Analysis
In Part 1 of this article, the historical reliance was on the Daniel text. This reference was supported by a number of other excellent sources. The idea of tinkering with scale and representation was born from that work. At the same time, simplicity and efficiency of gaming systems was stressed. What went wrong then?
On review, it seems that my original error was in trying to modify a brigadelevel rules system to provide for regimental-level action. The combat procedures and effects of same survived the transition fairly well, but the foundation of the rules, that being movement and maneuver, did not. It was inconsistent on my part to "use" the brigade-level approach for determining overall movement. For example, rolling to see if Buckland's brigade would be able to move in the 7:30 a.m. Union turn as opposed to rolling for each individual regiment of that brigade. As the fight developed and one or two of Buckland's regiments was thrown into disorder, the question arose: What table do I use to determine movement and maneuver for the brigade? Good order effects or Disorder effects? While the concern for simplicity dictated I use the table for the higher-element (the brigade), the equal concerns of common sense and recreating history, suggested that each regiment within the brigade had to be considered. In short, if combat is to be resolved at the level of the regiment, then so too must movement and maneuver.
A possible solution to this inconsistency was discovered (albeit too late - or perhaps it was read prior to the battle study and just forgotten) in the August 1999 issue of WARGAMES Illustrated. In Backing the Right Horse, Barry Hilton offers the following remedy to command and control: "Each turn, every commander rolls a decimal die indicating what percentage of his total units can move in that turn. 1-2: No movement, 3-4: 25% Movement, 5-6: 50% Movement, 7-8: 75% Movement, 9-10: 100% Movement." (35) In the same paragraph, Mr. Hilton comments on leadership modifiers, which may be used to increase of decrease the roll for movement. The use of modifiers goes against one of the premises advanced in Part 1 - that being the elimination of all modifiers for the sake of simplicity.
However, in this limited circumstance, I think that modifiers are a useful tool/device. It remains to decide (if yet another solo attempt is made at Shiloh) at what level these rolls for movement will be made: Brigade, Division or Corps? Additionally, it remains to decide just how to handle the units that become disordered. Perhaps a sub-phase of the game move sequence, wherein these units are rallied from their state or moved toward the rear when the rally roll is not made? Here again, the problem with a shift from brigade to regiment is apparent: I made no provision for the effective processing of regiments that were disordered.
Turning to a consideration of combat, I would maintain that the effectiveness rating is a good idea. The use of rosters and percentage values would, I think, work better with a smaller scale battle ... perhaps no more than a corps per side. With this reconstruction, the roster system became a little cumbersome given that it had to be utilized more than once each turn. That is to remark, the version of the rules used allowed two "turns" of firing: there was a defensive phase and offensive phase and then the roles were switched. Once units got into range, dice rolls became more and more frequent and numerous. Normally, I'm not one to mind a lot of die rolling. However, it seemed that at around the 8 o'clock hour, die rolling evolved into a kind of second job.
The easiest way to reduce the "complexity" of the combat sequence is to reduce the number of firing cycles or phases to just once per turn. The Confederate units would be able to shoot and then the Union forces could reply. Given the representative time scale of the used rules, it seems "logical" to figure that the firing is simultaneous. That is to say, only after all firing has been resolved is attention paid to the effect, meaning: ammunition status, unit casualties, casualties to leaders and then, the impact on unit morale.
Another way to reduce the difficulty inherent to the current, revised system is to adopt a step-reduction procedure much like that described in SHAKO, by Arty Conliffe. Instead of a basic strength point value for each regiment, one could base staying power and effectiveness more on the historical record. For example, the larger regiments might be allowed from 6 to 8 strength points, while some of the lesser regiments would have just 3 strength points. Initial tinkering with this kind of system could provide for the possibility of recovery at the time a unit reaches its break point value. Further ideas revolve around enforced withdrawal from the battle line once a certain number of strength points are lost. For example, a unit that started with 6 points and is now down to just 2, would have to retreat out of the fight in order to rest, refit and reorganize. If the dice allow, then this unit might return to the engagement with one or two points restored in addition to a resupply of ammo.
In Part 1, there was a notation about the percentage of higher-echelon officers wounded, killed or captured on the field. By my math, this worked out to be a figure of just over 34%. In the aborted replay of that First Day however, not a single officer was "involved" in combat. I do think I went to some lengths to make sure that leaders were represented on the wargame table. I also took some care in trying to reflect what I thought was, an actual portrayal of their ability to command and control. It seems however, that my rules for casualties to this kind of stand were insufficient. At the present time, I have nothing in mind or on paper to address this perceived problem. If the main goal of this reconstruction was or is to have things simplified for ease of play, then perhaps I need to reduce the impact or effect of higher-element command? But then, if this is done, what level of realism remains in a wargame devoid or nearly devoid of division or corps officers? How can rules governing the effect of leaders - whether good or poor - be simple? Phrased another way, is there a balance that might be struck between the idea (ideal) of simplicity and the facets of historical realism?
This very question was asked (though perhaps not in that exact wording) in Part 1 of SHILOH SOLO. I attempted to answer it with several revisions to an established rule set and a significant change of scale/representation.
To a degree, the experiment worked. I was, after all, able to get at least the terrain of Shiloh field recreated on my wargame table. And initially, there was some success in refighting the battle. As I remarked earlier however, the plan soon fell apart under its own weight. It would appear - at least from this particular study - that if realism is the foundation of the wargame project, then simplicity must be "sacrificed." If simplicity is the key, then realism must take a back seat in table top proceedings. Admittedly, this question - the search for an equitable "balance" between simplicity and realism is not an original one.
My experiment with Shiloh as a solo wargaming project failed on these two counts, then. First, I was not able to complete the wargame. Second, while I argued for a simple approach, I did nothing but contradict myself with a cumbersome roster system, overly detailed officer rules as well as indistinct revisions about disordered regiments and their impact on maneuver rolls for the parent brigade. From the standpoint that the experiment has forced me to review, reconsider and rethink what I hold important and integral to the pursuit of this hobby, then it may be remarked that the solo project went very well.
Shiloh Solo Part 2
Shiloh Solo Part 1
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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