In the must-have-text-for-any-wargaming-library, Battle Notes for Wargamers, Sir Donald Featherstone advances: "To refight any historical battle realistically, the terrain must closely resemble both in scale and appearance the area over which the original conflict raged, and the troops accurately represent the original fighting forces." (10) This dictum is followed by several comments on the conduct of the wargame refight. One can either "play" the refight as an exercise; the wargame replicating - exactly - the events that took place on the historical battlefield. Or one can "follow the original course of events reasonably well, but allow some leeway, without too much imaginative stretch, for a reversed result." (11) Sir Featherstone remarks that this approach must be monitored less the refight devolve into a simple wargame. In conjunction with this less conservative approach (wargame with leeway as opposed to strict replay or exercise), he sets forth a sub-section on what are called "military possibilities." These are defined as "controlled and logical alternative courses of action that, had they been taken at the appropriate time during the battle, might well have caused a complete reversal of the result." (11)
In the case example of the present solo-project, The First Day of the Battle of Shiloh, the number and variety of military possibilities is vast. What if Lew Wallace's Division had arrived on the field of Shiloh earlier than it did historically? Further, what if this division had marched behind the Confederate left and attacked from behind? What if Buell and Grant had been on better terms? The same may be asked of the Confederate commanders: Johnston and Beauregard. What if, instead of planning to pin the Federals against Owl Creek, the Confederates planned to encircle the Union forces and drive them back into the Tennessee River at Pittsburgh Landing? On other levels, one may also wonder what would have happened if Grant had ordered the Union lines be protected by entrenchments or breastworks? What would have been the effect/impact if one or two of the divisional commanders had taken that initiative? What if Powell had not ordered the early morning skirmish line / patrol into Fraley field? Would the Confederates have achieved tactical surprise in addition to the strategic surprise? What if Johnston had not been mortally wounded? What if Sherman and Grant - both subject to "near misses" from enemy fire - had been rendered "hors de combat?" What would have happened to the Union resolve then? Then again, one might just wonder what effect adverse weather might have had upon the battle?
It was remarked that the number and variety of possibilities were vast. Indeed, there were times during this project that I literally lost myself in considering the number, variety and combination of these possibilities.
But I get a little ahead of myself and beg the pardon of the reader.
BACKGROUND
The original idea to refight Shiloh goes back a few years, maybe four now, to the occasion of re-reading an "ancient" issue of WARGAMES Illustrated. In the June 1991 issue of this excellent magazine, the triumvirate of Pfiefer, Lyle and Hasenauer presented a four page article entitled: "BATTLE OF SHILOH: A Fire and Fury Scenario." They provided a succinct recount of the engagement and then followed with a page of scenario specific rules. In addition to the rule addenda, there was a detailed map as well as an even more detailed order of battle. At about this same time, I had purchased the Fire & Fury rules and was looking to "cut my teeth" on a scenario a little less daunting than those covering the three day battle of Gettysburg included in the rule book. And so, forces were built according to the order of battle provided and rules were read and reviewed and notes were made. When it came to preparing my game table however, I ran into a number of difficulties. For some reason or reasons, I simply could not reconstruct the terrain detailed on the scenario map. To make a long story short, the idea to refight Shiloh was scrapped and the armies used to wargame a completely ahistorical battle; one fought over friendlier terrain. (See "Encounter at Groverton" in MWAN Number 106.)
The idea to refight Shiloh was revisited over the long Thanksgiving weekend of 2002. The impetus stemmed from re-reading sections of Larry J. Daniel's superlative work, SHILOH: The Battle that Changed the Civil War. A contributing factor to "dusting off" this shelved idea was that the publication of this article (assuming it is accepted for the March/April issue) would coincide with the 141st anniversary of the battle. It appears then, that not only has reconstructing historical battles on my wargame table become something of a habit, it's also part of the "plan" to have the narrative of the experience published in an "anniversary" issue. (See "Bagration v. Lannes" in MWAN Number 120 for a most recent example of this habit - passion?)
Inspired by the Daniel text and having the troops already available and waiting in storage, the decision to refight Shiloh - the first day - was made. The only question that remained was if the terrain would again prove a major obstacle (no pun intended) this time around.
TERRAIN
The following description is found in Daniel's book:
- The terrain remained wilderness in places--uneven, thickly wooded, dense undergrowth--cut by sloughs, ridges, and deep ravines. Some five to seven hundred years earlier, an unknown Indian tribe had left a cluster of seven mounds, five to fifteen feet in height, three-fourths of a mile south of the landing. Three dozen farms dotted the area, mostly log cabins with adjoining forty-to-eighty-acre fields of cotton and corn and some orchards. (102)
A subsequent paragraph on the same page, details the roads that intersected the field, as well as the "numerous other paths (that) crisscrossed the terrain."
