by Chris J. Hahn
Terrain Pfeifer, Lyle and Hasenauer relate that all areas except "clear" (fields, mainly) are to be considered as rough ground, and modifiers to fire and charge combat applied accordingly. It would be inconsistent to eliminate all modifiers under the rules adaptation and then, re-insert them due to the nature of the field at Shiloh. Therefore, no +1 to defender facing a charge modifier or -1 to fire combat resolution modifier applies. The penalty to movement will remain in force, however. Similarly, the rules covering movement across streams and creeks remain as written. Ponds are another subject. I don't believe I will allow any unit to traverse any pond; especially artillery. There is no indication of swamp on the south bank of Owl Creek in the Daniel text, but the map seems to correspond with that provided in the article and the Opsrey book. A band of ground four (4) inches in width, measured from the south bank of Owl Creek will be regarded as swamp and so, is not passable for any kind of troops. Units that may be forced into the swamp by rout movement are considered eliminated and removed from the playing surface. With respect to units occupying "the sunken road," rolls against morale are modified by 10%. That is to allow, if a unit has an effectiveness level of 73 percentage points and must test morale, the unit will test as if having a level of 83. Order of Battle The following order of battle is transcribed in its entirety from the Daniel text, Appendix A, pages 319-321. The Army of the Ohio is not included in the transcription, as this solo project concerns just the First Day of Shiloh. As detailed in the section on unit representation, each regiment, battalion, battery listed is at 100% "strength." Starting Positions The WARGAMES Illustrated article presents unit deployments as of 0800 on 6 April 1862. The Daniel narrative, in contrast, details Union movement around 0530 in the vicinity of Fraley Field. (143-147) A review of the map covering this action shows only the brigades of Wood and Shaver involved on the Confederate side, with Gladden and Chalmers coming along by the Eastern Corinth Road at 0 00 and 0 30, respectively. For the Union command, Peabody and Miller bear the brunt of this initial advance. Exercising a little solo wargamer's license, I elected to start my refight at 0630 hours. The Confederates would move first on each game move turn. Furthermore, the Confederate plan of attack would not have three corps following one another onto the field and developing a major butternut & gray traffic jam as a result. Interested in finding out what would have happened had Johnston and his cocommanders developed a better plan, the corps of the Army of the Mississippi would form the points of a trident, with the Reserve Corps forming the handle. Phrased more succinctly: Polk's Corp would advance along the Pittsburgh-Corinth Road; Bragg's Corps would advance past the Shake-A-Rag Church (south, near Locust Grove Run), using the Hamburg-Savannah Road; and Hardee's Corps would form the left point of the trident, coming in by way of the Hamburg-Purdy Road. To make things more interesting, Bragg's and Hardee's Corps would roll for arrival time. The result of a 1d(6) would indicate marching on at 0630 up until 0900. As for the Reserve Corps, a 1d(6) would be rolled at the Confederate 0 00 turn. If the result is a 1, then the Corps marches on the field at that hour. If any other result, then the arrival is delayed by that many half-hour game turns. For example, a roll of 4 results in the Reserve Corps not arriving until 0930 hours. With respect to the Union deployment, I elected to keep with the historical encampments. However, instead of keeping with the late arrival of Wallace's 3rd Division, here I elected to have this command roll for arrival starting at the 1330 Union game turn. As suggested above, this command could march on the field between 1330 and 1600 hours. The arrival point for these troops would be the apex of the Hamburg-Savannah and Pittsburgh-Corinth Roads. Game Length For purposes of this reconstruction, the wargame begins with the Confederate 0630 game turn and ends with the Union 1 00 game turn. There are then, 24 turns in this planned refight. Confederate Surprise Attack Daniel provides the following account of the first action in Chapter Six: The Opening Attack:
Originally, I was under the impression that the Confederates were able to sneak up on sleeping and unsuspecting Union troops, and attack them in their camps. The Daniel narrative gives an entirely different version of events. The Union forces were not surprised. Indeed, under Powell's and Peabody's "direction," it was Billy Yank who initiated the fight at Shiloh. To be sure, a large number of troops in the Union encampments were busy preparing for Sunday inspection: the last thing they expected was a major engagement. However, as the alarm of enemy contact and presence was spread, the troops reacted smartly. Citing Daniel again, one finds:
