All Roads Lead to Shiloh
6:30 - 9:00 a.m., the Confederate Right/Bragg's Corps
As the first rays of sun were streaking onto the ridges, fields, orchards and rough roads of Shiloh field, a half-squadron from Clanton's Alabama Cavalry Regiment took up a skirmish line on the south side of Locust Grove Creek. The remainder of the troopers fanned out to the left and right side of weather-beaten structure, known locally as Shake-a-Rag Church. General Beauregard deemed it suitable enough for a forward command post, however. Satisfied with the uncontested approach by the Alabama horsemen, the General and his staff dismounted and using a bench from just outside the building, set about to reviewing their maps and orders for the attack. At odd intervals, either a courier was summoned and dispatched, or one would come galloping up on a sweating horse and salute the officer who received him.
The road column of the II Corps was making only fair progress: Withers's Division was in the lead and Gladden's brigade had nearly reached the fruit orchard in Larkin Field. The brigades of Chalmers and Jackson were following, but at a slightly slower pace. Farther down the road, the order to move had apparently been misunderstood, for not a single soldier in the leading brigade of the 1st Division stepped forward. The winding column of brown and gray-clad men stood in ranks; the length of the column somewhat concealed by pockets of fog the slowly drifted through the scrub and into the column, as if trying to run from the harsh warm light of the sun.
Units of Prentiss's command (the 6th Division) were quite unprepared for the arrival of Confederate forces on the left of their position in and around Sarah Bell Field and the Peach Orchard. However, the Division had been 'called out' as a result of the firing in the vicinity of Lost Field and Shiloh Church. The right-most brigade of the Division served as a link to the troops of Sherman's command (the 5th Division), and held two of the three crossroads that for all intents and purposes, intersected the Union lines.
Gladden's infantry appeared on the road from Larkin Field and quickly deployed to the right side of the Hamburg-Savannah Road. The 1st Louisiana formed on the right of this advance, with three Alabama regiments following behind. In reserve, Brigadier General Gladden kept the 26th Alabama. Robertson's Battery was close behind the infantry and unlimbered just south of the road, which gave them an excellent angle of fire into the Union infantry arrayed for a Rebel assault from the direction of Spain Field and not from the exposed left. Fortunately, Prentiss had seen the sense in having a battery posted at the end of this line: the 1st Minnesota - as surprised as the rest of the neighboring troops - hurried to turn its pieces to face the oncoming wave of butternut and steel. Close by, Colonel Miller managed to rearrange his regiments to face the same threat. He formed his right just behind Peabody's left, and extended the line almost directly north across Sarah Bell Field. The regiment on the left flank and part of that in the center held the Peach Orchard.
As the Confederates of Polk's Corps had done, here too, the engagement was opened at a long range. A brisk fire soon developed between the lines. Robertson's battery was very effective against the Union lines; the solid shot doing no little damage. Instead of firing against the enemy artillery, the Minnesota selected the nearest Rebel regiment and loosed a round of canister. The effect was not as severe but it did serve to give the Rebels pause. They infantry went to ground, seeking any cover and opened a desultory return fire. The sister regiments of Gladden's brigade remained in formation and volleyed against the Yankees just inside Sarah Bell Field.
During this exchange, the remainder of 2nd Division, II Corps came up. Just as Gladden's brigade had done, these troops deployed to the right of the road, trying to form a line between Sarah Bell Field and the tributaries of the Tennessee. The plan was that 2nd Division would lead and 1st Division, under Brigadier General Ruggles, would follow and reinforce or exploit any advantages. However, the troops under Ruggles were still having "trouble" getting on to the field, proper.
Being relatively exposed, the crew and horses of the Minnesota artillery began taking serious casualties from Confederate sharpshooters. This, coupled with Gladden's continued pressure on the Union line resulted in the surviving crew deciding that the area around the Landing "sounded" very good, and so, off they ran, leaving their pieces and caissons to the enemy. The advance would prove costly for the Confederates though: three of the four Alabama regiments present were soon reduced to 75-80% effectiveness. The 1st Louisiana regiment had been handled roughly; after a particularly telling volley from the 61st Illinois, the survivors broke and ran. To help support his own regiments that were themselves being reduced by Confederate fire, Colonel Miller sent aides to bring up the unassigned 15th Michigan and 14th Wisconsin regiments.
Stirred by the developing fight to their front, elements of the 4th Division (Hurlbut's command) responded to the long drum roll and prepared to advance. Colonel Williams's brigade was the first unit out of the encampment; it moved in an uneven line from Cloud Field and the Mounds toward the distant line of Jackson and Chalmers's troops.
7:•00 - 9:00 a.m., the Confederate Left/Hardee's Corps
Musketry, cannon fire and the occasional shouted order or scream of the wounded could be heard by the foremost units of Brigadier General Hindman's command. Delayed slightly by road conditions and a lost courier, the advance units of Hardee's Corps - much like the units under Bragg had - made a surprising appearance on the field. Their attention drawn to the area around Shiloh Church and the surrounding fields, regiments of the 4th Brigade (under Colonel Buckland) were not expecting the head of a Confederate column to debouch from Howell Field, along the Purdy-Hamburg Road. But debouch it did.
With the 3rd Confederate Infantry in the lead, Hindman's brigade rolled out of the early wheat and deployed on either side of the road. Their skirmishers kept up a brisk fire on the disjointed Union regiments, even causing two regiments to loose their carefully loaded volley prematurely. Most of the fire went over the heads of the Rebels, but an unfortunate few did fall - the first of Hardee's Corps. The 3rd Confederate line took the brunt of this; the 6th Arkansas regiment losing 6 percent of its men in addition. Once on line and prepared, the gray regiments replied in kind. The 70th Ohio was hit especially hard, but their morale held. It's sister regiment, the 48th also took some casualties and held the line. (As things turned out, it would be the start of a long two hours for the men of the 48th Ohio regiment.)
