferred from non-French units when foreign contingents were absorbed from areas annexed or allied to the Empire.(21) By 1809, Belgium, parts of Holland, Italy, Germany and Switzerland had been absorbed, and several Polish and German regiments had been transferred to the French Army, they being considered some of the best units in Europe. (22)

In addition, the vast majority of senior officers were appointed after serving for a year or more on the general staff, (23) having gained valuable experience in higher administration and tactics before taking up regimental command.

Informal Relations

Unlike the British army, relations between officers and men were close and informal, due in the main to conscription and promotion from the ranks. Corporal punishment was unknown, and discipline relied mainly upon mutual respect and dignity; not fear as in the British army. But, it must be added that this "respect" often relied upon officers ignoring ruthless foraging and plundering, especially in Spain and Portugal. While the British army did its share of plundering, compared to the French it was generally on a very minor scale.

The French cavalry's major failing was in its standard of horsecare in general, which was in the Peninsula seriously aggravated by the near impossibility of procuring enough suitable forage from the poorly cultivated land and a lack of suitable remounts. A lack of basic training in the depots seems to have been responsible for this (this problem is examined further in the next section).

The German cavalry on both sides provides a clear indication of the standards both British and French cavalry should have aspired to. Most commentators agree that the German cavalry was the best regiment for regiment in Europe.(24)

Four Hanoverian Kings German Legion cavalry regiments served in the Peninsula with the British; two hussar and two Heavy Dragoon regiments (converted to light dragoons in 1813 due to a severe shortage of efficient light cavalry).(25) Despite progressive drafts of all sorts of foreigners, the splendid Hanoverian officers and cadres maintained a high standard of proficiency. They proved excellent at outpost work, and displayed a high degree of discipline in action. The Ist K.G.L. Hussars under Colonel von Arentschildt from the very beginning built a formidable reputation, as Captain Kincaid illustrated:

'if we saw a British Dragoon at any time approaching in full speed, it excited no great curiosity among us, but whenever we saw one of the Ist Hussars coming on at a gallop it was high time to gird on our swords and bundle up'.(26) Captain Mercer illustrates their excellent standard of horsecare (a fact often mentioned by French officers in regard to their own German regiments)(27):

These beautiful animals they had brought with them from Spain, and I shall never forget the grief and indignation with which they parted with them. Affection for, and care of, his horse, is the trait, par excellence, which distinguishes the German dragoon from the English. The former would sell everything to feed his horse; the latter would sell his horse itself for spirit, or the means of obtaining them. The one never thinks of himself until his horse is provided for, the other looks upon the animal as a curse and a source of perpetual drudgery to himself, and gives himself no concern about it when once away from under his officer's eye .... In the Peninsula the only means of enforcing some attention to their horses amongst our English regiments was to make every man walk and carry his saddlebags whose horse died or was ill. (28) 

The French expressed similar sentiments as regards their own German units, especially the Kleve-Berg Chevau-Legers and the Nassau Chasseurs, of whom General Thiebault comments: 'They were in fact, a picked corps .... They were no less steady than brave, and I know nothing in the world that one might not have attempted with them'. (29)

There would seem to be several reasons for this marked superiority.

1) The practice of most officers beginning their careers as cadets in the ranks gave them a "professional" approach.

2) Relatively high rates of pay, better living conditions and a far higher social standing given to troopers and N.C.O.'s (compared to Britain) attracted a better class of recruit to the ranks, many in fact enlisting for positive career reasons, compared to the average British trooper who enlisted for negative reasons such as to escape imprisonment or transportation. For the French, a lack of training at the depots and being used to a plentiful supply of remounts in Central Europe left them poorly prepared for the rigours of the Peninsula.

More British and French Cavalry

Introduction
General Background
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: British
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: French
Comparative Performance

More British and French Cavalry Part 2

Comparative Performance
The Charge
Comparison of Swords and Swordsmanship
Conclusion, Notes, and Bibliography

Letter to Editor (AoN13)