The brigade is the tactical unit in Fire and Fury. Maneuver is conducted at a brigade level. Formation changes are made at a brigade level. Combat and combat resolution is conducted at that same level. Even the issue of ammunition supply is addressed on the brigade level. As mentioned a couple of times in this article, I think driving concerns behind the restaging of this historical battle was the idea of simplification. C
an the Fire and Fury brigade-level rules be adapted so that actions may be wargamed at the regimental-level? Perhaps I should rephrase that, given the theme of the present project. Can the Fire mm Fury rules be simplified, so that a solo wargamer can refight a large historical action? My tentative answer is "yes." I qualify this response as the following revisions are very much a draft effort; they have yet to be tested.
One of the key concepts in the Fire and Fury' rules is the level of effectiveness of a brigade or brigades. This level is measured (visually) by the number of stands on the wargame table. As the number of stands in the brigade decreases, the level of effectiveness of the brigade decreases. Of course, if the number of stands representing a body of troops is reduced to one as opposed to more than several stands, this measure of effectiveness cannot be made. How then, to track the fluctuation in a unit's level of effectiveness? How does one track status if the visual marker (number of stands) is taken away in the name of simplicity?
While some readers may view the use of unit rosters as "complicating" instead of simplifying the "flow" of a wargame, I believe the use of rosters in this instance is balanced by the realism of the troop representation as well as by the "bare bones" approach to movement and combat resolution. But again, I apologize, as again I get a little ahead of myself.
Initially, it was considered that one could take the brigade-level effectiveness and adapt this numeric value to each regiment within the brigade. For example, in the WARGAMES Ulustrated scenario, Raith's 3rd Brigade of the Union 1st Division has an effectiveness rating of 10/8/5. Referencing the Daniel text, one finds the 3rd Brigade to consist of four Illinois regiments. (319) So, one could assign effectiveness levels of 10/8/5 to all four regiments and use the Fire and Fury' rules as they are written. A roster would still be required with this approach, however. Additionally, one might also want to use some sort of marker to denote "Worn" and "Spent" statuses for the respective units. So, while there is an attraction to not having to tinker or tweak the rules, it seems that if this approach is taken, things are complicated by the use of a roster and unit status markers.
After re-reading sections of the Daniel text wherein combats across the various fields decorating the terrain of Shiloh are described, it was decided to assign or establish regimental effectiveness in terms of a percentage value. That is to remark, no matter what the historical regimental strength of a particular unit (be it 200 men, 340 men or 862 men), each combat unit/stand was given a percentage value of 100. To use the troops in Raith's Brigade again, each of the four Illinois regiments would have an effectiveness level of 100% under the proposed rules revision.
The shift from multiple stands for a brigade to percentage value or points for a single regiment directly impacts the procedures and processes of combat resolution. And again, in an effort to simplify these same procedures and processes, some changes were made.
First, all firing and close combat modifiers were eliminated. In brief overview, fire combat and close combat (if it did occur) was changed to a simple matter of each side rolling a 1d(10). The result of the roll was the percentage points lost by either side in the exchange. For example, a Union regiment faces a regiment of Rebel infantry. They are at a scale range of 180 yards (3 inches). Instead of the Union player rolling the die to see how many casualties are caused to the Rebels, the Rebels roll a die for their own unit. (It's a minor variation, and I'm sure unoriginal, but I think it adds a little something to the mix of solo wargaming.) To continue: The Rebels roll an 8 on their die, and the Union regiment rolls a 4. If both regiments began the exchange at 100% effectiveness, they would now be at 92% and 96% "strength"/effectiveness, respectively. In contrast to the morale system in Fire and Fury where the effect of the firing automatically determines the morale state of the target unit, this adaptation utilizes morale rolls based on the remaining percentage points of engaged units. In the above example then, the Rebels would have to roll less than 92% on percentile dice in order to pass the morale check. Rolls of 92% or more would produce negative effects.
The more points over the deciding number, the worse the result. As units become heavily engaged and suffer greater loss, it becomes correspondingly more difficult to roll against the deciding number. If, for example, the previously described Union regiment was at 70% when it was engaged in combat and took 9 "points" in losses, it would then have to roll below 61% in order to pass the required morale check.