If the overall goal is to "refight the historical battle realistically," as Featherstone relates, then how best to replicate such literal wilderness on the wargames table?
Perhaps the first step is recognizing and admitting that there is just no way I am going to be able to reconstruct the woods, undergrowth, sloughs, ridges and ravines. The Perry twins or The Holiday Wargames Center might come close, but me? A solo wargamer with limited resources? Extremely doubtful. On the other hand, while the appearance of this Shiloh battlefield may be found lacking in the eyes of many miniature wargamers, I think that on this second attempt, a much better job was done adhering to scale, and though it may seem contradictory, appearance.
A studied comparison of available maps (the scenario lay out in the WARGAMES Illustrated article; the schematic on page 34 of the Osprey Book, SHILOH 1862: The Death of Innocence, by James Arnold, and Map 3: Pittsburgh Landing and Vicinity, in the Daniel text) resulted in the selection of the Daniel map. As opposed to the other maps, this diagram was presented with an east-west orientation. In this respect, the Daniel map gave more breadth or width than depth to the field. Furthermore, each and every clearing or field was named. Additionally, there were other orchards indicated; not just the peach orchard made famous during the battle. When Water Oaks Pond, Shake-a-Rag Church and the Indian Mounds are taken into consideration, the Daniel map was judged (subjectively, this goes without saying) a better resource.
Yet another "selling point" of the Daniel map was the scale in miles bar on the lower left of the diagram. To be sure, the other two maps provided scale references, but Daniel's treatment seems - to me - more studied. Taking the ground scale from the larger 200 scale used in the Fire AND Fury rules, it was simply a matter of cutting, pasting, enlarging and drawing a grid overlay on the reproduced page. In this manner, my field of Shiloh would measure approximately 88.5 inches across and 73.75 inches deep. The defining terrain features of this replicated field were, clockwise from the southwest corner: Wood's Field and Fraley Field; Owl Creek; Pittsburgh Landing and in the southeast corner, Lick Creek - running just south of McCuller Field and its orchard. The field was then divided into grids by string at the half mile mark on each directional axis. While primitive and not very aesthetic, this grid did much to assist in placement of terrain features as well as assist my own orientation and familiarity with the battleground. Roads - such as they were - were indicated by half-inch masking tape. Fields and water courses were cut from sheets of appropriately colored felt. For the creeks and branches of the Tennessee River or of Owl Creek, blue yam was used and care was taken to try and match the meandering course of each. As a finishing touch, labels were printed and taped to cardboard stands in order to identify each feature. (Please see Map I)
Due to the nature of the terrain and its replication for the wargame refight, the accompanying map (based on the one found in the Daniel text) looks like a reject flash card from a Rorschach test. Even without the identifying labels, the diagram is already very "busy." At one point, I considered leaving the map out of this report altogether. For those readers interested in reviewing the original diagram, I strongly recommend taking a look at the Daniel text. It is excellent. Anyhow.
Overall, and again I stipulate to the subjective nature of this assessment, the effect is not bad. The field of Shiloh had been reconstructed. For sake of a "clean" game and to keep cost in time and material low, the wooded scrub, sloughs and thickets were assumed. That is to reference the notes on terrain in the scenario article: "The areas on the map enclosed by dotted lines represent clearings. All other terrain areas are wooded and will effect combat, movement and line-of-sight." (22)
Having satisfied the terrain aspect of Featherstone's dictum, I next tackled the issue of "accurate troop representation."
REPRESENTATION
In the process of reviewing the already built armies and cross-referencing the orders of battle provided in the various sources, a couple of discrepancies were noted. For example, the Daniel text has Sherman's 5th Division at 8,508 effectives. Dividing by the 200 scale used in Fire Am Fury'', one arrives at a figure of 43. This should be the number of troop stands', used to represent the brigades of Sherman's command. However, only 41 stands are accounted for in the scenario order of battle. This number includes artillery and Sherman's command stand. Where are the "missing" 400 men? It could be that they were in hospital as many troops on both sides of the battle were suffering from 4 type of stomach flu. But then, where are the cavalry battalions in the scenario troop list? The order of battle in the Daniel text shows that most commands had cavalry attachments.
