By John Astell
As the political and economic turmoil died down in post-war Germany, the Germans began to subvert the treaty. In the 1920's, Germany and the Soviet Union maintained secret military ties, which allowed the Germans to experiment with tanks and aircraft inside the Soviet Union. Submarine designers went to work in neighboring countries, to maintain their design skills. The German government encouraged aviation, heavily subsidizing the German civil airline industry and promoting gliding clubs. The Army sought to augment its strength and protect the eastern frontiers through veterans' organizations and border militia that could be mobilized in emergencies. Finally, the Army kept track of the capabilities of German industry. When the time came to rearm, the Army could plan its requirements without revealing the scope of its plans to less-discrete industrialists, and it could start receiving war materiel within a year despite the lack of an armaments industry. When the Nazis came to power in 1933, they greatly stepped up Germany's remilitarization. The initial stages were kept secret. In 1935, however, Hitler renounced the Versailles Treaty, revealed the existence of the Luftwaffe, introduced conscription, and began a series of bluffs and brinksmanship that would eventually plunge Europe into war. The German Army continually expanded from 1935, as the table below illustrates.
Notes
1939 By 1939, the German Army had expanded from 100,000 men in ten divisions to a field army of 103 divisions with an authorized strength of about 2,760,000 men. (Of these nearly 3-million men, 2,210,000 were allocated to field units, 220,000 to fortress and border units, and 430,000 to construction troops.) In addition, a 990,000 man replacement army would be formed in the rear upon mobilization, training recruits and supplying new units and replacements to the field army. This gave the overall Army an authorized strength of 3,750,000 men. (Independently, the "special purposes" field troops of the SS numbered a bit over 20,000 men. Officially and administratively, the SS was a Nazi Party organization, independent of Army and even Wehrmacht control. SS troops did come under Army command when engaged in combat operations.) While the above is an impressive record of rearmament and expansion, the raw numbers hide important problems the Germans faced. The Army often lagged behind its authorized levels, sometimes unable to form divisions as quickly as its plans required. Typically, new units lacked equipment and included recruits with inadequate training. This was especially true for the reserve and Landwehr divisions, which were virtually worthless in 1936 and '37. Older units were often disrupted, frequently having to split off cadres for new formations. These problems were most severe in the mid 1930's; by 1939, the problems still existed but had greatly a bated. Authorized manpower levels reflected the full-strength mobilization requirements of the Army. The actual manpower of the army often was lower. Training conscripts, new officers, and new NCO's that the Army needed as it expanded strained its resources, and the problems of providing sufficient training for the reserves was never satisfactorily solved before the outbreak of the war. Manpower was classified as follows:
Class I Reservists All men discharged from the Army following their 2-year period of conscription; 500,000 men total in 1939. They formed the pool of the most-capable reservists, having undergone recent military service. Since, however, conscription was reintroduced in 1935 (drafting men born in 1914), the first Class I reservists didn't appear until 1937. By 1939, these reservists still constituted only a small part of available manpower. Class II Reservists The "white groups" born 1901-1913; 600,000 men total in 1939. Since they came of military age when the Versailles Treaty was in force, they were "white" - never drafted or otherwise allowed to receive military training. They were needed to bring the Army up to strength on mobilization, but they required special training to make them fit for military service. The Germans lacked the resources to give them this training before the outbreak of the war. (This led to some generals complaining about "training deficiencies" in various units in 1939, and the Germans used the Sitzkrieg in the winter of 1939/40 to further train these units.) Landwehr Men aged 35-45. Most of these had received military training in World War I or earlier. Even though this training was for antiquated combat methods and had mostly been forgotten by the men in the years since 1918, the Germans judged this to be better than nothing. The Landwehr formed the basis of 21 Landwehr divisions, later converted to regular infantry divisions, that gave good service in the war. In addition, the Landwehr would make up any manpower shortages in various Army units, due to the Army's insufficient numbers of active soldiers and Class I and II reservists. Landsturm Men aged 45 and over. They had had military training before World War I and formed regional defense (Landesschutzen) units. Inside Europa First to Fight Designer's Notes Part II, Section A Germany
Army Re-armament and Manpower Strategic Situation Germany-Allies Strength Comparison German High Command and the Government Volksdeutsch Resettlement 1939-1942 The Wehrkreis System Frontier Defenses and Border Regt Commands Back to Europa Number 23 Table of Contents Back to Europa List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1992 by GR/D This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com |