With respect to close combats, morale checks must be passed before contact is made. This test must be completed by the attacking unit first, and then if it does pass, the defending unit must roll to see if they stand to receive the "charge." In terms of the process involved in resolving an actual close combat, it is very similar to that used in fire combat. Both sides will throw a 1d(10), with the result of the die toss being the casualties that their unit takes. Here however, the Charge Table from the Fire and Fury rules is used (page 42), with the loss differential determining the morale result.
For example, The 17th Illinois attacks the 5th Louisiana regiment. In the ensuing melee, the Yanks take 5% casualties and the Rebels lose 8 percentage points. The defender "lost" the contest by 3 percentage points, so they are considered "Hard Pressed" per the Charge Table.
Readers of this article may voice the opinion that I am not really simplifying matters by having two sets of morale rules: one for casualties taken from artillery and small arms, and another for casualties taken during periods of melee. To be certain, on most every point of these rules modifications I struggled with the desire for simplicity and the seemingly contradictory principles of playability and realism. I should like to point out, and will do so again in the conclusion of this half of a twopart submission, that the revisions to the Fire Arm Fury rules are very much a work in progress. This much is evident when one considers my tinkering with the movement and maneuver rules, as well as the leader /command rules.
The problem of representation was "solved" with a shift from Brigade to Regiment as the tactical unit. It would seem to follow that each unit - each regiment - would roll for its movement on the Maneuver Table. (Page 23 of the Fire AID Fury' rules) But then, this complicates matters, at least in respect to time involved, if instead of just three rolls for the three brigades of the 1st Division, one is having to roll 12 times for the 12 regiments, in addition to rolls required for any mounted element and whatever artillery might be attached. So, for purposes of this solo project, the Brigade was kept as the unit of maneuver.
On page 13 of the Fire and Fury' rules, one finds: "The only brigade commanders that may become casualties are the exceptional brigade commanders." This can be understood in the sense that because they were exceptional leaders, they most often would take a position in front of the brigade and so, be subjected to enemy fire. However, the rule seems prejudiced against the majority of leaders who were not exceptional. In the Daniel text, one finds that nine officers out of 24 total (Brigade and Division-level) were wounded, mortally wounded or captured during the battle of Shiloh. That impresses me as a pretty significant percentage.
Therefore, under the regimental "system," any leader can be wounded, killed or captured during the course of battle. This includes regimental officers as well as those of the Brigade and higher-level command. The leader does not have to be attached to a unit that is engaged in order to become a casualty, they can be completely separate from any command, and targeted by enemy units. (The Daniel narrative reports on the near death experience for both Sherman and Grant during the battle.) And, instead of the command losing the leadership bonus of their commander, the units within a certain radius of his "being unhorsed" would have to roll against their effectiveness level to determine what reaction they would have to his wounding, death or capture.
The command radius or "influence" of leaders seems a little disproportionate given the scale of the rules. Phrased another way, it struck me as odd that an officer could have any kind of influence over a unit some 1000 yards away. (Page 21, Fire and Fury rules.) For the type of terrain around Shiloh, this kind of command "reach" seemed especially unrealistic. In the adaptation to a regimental "system" then, the following command "ranges" were developed: Regimental Officers/Leaders - considered integral to their regiment; Brigade Officers/Leaders - may attach/detach per the Fire and Fury rules, but have a radius of command of just four (4) inches; Division, Corps and Army Officers/Leaders - these may also attach and detach per the original rules, but will have a radius of command extending just 10 inches.
Given the representation of combat units under this rules revision, status markers play an important role. The markers, in addition to the unit roster, give a visual indication of just what is "going on" with the unit at that time. For example, with respect to Brigade Leaders, if one is wounded by enemy fire, the stand is marked with a red status marker. If he is killed outright by the fire, then the status marker is black. Infantry, cavalry and artillery units are subject to this "marking" as well. A white status marker, to continue the example, indicates that the unit is "low on ammunition." Markers of other colors are used to indicate such statuses or conditions as: "Disorder," "Prone" and "Limbered."
Having looked - however briefly - at the impact the shift from Brigade to Regiment concern has upon the Fire Am Fury rules, I would now like to turn my attention to the scenario specific rules supplied in the WARGAMES Illustrated article. My intention here is two-fold. First, I wish to comment on the historical accuracy of these specific rules and second, I want to introduce some military possibilities.
Shiloh Solo Part 1
Back to MWAN # 122 Table of Contents
Back to MWAN List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com