In addition to identifying the cavalry arm of the Union and Confederate divisions, Daniel goes into such detail that he provides the names of commanders for the artillery sections and batteries. (319-321)
If, again, the goal is to refight the historical battle as realistically as possible, then does it not benefit the wargame enthusiast to represent - as accurately as possible - the troops that were involved in the contest?
The answer is of course, "yes." But the follow up and more significant question is: "How to best model that representation?"
In their brief preface to the rule addenda, the authors of the WARGAMES Illustrated article write: "The following scenario is provided for refighting the first day of the battle of Shiloh. The scenario will take approximately 8-10 hours and can accommodate up to 9 players. (22)
The game move sequence of the Fire AND Fury rules is structured in such a way as to allow the miniature battle to move along at a fairly good pace. One could suggest that the rolling for maneuver of each brigade at the start of a turn slows things down a little, but the time expended in this process is balanced by the realism it provides with respect to taking control out of the hands of the player. As I reviewed the order of battle in the scenario pages and considered the implications for the solo enthusiast, it occurred to me that the basic reason for the length of the scenario was the number of stands involved. Even without the divisions of Lew Wallace and Nelson, the Union players have some 230 stands to maneuver and manage each game turn. By the 0900 game turn, the Confederates have roughly 185 stands to control. The total number of stands - exclusive of status markers and the like - comes to just over 400.
One of the most attractive features of solo wargaming is that the solo wargamer can take as much time as he wants/needs to fight the tabletop battle to a conclusion. However, with 400 stands to roll dice for and maneuver or manage, it seems like the envelope of reason and common sense is being sorely tested. How then, to make the reconstruction of the first day of Shiloh more palatable to the solo wargamer but still maintain the realism of actual troop representation?
A "working" answer lay in the pages of Appendix A - the order of battle - of the Daniel text. Instead of force representation at the brigade level, representation at the regimental level allows for more historical "adherence." More significantly, such representation reduces the number of stands involved in the wargame refight. Let us take for example, the Union 4th Division under Brigadier General Hurlbut. One finds, by the WARGAMES Illustrated order of battle, the division has one (1) leader stand, 33 infantry stands and two (2) artillery stands. A grand total of 36 stands. If one adopts the regimental approach, the order of battle in the Daniel text provides: 12 regiments of infantry, three (3) batteries of artillery, two (2) battalions of cavalry and four (4) higher-echelon leaders. With this method of representation, Hurlbut's division (infantry, artillery, leaders and cavalry - curiously not present in the other order of battle) has 21 stands. With this method of representation, the number of stands required is cut by nearly 50%. If the example is extended to the whole of the Union force, one discovers a "savings" of over 100 stands. A similar accounting is noted when the Confederate order of battle is "changed" from a brigade-level representation to one of a regimental-level representation.
In terms of the number of stands, the shift to a regimental-level concern results in something of a simplification of the planned refight. Fewer, albeit more historically accurate, pieces means less time taken with each game turn. In terms of accurate representation of scale however, that age-old bug bear would not go away.
If one posits that an infantry regiment will be represented by a single stand or tray measuring 2.5 inches by 1.0 inches, then one is looking at a piece of ground 150 yards long by 60 yards deep. How would a 400 man regiment, newly raised from Louisiana - for sake of coloring the example - occupy this area? If the men are formed in a two-rank line, and each man is allowed some four feet of frontage, then the regiment would take up roughly (200 men x 4 feet per man = 800 feet / 3 feet to the yard ... ) 266 yards. So right away, the ground scale is "off" with respect to "fitting" the troops. To be certain, the problems with scale are reinforced if one looks at the depth of a two-rank line of riflemen and a stand that provides for 60 yards of terrain. In certain respects, the issue of ground scale corresponding to troop scale is like the problem of replicating the terrain on the field of Shiloh: it is just not going to happen.
A working solution was based on the concept of zone of control, described in the Napoleon's Battles° rules (pages 11-12 of the Introduction to Miniature Gaming booklet), as well as upon what felt "right." For the sake of uniformity and of ease of production, completely new infantry, cavalry, artillery and leader stands were crafted.
Under this regimental "system," infantry stands measured 2.5 inches by just over 1.0 inch. Cavalry battalions were organized along the same lines. Artillery sections/batteries were represented with stands measuring 1.5 inches wide/long, with the same depth as infantry and cavalry units. Command stands were square; measuring just over 1.0 inch on each side.
Having simplified the representation of troops while maintaining a large degree of historical accuracy (again, excepting the issue of scale), it now remained to build upon that simplification with respect to rule mechanisms and procedures.
Shiloh Solo Part 1
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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