Battle of Montmirail

Part III
Introduction

The Six Days Campaign
of the 1814 Campaign in France

by Jean Lochet, Jean-Philippe Sanjet and George Nafziger

Part I: Opening Situation
Part II: Battle of Champaubert

Note from Editor: George Nafziger researched the Prussian side of the Battle of Montmirail as well as the orders of battle presented on page 43. Where George's data merges with our text it is duly credited. As this series continues for the next two issues, George will author the Prussian versions of the battles of Chateau-Thierry and Vauchamps. Rather than try to reconcile the French, Russian, and Prussian versions of these battles into one single narrative, we plan to present each side's reports in order to give the readers a much better understanding of the campaign.

The Battle of Montmirail-Marchais

Montmirail is a wonderful small French city on the border of the Brie and Champagne regions, offthe beaten path. Although "progress" shows, its influence has been minimal on this somewhat sleepy little town which has kept the charm of the past. The friendly owner of a small bistro, where we had an excellent ham sandwich [1] on still warm French bread, was only too happy to chat with us about the Napoleonic battlefields. After another stop in an equally quaint pastry shop, we felt in good condition to explore the Montmirail battlefield.

Coming from Montmirail, on the N33 (i.e., National Road #33), one cannot miss Napoleon's initial command post marked by a huge column. By the way, this highway follows the same route as that of the Napoleonic period road. It is the most direct road to Paris from Chalons via Champaubert, Montmirail, La Ferte- sous-Jouarre, and Meaux.

The Events After the Battle of Champaubert

Late on February 10, after learning about General Olssufiev's crushing defeat at Champaubert, Field Marshal G. L. von Blucher moved back toward Vertus to await the arrival of Allied reinforcements under General Kleist and General Kaptsevitch. He then sent orders to General Yorck, whose Prussian I Corps had pushed Marshal Macdonald's small French command back as far as Trilport, to turn back eastward and unite with General Sacken's Russian corps as soon as possible.

Unfortunately, Yorck received his orders late and could only move a part of his command toward Montmirail after crossing the Marne River at Chateau-Thierry. Sacken also received orders to halt his advance toward Paris and counter-march to make his junction with Yorck. Yorck had suggested to Sacken that he move toward Chateau-Thierry in order for the two Allied columns to meet halfway. According to Russian accounts, Sacken refused to believe that Napoleon was at Montmirail in person. He decided to ignore Yorck's suggestion and strictly follow his orders, i.e., move directly toward Montmirail.

His victory at Champaubert had placed Napoleon in a perfect central position in the midst of Blucher's widely separated Army of Silesia. Blucher would have to move to support his vulnerable subordinates. Napoleon's priority was clear: he had to defeat Sacken quickly, before Blucher could arrive with reinforcements. In addition, the Emperor concluded that Montmirail, where the highway from Chalons to Meaux crosses the roads to Sezanne and Chateau-Thierry, would be the rallying point for the Army of Silesia.

He made the decision to attack the Prussian and Russian forces lying to the west with the concentrated Grand Armee [2] and dispatched Marshal Marmont with part of his VI Corps (4,000 men) to Vertus to watch Blucher. [3]

That night Napoleon wrote from the little house in Champaubert that still stands opposite his monument: "I shall march tomorrow to Montmirail to attack Sacken." General Nansouty left Champaubert that evening with General Colbert's 1st Guard Cavalry Division and reached Montmirail around midnight despite the muddy roads. There they surprised General Karpov's cossacks in their sleep and threw them out of town. One of General Ricard's brigades from Marmont's VI Corps had followed the cavalry and joined them during the night. Ricard's other brigade of infantry arrived the next morning. Marshal Mortier left at dawn on February 11 with the Old Guard.

Orders were sent to Marshal Oudinot to send two divisions north from Provins to cooperate with Marshal Mortier on the Emperor's southem flank, ready to march to the sound of guns. Macdonald was ordered to halt his retreat toward Meaux and resume the offensive, his objective being the recapture of Chateau-Thierry to deny the Allies the use of its bridge over the Marne. [4]

Marshal Ney's Young Guard watched over the Emperor that night and left Champaubert at 6 a.m. the next morning, an hour after Napoleon. They were escorted by Laferriere's 3rd Guard Cavalry Division.

The Montmirail Battlefield by George Nafziger

The battlefield is bordered on the south by a valley in which the Petit-Morin flows, running westward from Montmirail to La Celle. A tributary of the Petit-Morin flows northwards, across the battlefield, in front of Marchais to La Motte. This stream formed the basis of the French line. A second tributary of the Petit-Morin flows northward further to the west behind Les Meulliers. Although the Prussians would deploy forces forward of it, their principal lines were behind this stream. The land is rolling with a number of large woods scattered across the battlefield. One significant wood (Courmont) covered what would be the French left flank, where it was anchored on the valley of the PetitMorin. Marchais stood on the northern edge of this wood. The main road from Montmirail ran roughly east-west, passing to the north of Marchais and running to Les Yeux-Blois Hautepin.

