One plan called for Poland to abandon the western third of its country. Germany, counting the puppet state of Slovakia, had a border with Poland stretching for well over 1,000 miles, enveloping western Poland on three sides.

The Polish Army simply wasn't big enough to defend the entire border in strength. Instead, by holding Warsaw and the east banks of the Narew, Vistula, and San Rivers in central Poland, the army could be concentrated for a strong defense, without being outflanked from East Prussia or Slovakia. This plan was rejected, for several reasons:

Mobilization

For this plan to work, the Polish Army would have to be mobilized and in position when the Germans attacked. Otherwise, the Germans would overrun many units in western Poland as they tried to form up. Mobilization would take about two weeks. The Poles expected, however, that Germany would launch a surprise attack, with little or no advance warning. Furthermore, France and Britain strongly opposed the idea that Poland fully mobilize before Germany started hostilities. They feared that Polish mobilization would give Germany a pretext to invade. Britain and France bitterly remembered that World War I had been caused in part because "mobilization meant war."

Once one country started mobilizing, its neighbors also had to mobilize, or risk getting caught at a disadvantage. Inflexible mobilization plans virtually precluded any last minute attempts to avert conflict. Any changes or even pauses would disrupt the timetables-risking early defeat. In 1914, the crisis between Austria-Hungary and Serbia quickly pulled in, one by one, Russia, Germany, France, and Britain. Once the soldiers started to march, war became inevitable even before the first shot was fired. Even though conditions in 1939 were different from those of 1914, Britain and France wanted to avoid the possiblity that mobilization alone could spark a war; they thus opposed any mobilization while diplomacy might still keep peace.

The Poles thus faced a dilemma. There was the chance that if they mobilized early, France and Britain would abandon them, claiming they had provoked the German invasion. (As late as 30 August 1939, when Poland announced general mobilization, France succeeded in pressuring Poland to revoke the mobilization order. On 31 August, Poland again ordered mobilization, this time ignoring British and French opposition.) On the other hand, there was every likelihood that if they mobilized too late, a German surprise attack would overrun Polish units trying to form up. (This calamity in fact happened to Yugoslavia in 1941-the German surprise attack smashed many units before they could form up.)

Importance of Western Poland

Western Poland was a very important region of the country, containing key industries and resources. Its loss would seriously hamper the Polish war effort in event of a long war. Further, Polish national pride demanded that as much of the country be defended as possible.

Creeping Annexation

Almost as much as an outright invasion, the Poles feared the Germans might try to annex their country in stages-much as happened to Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939. If the Polish Army withdrew from the western third of Poland, the Germans might be tempted to grab the undefended provinces and then halt, without armed conflict. If the Poles did not respond to this, then the Germans would gain another bloodless conquest and would later attack a weaker Poland. If the Poles attacked to regain their territory, their allies might claim that Poland started hostilities and thus renege on their alliance commitments.

This issue of the magazine features a Defense in Depth scenario for First to Fight. The Actual Polish Plan

The other plan called for a forward defense of Poland. Armies stationed along the borders would absorb the impact of a German surprise attack. While the border was too long to defend in strength everywhere, the vital Breslau-Warsaw axis would be well defended, and the other important border areas would be screened. Once the war started, forces in the interior would mobilize and counterattack the Germans, as the frontier forces slowly fell back. The Poles would not be able to defeat the Germans by themselves, but they hoped this plan would defend Poland until the French offensive turned the tide.

The plan was quite reasonable-for World War I infantry operations. The slow advance of a German offensive would give the Poles the time they needed for the French to come to their aid. Unfortunately for the Poles, World War I conditions no longer prevailed. With armored warfare, battles developed at a rate of 20 miles per hour, not 2.5 miles per hour. In the actual event, the German panzers smashed through the Polish frontier armies in a matter of days, surrounding them and reaching the outskirts of Warsaw. At the end of two weeks, it was clear that the Polish Army was decisively beaten, and the French never launched their offensive.

So, was the rejected plan better? Possibly, but its mobilization requirement was a potentially fatal flaw. Also, German mechanized forces meant a rapid sweep across an undefended western Poland, thus beginning the "Battle of the Vistula" almost at once. In fact, a similar river line strategy failed spectactularly in 1940. French forces held the line of the Meuse River behind the Ardennes, while strong Allied forces marched into northern Belgium to meet the Germans. German mechanized forces drove through the lightly-defended Ardennes, reaching the Meuse much sooner than the French expected. Their subsequent crossing of the Meuse and drive to the English channel resulted in the defeat of France.

OOBs

First to Fight contains two orders of battle (OBs) for Poland. The first, the one for the Polish campaign, covers the Polish OB for play of First to Fight, at three days per turn.

The second OB covers Poland in 1939-40 using standard Europa turns. Of course, everything past Sep II 39 is hypothetical, since the Germans had overrun the country by then. The OB projects the development of the Polish armed forces, based on historical plans and projections, had Poland not succumbed. This includes a greater utilization of Polish military manpower and steady expansion of the war industries.

The 1939-40 OB doesn't include a mobilization schedule for Poland. Poland was already mobilizing by Sep I 39. Further, Sep 139 is the starting point for Europa, which begins with Germany and Poland in a state of war. A separate Polish mobilization schedule, which can also be used in hypothetical, pre-September 1939 scenarios, appears as a part of this issue's Defense in Depth scenario.

Inside Europa First to Fight Designer's Notes Part III: Poland [Europa 25]

Introduction and Strategic Situation
Defense in Depth Plan vs. Actual Polish Plan
Orders of Battle: Army
Orders of Battle: Air Force
Orders of Battle: Navy
Table 1: 1939 Polish Tanks and Armored Cars
Table 2: Polish Aircraft

Inside Europa First to Fight Designer's Notes Part II, Section B Germany [Europa 24]

German Army Divisions and Panzer Troops
Mountain Troops and Infantry
Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineer/Construction Troops
Security Troops
The Replacement Army
Luftwaffe
Kriegsmarine
Brandenburgers
SS and SA
Table 1: 1939 German Tanks
Table 2: 1939 German Divisions: Authorized Organizations
Table 3: German Divisions: Authorized Strengths
Table 4: German Aircraft

Inside Europa First to Fight Designer's Notes Part II, Section A Germany [Europa 23]

Introduction
Army Re-armament and Manpower
Strategic Situation
Germany-Allies Strength Comparison
German High Command and the Government
Volksdeutsch Resettlement 1939-1942
The Wehrkreis System
Frontier Defenses and Border Regt Commands