Battle of Champaubert

Part II
Introduction

The Six Days Campaign
of the 1814 Campaign in France

by Jean Lochet and Jean-Philippe Sanjet

Part I: Opening Situation

In EE&L #7 we presented the chain of events leading to Napoleon's decision to attack the Allies' overextended flank.

On February 6, 1814, reconnaissance reports revealed that Field Marshal G. L. von Blucher's Army of Silesia was not heading for Nogent-sur-Seine but toward ChateauThierry, Meaux, and Paris along the Marne River.

In fact, in light of these new reports, it became evident that Blucher was engaged in a very risky lateral march in which his four corps were spaced out from each other by at least a day's march. Napoleon's fertile mind was quick to see the opportunity.

Marshal E. J. J. A. Macdonald's weak force was no match to stop Blucher's army. Paris was in imminent danger and Napoleon had no choice but to abandon his preparations to move against Field Marshal Prince K. P. von Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia.

The news of Schwarzenberg's withdrawal to Bar-sur-Aude allowed Napoleon to begin switching troops northward immediately. In just a few days, Napoleon was able to concentrate 70,000 men in a central position. He was ready to strike.

However, as of February 6, Napoleon had yet to find the exact whereabouts of the Army of Silesia. He believed that Meaux was Blucher's next objective. As shown on the map, there were three roads to Meaux by which Blucher could advance:

    (1) The highway from Chalons through Epernay and Chateau-Thierry was the most northernmost and most unlikely;

    (2) The most direct route was the road from Chalons through Vertus, Champaubert and Montmirail; and

    (3) The road from Chalons to Sommesous and Sezanne.

On February 7, Napoleon had issued orders for Marshal C. P. Victor, with Marshal Nicolas-Charles Oudinot on a second line, to hold the line of the Seine River, and especially Nogent-sur-Seine in case of an eventual attack by Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia.

Then he ordered Marshal August Frederic-Louis Viesse de Marmont with his 8,000 men to move to Sezanne to clarify the situation there. The Imperial Guard and Marshal Emmanuel Grouchy's cavalry were to follow Marmont to Sezanne, to be in a position to attack the Army of Silesia since Napoleon felt that Blucher could not be far from Sezanne. The Emperor had under his personal direct control some 30,000 men.

Time was critical, but Napoleon did not want to rush anything and make any mistakes. He had calculated that Blucher and the corps under General Yorck and General Sacken had between them some 45,000 troops. The Emperor thought that Macdonald could hold the attention of at least some 5,000 of these, leaving him to deal with 40,000 Allied soldiers which he expected to attack and defeat in detail.

To be successful, Napoleon wanted to be absolutely certain that Blucher had irremediably compromised his command by spreading it out in several parts. He expected news from Macdonald, who was in contact with Yorck's corps, to clarify the murky situation.

Events after February 7

On February 8, Marshal Macdonald reported to the Imperial Headquarters that Yorck was near Epernay with some 18,000 men and that there were no signs of a larger concentration of troops there. So, if 18,000 men of Blucher's total of 45,000 available troops were on the northern road, the rest must be using the southern routes to Paris!

Any further doubts were ended at 9:00 a.m. on the 9th when Marmont reported from Champaubert that General Sacken and at least 15,000 troops were at Montmirail some fifteen miles to the west.

It was evident that while Yorck was chasing Macdonald up the Marne River from Epernay, the rest of Blucher's army was taking the shortest route to Paris through Montmirail and La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Apparently, Sacken's corps was the van of the Army of Silesia followed by LieutenantGeneral Olssufiev's corps about a day's march behind. Blucher was further in the rear at Vertus, waiting for the corps of General Kleist and General Kapzevitch.

The Army of Silesia was clearly scattered in four main groups too far from each other for mutual support. This was the golden opportunity that Napoleon had been looking for.

The Emperor was quick to react. He wrote to Joseph: "I am going to Sezanne with whatever is necessary to beat whomever shows up on the line of communications between La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and Sezanne." He instructed Macdonald "not to retreat so precipitately." Then the Emperor left Nogent escorted by the service squadrons and slept in Sezanne.

It had been raining steadily for five days, transforming the roads from Nogent to Sezanne (and also the ones by which Blucher was traveling from Vertus to Montmirail) into quagmires. The poor condition of the roads was going to be a formidable obstacle for the French. The road from Sezanne to Champaubert was considered impassable by large formations at that time of the year.

In the meantime, as ordered, Marshal Michel Ney had crossed the Seine River at Nogent the previous evening with his two Young Guard divisions, General Friant's Old Guard Division, and General Nansouty's three cavalry divisions, heading for Sezanne.

The road from Villauxe to Sezanne had already been used by Marmont's troops. Consequently, it was a foot deep in mud. Some of the "grumblers" and voltigeurs left their shoes behind at every step. The dragoons and horse grenadiers and all the cavalry traveled on foot, pulling their mounts out of the mire by their muzzles. As for the artillery, Dulauloy, Griois and Leroy had to get the help of the horses in Barbonne and of the enthusiastic local population to pull their guns and caissons through the mud.

On that evening, the horse and foot Guard finally reached Sezanne where it camped in soaked, miserable bivouacs. Some of the Guard artillery was still bogged down in the SaintGond marches.

Also that evening, Napoleon found another dispatch from Marmont reporting that Napoleon was a day too late since Sacken had left Champaubert at 8:30 that morning.

However, Napoleon did not care about Sacken, at least not yet! As later events were to show, unfortunately for Napoleon, neither Marmont, Ney, Macdonald, nor Victor understood the Emperor's strategy.

More Champaubert Part II

More Six Days Campaign of 1814

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