French Accounts of the Battle of Montmirail

At 10 a.m. on February 11, at the Chateau of Montmirail, Napoleon ate his breakfast in fifteen minutes, then headed for the Marchais plateau and stopped at la Dogerie farm (see map #2) on the road to La Ferte- sous-Jouarre.

General Nansouty., whose tired cavalry squadrons were resting at the Montcoupot farm (see map #3), told the Emperor that his outposts had reported the approach of Sacken's corps on the Chateau-Thierry road. General Vassiltchkov's hussars and Karpov's cossacks were between Viels-Maisons and La HauteEpine, and Yorck's cavalry had reached Viffort (off map).

From these reports Napoleon concluded that both the Russian corps under Sacken and Yorck's Prussian I Corps were converging on Montmirail. He decided to attack Sacken first and dispose of him before the arrival of Yorck.

Sacken was near Trilport when he received a dispatch from Blucher ordering him to move back to Montmirail and join with Yorck. After learning of Olssufiev's defeat at Champaubert, Yorck suggested to Sacken that the Russians should cross the Marne and unite with his command on the other side of that river. But Sacken refused and decided to follow Blucher's orders. Consequently he turned his command around, and, as ordered, headed for Montmirail. He disregarded his cossacks' reports that Napoleon was at Montmirail in person with the Imperial Guard.

His troops were tired by the long fourteen-hour march. The Russian general was anxious to reach Montmirail where he expected to find Blucher. By 10 a.m., Sacken's vanguard had reached Viels-Maisons, six miles west of Montmirail. It was now clear to Sacken that with his vanguard in contact with the French, they had beaten him to Montmirail .

Sacken's Command and Initial Deployment by George Nafziger

Sacken commanded a substantial force, two infantry and one cavalry corps which, according to some sources, was a total of 15,700 men and 90 guns. The Russians had a good chance to link up with Yorck's command as they were relatively close to the Prussian I Corps.

General Sacken's force included the XI Corps under Generalmajor von Lieven III, consisting of the 10th and 27th Divisions, plus a brigade from the 16th Division. The VI Corps was commanded by Generallieutenant Tallisin II and consisted of the 7th and 18th Divisions.

The Cavalry Corps, under Generallieutenant Vassiltchkov, consisted of the 2nd Hussar Division (Generalmajor Lanskoi) and the 3rd Dragoon Division (Generalmajor Pantschichscheff). His reserve artillery, under Generalmajor Nikitin, had three 12-pdr batteries and four 6-pdr batteries. [5]

The daily returns for these Russian corps indicate that Sacken had about 14,000 effectives and 80 guns. The Prussian I Corps totaled about 5,000 men.

When Sacken arrived on the battlefield he deployed his forces to attack the French. He deployed the 7th and 18th Infantry Divisions on both sides of 1'Epine-aux-Bois. The 10th Infantry Division was posted on their left. The 27th Infantry Division and Vassiltchkov's cavalry occupied the ground north of the Chalons-Meaux highway.

The Russian infantry and cavalry was formed in two lines. [6] The Russian XI Corps under Lieven remained in reserve, on the main road behind l'Epine-aux-Bois. Sacken also deployed a grand battery of thirty-six guns behind the ravine, which ran from Haute-Epine through l'Epineaux-Bois and Vendieres toward the Petit-Morin. These guns were to support the attack on Marchais.

To the right of the main road, in the center of the Russian line, and on the right of the main road stood a 12-pdr battery. To the left of this battery, on a brushy knoll in the direction of Plenoy, stood a second battery. [7] Apparently the Prussian reserve cavalry under General von Jurgass was far to the rear, in the direction of Tourneux. It did not participate in the battle.

Footnotes

[1] Both of us were eager to have a light meal for a change after the unbelievable treats we had consumed Christmas Eve and Christmas. Our trip took place on December 27.
[2] If he had moved east, Blucher could have retreated to Chalons while Sacken and Yorck could have escaped by crossing the Marne river at Chateau-Thierry.
[3] Marmont moved with only one of his divisions (La Grange's 3rd Division) and the Grande Armee line cavalry corps under Grouchy. His orders were issued by Napoleon even before the guns of Champaubert were silent: Move to Etoges and observe the roads from Chalons and Vertus.
[4] Macdonald did not follow his orders and did not take Chateau-Thierry and its strategic bridge over the Marne. If he had done so, the Russian and Prussian retreat on the next day would have been very difficult.
[5] Bogdanoich, M.I.
[6]. Sporschill, Vol. II, pp. 395 6.
[7] Von Damitz, Vol. II, p. 121.

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