Taking Stock
It is with some regret that I must inform the reader that, due to a number of factors - both personal and professional - the reconstruction and refight of the First Day of the Battle of Shiloh was terminated with the conclusion of the Union 9:00 a.m. game turn. Pressed for a more detailed explanation, this presently frustrated Shiloh solo wargamer would offer the admission that the attempt to simplify representation, rules and processes quite literally backfired. Indeed, I was reminded of that axiom regarding battle plans, which reads (paraphrasing): "A battle plan looks very good on paper, but the moment the actual fighting starts, one can pretty much wave bye-bye to the battle plan." In this particular case, the plan to refight Shiloh went "out the window" shortly after the Confederates began their advance on the 6:30 a.m. turn.
Before turning to an analysis of why my goal of simplicity was not met and why the plan failed, I would like to take a few lines and compare the losses of each side up to the hour the wargame was called. I would then like to postulate what might have happened had I been more judicious in my time management as well as more realistic with regard to expectations and use of resources.
Looking first at the Union Army, one finds that Sherman's command (5th Division) bore the brunt of losses during the morning's fighting. Two regiments, the 40th Illinois and 48th Ohio were routed from the field. Three other regiments, though they stayed on the field, were reduced to 50% effectiveness. Of all the units comprising this force, only one regiment, one battery and one battalion of cavalry escaped harm. Interestingly enough, given the numerous reports of officer casualties in the Daniel text, not a single Union commander in the 5th Division was killed, wounded or captured. There were, however, a few times when McDowell and Buckland were exposed to the enemy - their regiments having broken and run for the presumed safety of camp or friendly lines. Brigadier General Sherman himself was subject to this "discomfort." But again, neither brigade nor divisional officer was lost.
The command of Prentiss was the next most heavily engaged. While no units were routed from the field, a few suffered 40% losses. The majority of those in the line suffered approximately 30% killed or wounded. In contrast to Sherman's command, the 6th Division suffered the loss/capture of a battery of artillery. This was the 1st Minnesota. Its crew and horses were shot down by men of Gladden's brigade and then the guns taken once the Alabama regiments advanced into Sarah Bell Field. Here too, there was not a single line officer lost.
Lastly, there is the 1st Brigade of McClernand's command. Colonel Hare's men advanced to take on units of Hardee's Corps and were given a bloody nose as a result. The 8th Illinois routed after losing a quarter of its men. The 11th Iowa would lose nearly 60% of its complement as well as run out of ammunition. The remaining two regiments would each be reduced to 70% effectiveness. And again, as described above, there were no casualties among the officer ranks in Hare's command.
Turning to a consideration of the Rebels, the counter-part to Sherman's command would have to be the I Corps under Major General Leonidas Polk. Each division making up this small corps lost a regiment to rout. Both brigades of Clark's command were well-engaged and suffered proportionate losses. Only the 1st Brigade of Cheatham's division saw action: Stephen's command having been prevented/delayed due to the formation used during the advance; the terrain they were moving through and, by the intervention of elements of Hardee's Corps. As was the case with the Union forces, here in Polk's force there was not a single officer casualty. Indeed, among the officers wearing gray, brown or butternut, there was not a single one who was wounded, killed or taken prisoner.
As described in the brief narrative, Gladden's units were the only of Bragg's Corps to see combat. The poor luck of the Louisiana contingent seem to continue here, as the 1st Regiment routed after taking 28% losses against the Union position in Sarah Bell Field and the Peach Orchard. The four Alabama regiments would take casualties of 31, 40, 28 and 10 per cent respectively.
Finally, there is Hardee's Corps to review. The brigades involved on this flank were those of Hindman and Cleburne. In Hindman's case, the 3rd Confederate suffered the most hits; losing 38% of its effectiveness in less than 2 hours of fighting. Casualties among Cleburne's troops were more evenly spread, though a couple of regiments did lose almost 30% of their men. Trigg's Battery was perhaps the most seriously engaged; the crew routed away after taking successive volleys from Union infantry that got too close as well as enduring solid shot and shell from batteries of the 1st and 5th Divisions.
A snapshot of "my" field of Shiloh at the hour of 9:00 a.m. showed the following: Sherman's command was under a lot of pressure and near collapse; McClemand had moved only one brigade into harms way; Prentiss was engaged on opposite ends of his lines and was threatened by probable advance across his line of retreat. Hurlbut had started to move his units toward the sound of the guns, but as with McClemand's effort, this was piecemeal. (Please see previous map. As with the map presented in Part 1 of this article, due to space constraints, all names and identifiers have been left off the schematic. The Confederate Corps and directions of attack are shown by broad arrows. A = Hardee, B = Polk and C = Bragg. The Reserve Corps is not shown on the map, but would come on at the south-west corner or edge of the battlefield. For the Union troops, positions are marked by "rough" lines. A numeral on the map corresponds to the Union Division. For example, 5 would represent the approximate area of Sherman's command.) The question is then, what would have happened if the wargame continued to a more natural end?
It might be argued that though the advantage seemed to be with the Confederate commanders, this was simply an illusion. Polk's Corps had been roughly handled and with just one brigade that was fresh, it is questionable how effective these troops would have proved. True, these men faced Sherman's disjointed and battered forces, but in two hours fighting, the Yankees had only given up the ground around Shiloh Church. Hardee's Corps was still in a veritable traffic jam on its entry road. If Sherman had lost command and control, McClemand was next in line. The Confederates would have to contend with the distraction offered by well-stocked enemy encampments as well as the difficulty of the terrain. To be certain, the roads were better than moving across fields and ravines. However, the roads had an awful tendency to limit the number of regiments one could put into line in the face of the enemy.
Things were going better for the Rebels on the right of the line. Gladden's men had proved themselves right away and were continuing to do so, in and around Sarah Bell Field. The rest of the division had finally marched up and was deploying in preparation of an advance on Cloud Field. Here it seemed, they would face Hurlbut's regiments. If, however, the division followed the direction of Gladden's attack, Prentiss may have been routed or captured, but the right flank would have been open to Union troops of the 4th and possibly 2nd Division. To be certain, a couple of brigades may have held out for a period of time against this expected Yankee counter-punch. But again, I would think that the numbers would eventually begin to tell and the Confederates would have been forced to yield some hard-won ground. The Division under Ruggles has to remain an unknown variable here, for its "performance" with respect to maneuver rolls was abysmal.
The other unknown variable is the Reserve Corps of Breckinridge. Per the revised scenario rules, this force was scheduled to arrive on the field at 10:00 a.m. Given that most of the fighting would be taking place by then in a line between Jones Field and Cloud Field, it may be remarked that units of the Reserve would not have made it into combat before the hour of Noon, if at that. The impact of this force would probably be countered by the Union 2nd Division - if not already in the fighting. And if not by the 2nd, then by the 3rd under Wallace, which was "due" to arrive in the early afternoon.
To be sure, the Union forces would have been under no little pressure. However, they would have had three basic advantages: defense in depth, interior lines and being closer to a base of supply. Based on this limited reasoning, I think the Union would have prevailed, just as they did historically. I also think that it would have been a very costly wargame refight, the same as history.
Shiloh Solo Part 2
Shiloh Solo Part 1
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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