Not yet twenty-seven years old, Napoleon had taken command of the Army of Italy in April. He quickly commenced his first campaign that would ultimately bring him to the attention of the European military establishment and earn him greatfame in France. Before the end of April, at Mondovi, Austria's ally Sardinia Piedmont would be knocked out of the war through a brilliant and daring series of manuevers that marked Napoleon's campaign in the imposing Appenine mountains. Following the Treaty of Cherasco, in May, Napoleon and his hungry men descended onto the fertile plains of northern Italy where they defeated the Austrians at Lodi and Borghetto and chased them into Mantua. With his opponent besieged, Napoleon resupplied his army through a series of raids to the south which also served to remove Naples and the Papal States from the First Coalition. Perhaps more importantly, Napoleon took advantage of his victories and fulfilled the vital task of plundering northern Italy to fill the coffers of France (as well as the purses of his men).
During the months of June and July, 1796, the French
Army subdued the central Italian states. Among the many benefits of these punitive raids was
the acquisition of the heavy artillery required to prosecute an active siege. A portion of
Bonaparte's army had the garrison of Mantua bottled up within the defenses. Now with the
arrival of the artillery, it was only a matter of time before the guns would breach the walls.
On 17 June, Murat, future Marshal of France [see "Prelude to Leipzig" for an account of Murat's later Battle at Liebertwolkwitz] led an attempted coup-de-main across the lakes in boats, but the water level had dropped and the heavily-loaded vessels grounded themselves halfway to the walls. The French on this raid took heavy losses before they could escape. The following day a French boat bridge was blown apart by the Hapsburg artillery. Dismayed by the costly failure of these direct assaults, Bonaparte now waited for his artillery train to do its work.
The strategic situation, however, was growing worse for the French each day. General Wurmser was marching south from the Tyrol with an Austrian army of more than 50,000 men. Wurmser's
objective was to rescue the 13,000 man garrison at Mantua (of whom nearly a quarter were sick) and defeat the 43,000 French forces dispersed in the region.
Defended by over 300 artillery pieces, Mantua was also surrounded by lakes that
made any shelling come from across the water at a considerable distance. Furthermore, the
northern approaches were guarded by two large forts--St. Georges and the Citadel--while the southern approach faced a line of entrenchments. These would have to be taken before any attempt could be made on the main city. The French under General Lannes took Fort St. Georges on 3 June, whereupon the army settled down to a siege of containment until the heavy artillery arrived.
...the pre-arranged Austrian raiding party
arrived six hours too late to seize Bonaparte
and forever alter history. P>
Dividing your army in the face of the enemy, as even the Austrians were becoming aware, was a risky move. However, in order to facilitate the passage of his forces over the limited roads and rugged terrain from his base at Trent, Wurmser divided his army into two main wings. Communications between the two would partly be maintained by a fleet of Austrian gunboats on Lake Garda.
Thus, 17,500 men under Quasdanovitch moved down the western bank of the lake while the main force under Wurmser, now consisting of approximately 25,000 men, would come down the Adige River valley on the east side of the lake. Wurmser expected to be able to rejoin his two wings south of the lake, in the vicinity of Lonato and Castiglione, before the French would react.
Many generals placed in Napoleon's predicament would no doubt have elected to retreat from the superior forces descending upon them. Instead, Napoleon tenaciously refused to give up northern Italy. He opted to seize the initiative and attack.
Renowned historian David Chandler in The Campaigns of Napoleon (Macmillan, 1966) summarizes this remarkable situation: "Wurmser was not able to make the most of his initial advantage, for although he planned to crush the French between his converging forces, he failed to coordinate the activities of his two pincers and became obsessed with the need to relieve Mantua, which he erroneously believed to be on the point of surrender.
Consequently, Bonaparte was given just sufficient time to make the greatest possible use of his central position and narrowly defeat each wing of the Austrian army in turn." On 29 July, upon news that Massena's division had been pushed back by Quasdanovitch with some loss, Napoleon ordered preparations for abandoning the siege of Mantua, and began to make plans for a possible retreat on Milan.
A footnote to history occurred at this point in the campaign. Josephine, his bride since March, had been with Napoleon since 29 June. During their stay at Brescia, the Proveditor of the town was preparing a grand ball in honor of the young Corsican. Josephine sensed something suspicious and insisted that they leave. Despite the protests of the town officials, the French commander left in the late evening only to have the pre-arranged Austrian raiding party arrive six hours too late to seize Bonaparte and forever alter history.
The Battle of Lonato
Napoleon decided to move first against Quasdanovitch's smaller wing. The battle was joined around the town of Lonato on 3 August, 1796. Having sent for Serurier's 5,000 men on 31 July, thereby temporarily abandoning the siege of Mantua, Napoleon also detached Augereau's division to delay Wurmser. Then he massed the three divisions of Sauret, Despinois, and Massena to attack Quasdanovitch.
The attacking French began to envelop the Austrian western flank. In the mean time, the white-coated Hapsburg columns had taken Lonato in the center. Napoleon harangued his troops and sent them forward in a massed bayonet charge that retook the town. As the Austrians were pushed out of Lonato, Napoleon sent in his reserves and the Austrian forces broke. They fled to the north and northwest; many were captured when they ran into the French performing the flank attack.
