Editor 's Note: If his campaign in Italy in 1796-97 showed the genius of Napoleon 's strategy of seizing the central position against a larger army, and then defeating the enemy piecemeal with a series of concentrated rapid blows, the battles around Leipzig in 1813 showed how this method of war could ultimately fail.

Having at last given up the Elbe River line of defense, in October Napoleon ordered his Grande Arme'e of 208,000 men and 799 guns to concentrate at Leipzig. The Allies, meanwhile, advanced upon him concentrically. From the north came Blucher's Army of Silesia with over 60,000 men and 300 cannons, who was cautiously backed up by Bernadotte's Army of the North with approximately 70,000 men and 220 more guns. From the south and the west came Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia, comprising nearly 200,000 men and over 750 cannons. The Army of Bohemia contained the Allied Guard formations and nearly all of their heavy cavalry (Russian and Austrian cuirassiers), and as such was a formidable host, by itself equal to the entire French force. Its destruction, so narrowly avoided at the end of August at the battles of Dresden and Kulm, might have ended the war in the French Emperor's favor.

Opposing Schwarzenberg's advance on Leipzig was the flamboyant Marshal Murat, King of Naples, and his greatly outnumbered wing of the Grande Arme'e. Murat's mission was to hold Leipzig long enough for Napoleon to head north in an effort to destroy Blucher's isolated army. While the French won some small successes, Blucher's army escaped in accordance with the overall Allied strategy mapped out that summer--avoid battle with Napoleon whenever possible while concentrating on defeating his subordinates.

This principal of avoidance had generally succeeded in countering Napoleon's strategy of the central position. Further hampering Napoleon was the decline in the quality of his troops, who could not achieve the exertions of his veterans of 1796 or 1805, the serious lack of horses and supplies, and the failures of his subordinates, like Marshal Ney and Marshal Macdonald, who simply couldn't measure up to a Lannes or a Massena when holding an independent command.

Prelude to Leipzig (part I)
Prelude to Leipzig (part II)
Battle of Liebertwolkwitz: Order of Battle

Modern day Liebertwolkwitz looking from the direction of Stormthal. Notice the gentle rise in ground toward the Galgenberg feature. Photo courtesy of Ed Wimble

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