Hall's directive must be understood in a strategic rather than a tactical context. In late spring 1944, Washington planners reconsidered the idea of bypassing the Philippines in favor of an attack against Formosa. The Combined Chiefs conference in London in early June endorsed the Formosa plan, and a JCS notification to MacArthur on 12 June stated that in order to expedite the Pacific Campaign, "presently selected objectives" (read Philippines) would be bypassed in favor of an invasion of Formosa. MacArthur attempted to rebut the JCS note in an 18 June message, but by this time General George C. Marshall also was leaning toward the Formosa plan.

Nevertheless, MacArthur had his plan to retake the Philippines ready by 10 July, and this was the strategy he tried "to sell" to President Franklin D. Roosevelt when they met in Hawaii from 26 to 29 July.

In this light, it seems logical that MacArthur was pressuring his subordinates to conclude the Aitape campaign rapidly in order to demonstrate the efficacy of his strategic concepts and thereby win presidential endorsement for his Philippine plan. Strategic decision making directly influenced the tactical conduct of the Aitape fighting and, in large measure, accounts for the enormous pressure from above that General Gill described. Tactics, however, did not exert a reciprocal influence on strategy, because Gill could not finish the campaign in forty-eight hours. Nor did the Hawaii meeting clarify U.S. Pacific strategy to the degree MacArthur desired. [64]

The immediate impact on the 112th was that Gill rejected General Cunningham's plea for an additional rifle battalion. Higher headquarters' apparently cavalier disapproval infuriated Cunningham, who compensated by shortening his line, bending his south flank back from the Driniumor along the Afua-Palauru trail, and stationing Troop A on the high ground guarding the western extremity of his new position. [65]

He was convinced that a numerically superior enemy force was outflanking the regiment from the south. He also had unsettling reports of Japanese troops to his west and northwest, where a Japanese roadblock prevented overland resupply at River X, and was uncertain about his routes of withdrawal, should the necessity arise. For all Cunningham knew, the 112th Cavalry might already be surrounded. The men could only dig deeper, improve their defensive positions, and distribute ammunition dropped by plane.

Their fate had become intertwined with that of the Japanese soldiers in Miyake Force, who spent 17 July slowly maneuvering into their assembly areas north and northwest of Afua for the attack on the 112th Cavalry.