While adding an element of "fun" (for the Confederate player only), the Surprise Attack Table provided in the scenario article is not historically accurate. Union regiments were able to "turn out" of their camps, form line of battle and face the advancing Rebels. It was only after being overwhelmed by numbers and attacked on the flanks, that regiments and brigades collapsed and began to run for the Landing. So, for purposes of this refight, "surprise" is not an issue. Looting In contrast to the Surprise Attack Table, this added rule is historically accurate. The minor changes I would make are: 1. To not remove an encampment once it has been looted by Confederate forces, and 2. If a unit passes a morale check upon advancing into or near (2 inches) a Union encampment, then it may continue to move normally. The Johnston "Effect" Johnston, Beauregard, Sherman, Grant and others were at Shiloh and so, are represented on the wargame table by command stands. If leadership modifiers are allowed for these notables, then the effort to simplify and streamline procedures is compromised. At the same time, one cannot truly disregard the positive effect Johnston and others could have on troops of the line. As of this typing (January 18, 2003), I am still undecided about the issue. I ask the reader to please recall that these revisions - both at the general and scenariospecific level - are still very much a work in progress. Gunboats Unlike the previous item, I am not undecided about the issue of Gunboats. The Lexington and Tyler will not be playing any role in this solo refight. Victory Conditions In the scenario article, the Confederates have something of a daunting task in front of them with respect to accumulating victory points. They must either "inflict 20 casualty points on the Union army and obtain a 3:2 margin in victory points," or occupy the area of Pittsburgh Landing with one non-spent infantry unit and score more victory points than the Union." (25)
I am not entirely sure what the difference is between a casualty point and victory point. This much aside, the shift from brigade concern to regimental detail necessitates a revision to the casualty / victory point table. In terms of occupation of the Landing, I think that a Confederate force of at least three (3) regiments would be required to hold and/or consolidate the position. "FINAL THOUGHTS"Due to a number of factors: the post-lethargy of the Holiday season; repainting the apartment; waffling over rules and revisions of same in the pursuit of simplicity; an unusually frustrating number of drafts and perhaps, ultimately, poor time management, I find myself unable to refight the First Day of Shiloh and have the report prepared in time for the March/April issue of MWAN. I also find myself rather dissatisfied with the quality of the first half of what is now, a two-part effort. It seems that in the attempt to answer the questions raised by a review of the literature available on this battle and its wargame reconstruction, I have raised more questions than answered. Perhaps Shiloh is really too large an endeavor for a solo wargamer? Can there be a "true balance" between simple game mechanics, realism and historical accuracy? Why is the combination of ground scale, weapon range and troop scale so frustratingly problematic? Featherstone sets a wargaming gold standard with his "rules" for refighting historical battles. The Daniel text provides more than enough material to "flesh out" the unintentional gaps in the WARGAMES Illustrated scenario. Utilizing these sources and others, I have attempted to present an introduction - for lack of a better word - to my experiences in planning to refight the First Day of the Battle of Shiloh. The terrain of the field has been replicated as closely as possible, given the available resources. The troops that fought on the field have also been modeled as closely as possible. The "departure" from the Featherstone dictum, in terms of the "military possibilities, has been noted. In only remains to see what happens when this possibility is played out on the wargames table. Part 2 of this report will consist of a narrative of the solo wargame, followed by an evaluation of the rules revision. SOURCES"BATTLE OF SHILOH: A Fire and Fury Scenario," by Ray Pfeifer, Greg Lyle and Rich Hasenauer, in WARGAMES Illustrated 45, June 1991, pages 21-25.
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