Wurmser had followed a rather confused course over the last few days. After reaching the foot of Lake Garda he waited for word of Quasdanovitch. When he learned that the siege had been raised at Mantua, Wurmser and 15,000 troops marched to the fortress and re-victualled the garrison. After marching to a position north of the city, he began moving northwest when the sound of the fighting at Lonato interrupted. Wurmser prepared to attack Augereau in order to break through to Quasdanovitch. Augereau pre-empted Wurmser by launching an assault against the Castle of Castiglione. What followed was one of the more desperate fights of the war. The French troops launched column assaults through the narrow streets of the town and up the steep slopes at the Austrian defenders.
Wurmser launched an immediate counter-attack that nearly dislodged the Republicans. French commanders were falling quickly as they attempted to steady their outnumbered troops. At the height of the battle, Augereau replaced his artillery commander with Marmont, no doubt because of the lack of close artillery support that Augereau's men so desperately needed. Marmont handled the guns superbly, delivering canister rounds at close range into the brave Austrians. His performance this day earned him a reputation as an artillery specialist.
Throughout the day the struggle continued with the French finally gaining the advantage and compelling the Hapsburgs to withdraw to a defensive position. The exhausted French had
triumphed and had gained the time for Napoleon to completely repulse Quasdanovitch.
An elated Napoleon embraced Augereau when he met him that night and bolstered the rattled commander (Augereau would later recount this meeting, but reversed the respective states of their morale, implying that he was the steadier of the two). Napoleon would always credit the future Marshal with having the best day of his career on 3 August, 1796, and Augereau's performance in keeping Wurmser engaged deserves the highest praise.
The following day Napoleon gathered as many of his troops as possible that had fought at Lonato and moved them southeast to prepare to attack Wurmser On 4 August, 2,000 men from Quasdanovitch tried to slip past the French and link up with Wurmser's force. Massena's men opposed them with a little over half their number. The Austrian commander called for the French force to surrender. Napoleon had just come up and responded that rather than surrender, it was the Hapsburgs that had to surrender or he would give no quarter. The Austrian commander, easily cowed after the defeat of the previous day, capitulated.
The Battle of Castiglione
By the morning of 5 August, Napoleon had massed the divisions of Massena and Augereau with part of Despinois' division coming up. In addition there was the cavalry of Beaumont and the converged grenadiers under General Verdier. These units were to pin Wurmser on the plain below Castiglione and Solferino while Napoleon's surprise attack fell on their flank and rear. Serurier's division from Mantua, under the command of General Fiorella because of Serurier's illness, had marched to a position during the night that allowed them to fall upon Wurmser's rear.
At early morning light, Bonaparte began his demonstration in front of the Austrians. He was waiting for the troops of Despinois to come up before launching his combined attack. Before these troops came up, Fiorella began his attack on the left-rear of the Austrians. This allowed Wurmser to swing his reserves around to meet this threat.
The Austrian line now formed an "L" with the position anchored on a rise called Monte Medello where their main battery and a redoubt were located. This was the key to the position and Napoleon was determined to crush it. The French reserve artillery was lighter caliber than the Austrian guns so it was determined that they could only be effective with close range fire.
Hence, eighteen light guns were galloped forward in columns of twos led by the gallant Marmont. The first two guns received the full brunt of the the remainder were able to deploy and begin a brisk fire at a range of 100 yards. Napoleon now sent in the grenadiers against the weakened position while moving the cavalry against their flank. The Austrian gunners gave way and abandoned their guns in flight. With his position unhinged, Wurmser now called for a retreat. The Austrians gave ground slowly and fell back to the hill position around Solferino.
It was now 8:30 in the morning and Despinois came up with a brigade. Sensing that the enemy was wavering, Napoleon sent them forward in an uphill charge against the castle and town. Again the Austrians were forced out of an imposing position and the shaken troops fled northeast. Wurmser had called for his last reserve under Bajalich to come up from Pescheria. They moved to cover the retreat. The French were hardly able to push them at all. They were near the point of complete exhaustion; their officers had in some cases been in the saddle an average of twenty hours a day for the last week. As a result the battle petered out by midday.
The Austrians continued to retreat up the Adige valley to Roveredo where the next phase of the campaign would occur in September. Napoleon sent a covering force north and once more put Mantua under siege.
In the summer of 1796, the French Army of Italy, reduced by its earlier exertions, had faced a grim situation. How could they be expected to contend with fresh, superior enemy forces arriving to their front while maintaining a crucial siege to their rear? Retreat seemed prudent, and disaster a real possibility.
Yet, through master strokes coupled with astonishing tenacity, Napoleon was able to inflict another decisive series of defeats upon a larger enemy. The campaign stands as one of the more remarkable in history, and the Battle of Castiglione remains a brilliant tactical victory, where French artillery and grenadiers broke the hinge of an enemy army that had been bent by the unfolding of Napoleon's designs.
The methods Napoleon revealed a Lonato and Castiglione, which features the use of the central position combined with the seamless integration of strategic and tactical purpose, would form the basis of a system of warfare tha would carry Napoleon to unsurpassed heights as a commander.
The 200th Anniversary Series on Napoleon in Italy
-
First Installment: Side Road To Immortality
Second installment: The Supporting Cast
Third installment: Maintaining the Initiative
Fourth installment: General Bonaparte Defends His Conquests
Fifth installment: Napoleon Turns Defeat into Victory
Sixth installment: One Final Victory: Rivoli
Seventh installment: Endgame: The Pursuit to Final Victory
Eighth installment: Instrument of Victory: Army of Italy
About the author:
Todd Fisher is the CEO of Emperor's Press an the Emperor's Headquarters. He is also the Executive Director of the Napoleonic Society of America. This is the third installment of a ongoing series begun in Napoleon #2 promoting the Napoleonic Era's bicentennial.
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