Cleburne's brigade made good time following on the heels of Hindman's men. These men would also reach the east end of Howell Field and turn to either the left or right in order to set up the brigade in a long line: three regiments north of the Purdy-Hamburg Road and three regiments on the south side. In the face of this growing pressure, Buckland ordered a fighting withdrawal to ground more advantageous; to a position where he could tie his flanks to other Union brigades. While his regiments slowly retreated, they unleashed several well-aimed volleys into the static line of Confederates. And again, the men of the 3rd Confederate suffered. Losing fully 10% of their roster in the space of 20 minutes, the regiment wavered and then collapsed, causing some disorder in the ranks of Cleburne's units that were not quite 400 yards behind. Brigadier General Hindman ordered one of his aides to rally the unit and then returned to controlling the tempo of the action at hand. Warren's Light Battery was brought up and unlimbered, in order to help the Arkansas regiments push the blue line back farther.
The sound of gun fire could be clearly heard in the encampments of the 1st Division (McClernand's command). Hare's brigade was the first to fall out and muster for action. The brigades of Marsh and Raith followed in kind, that is to remark that they too, did fall out and muster for action. However, when it came time to move toward the fighting, the commanders were suddenly overtaken with the spirit of caution. Marsh did manage to move his command some 500 yards forward of their tent line, but no more. Major General McClernand pinned his hopes on the Illinois and Iowa men under Colonel Hare. Having passed through the lower portion of Crescent Field, these men were soon hotly engaged by regiments of Hindman's and Cleburne's commands. At one point in the contest, Hare's men charged the waiting line of Confederates. In a close-fought action, the Yankees were repelled.
6:30 - 9:00 a.m., the Confederate Center/Polk's Corps
At the same time elements of Bragg's Corps were marching up the road into Larkin Field, units under Brigadier General Charles Clark were traversing the Shiloh Branch and advancing through on a fairly broad front. To their immediate left-front was Shiloh Church; to the center and right-center, Lost and Barnes Fields, respectively. In addition to negotiating the terrain, these regiments faced a number of Union brigades. To be sure, the Union regiments barely had time to take a few bites of their breakfasts before the action became general. Maneuvering would prove problematic too, for the encampments presented a slight obstacle and being arrayed in layers - for lack of a better word (the Yankees camps were set out in supporting distance of each other; some sections at odd angles) would require no little communication between officers as well as tight control of companies and regiments.
On the Union left, Colonel Peabody's brigade (6th Division), held the line between Sarah Bell Field to just north of Barnes Field. Extending that same line, were elements of Sherman's command (the 5th Division) under McDowell and Hildebrand. These as yet untried regiments would face the first of several attacks made by Clark's Division.
By 7:45 a.m., this sector of the Union "front" was heavily engaged. General Clark had thrown both his brigades and artillery into the assault. Colonel Russell's brigade advanced against Hildebrand's line and in a series of musketry exchanges, felled over 25% of the 53rd Ohio. The Colonel threw himself into the fight, shouting encouragement to the rank and file. At the end of the next hour of fighting, the 53rd would be at roughly half-strength, but still holding its place in the beleaguered line. Amazingly enough, Hildebrand escaped the early morning scrap without injury. In fact, the men of his command denied the Confederates any ground: back and forth through Lost Field they would go, leaving more dead and wounded with each advance and retreat. It would eventually prove too much for two of the regiments: the 11th Louisiana ran out of ammunition almost as soon as the firing began and the 12th Louisiana taking something of a beating - they would withdraw from the line with just 64% of their original roster still standing.
Four other regiments would reach this level of effectiveness by the hour of 9:00 a.m. (two were of McDowell's command and one each from the brigades of Stewart and Johnson), as fighting intensified to both the left and right of Lost Field. At one point, cavalry from both sides were engaged - though not against each other and not in what might be called the "traditional role." The 3rd Battalion of the 4th Illinois provided some cover for Hildebrand's regiments as they recoiled to resupply and reform in the face of mounting pressure. The troopers did not dismount, however. Instead, they kept up a stinging fire from horseback.
The 1st Mississippi Cavalry (Cheatham's command) did try to engage the faltering Union line at around 8:30 a.m. but were hampered by terrain and the disorganized mass of troops in the area. It should be mentioned that they were more dismayed by the effective Union rifle fire.
It was at approximately this same time that the Confederates wrested possession of Shiloh Church from the grip of Sherman's regiments. In addition, a link had been established to the west of the church between units of Polk's Corps and units from Hardee's command. The Rebels had a disjointed line then, stretching from just north of Howell Field, south and south-east to the lower portion of Barnes Field. There was then something of a gap until Sarah Bell Field. Here, the troops of Withers's command were "busy." Additional Confederate forces were still in road column at opposite ends of the planned trident-shaped attack. The regiments and artillery under Brigadier General Wood (III Corps) were waiting for the PurdyHamburg Road to open up and allow admission to the battlefield. Ruggle's Division, south of McCuller Field, was experiencing some command and control problems. There seemed to be some sort of confusion as to the order of march. Gibson, Anderson and Pond each wanted to lead the Division onto the field.
There was no similar confusion in the Union lines. But there was the confusion wrought by sudden attack; not enough ground on which to deploy; a lack of central command and from facing an enemy on three fronts. Well ... one front and two flanks, really.
Shiloh Solo Part 2
Shiloh Solo Part 1
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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