During our last visit to France, in December 1992, we had the opportunity to visit some of the 1814 battlefields. [1] Our choice fell on Vauchamps, Champaubert, Chateau-Thierry and Montmirail because three of these battlefields are still relatively untouched by "progress" and look much the way they did in 1814. In addition, they have the advantage of being within a few miles of each other. Furthermore, the four battles that took place there between February 9 and February 14 were the result of Napoleon's most brilliant maneuvers of the 1814 Campaign known as the "Four Victories." We took several rolls of film. So we have enough pictures in our future articles to illustrate the most important parts of the main battlefields. We plan to present one battlefield per issue, starting with Champaubert in the next issue. Champaubert is in Champagne province just at the limit of the Brie region, where the famous cheese is made. In that part of France the December weather is almost invariably gray and foggy. So we had to wait for a relatively clear day. The pictures we have taken reflect the mood and the kind of weather the combatants of both sides had to deal with. Even when freezing, the air is always very humid, often covering the roads with a dangerous thin coat of slippery ice known as verglas, resulting in foggy and dreary weather at best. In addition, because of the foggy conditions, visibility is often very poor. The rich soil is always wet and solid only when frozen. When it's not freezing, the dreadful mud invariably sticks to your shoes making walking a very tiring experience. One has to periodically stop to remove the accumulating mud from the shoes. In addition, since the water table is very close to the surface, rain water has a tendency to accumulate in the smallest depression making the fields almost impassable. Some of the roads of the period were not much better. The famous "marais de St. Gond" (i.e., the "St. Gond Marsh") south of Champaubert is the worst example and illustrates well that natural trend. One can imagine the difficulty attempting to move artillery in these soaked fields and roads, which at that time of the year were considered impassable to a numerous force. Before the Battle of Champaubert it had been raining steadily for five days, transforming the roads from Nogent up to Sezanne (which wound through the Traconne forest and the Barbonne swamps) into a quagmire. The road on which Blucher's Prussians were traveling from Vertus to Montmirail was not in much better shape. Mud was going to play an important role in the 1814 Campaign and we cover the matter in a separate article beginning on page 12 of this issue. Generalities on the Campaign of 1814 The fact is that, almost invariably, wargamers and many historians favor the Campaign of 1813 and Battle of Leipzig over any other campaign. The Campaign of 1814 has been, to our a great surprise, almost completely ignored. Granted, Napoleon's second Grande Armee had been practically destroyed and Napoleon kicked out of Germany by his defeat at Leipzig. However, the Emperor was not decisively defeated until 1814 when he failed to repulse the Allied invasion that led to the capture of Paris. After the huge losses of the Campaign of 1813 increased by the typhus epidemic, and with some of his best troops trapped in the fortresses of Germany, Napoleon had once more to rebuild his army. All he had left were some 80,000 men; exhausted, diseaseridden survivors to defend the 300-mile length of the eastern frontier. [2] France had almost been bled to death by the successive drafts and the French arsenals depleted by the massive efforts of 1813. In spite of a remarkable tour de force in raising new units (with a draft some 175,000 men during the Campaign of 1814), the French army under Napoleon's direct command, in directly facing the Allies' eastern invasion, never exceeded 120,000. That was not much to face some 250,000 Allied troops constantly and steadily reinforced during the course of the campaign. The 1814 Campaign in France showed Napoleon, in spite of some major mistakes, at his best and can be classified as one of his finest. As a matter of fact, with raw recruits and feeble effectives, Napoleon was almost always out-numbered (except at Champaubert), and at least twice, came very close repulsing the Allies. With all this mind, the 1814 Campaign in France, should make for a most interesting wargame campaign or historical study. The Campaign of 1814 can be divided into three phases. The first phase takes place between January 25 and February and is marked, in spite of some small local French successes, by the constant menacing progress of the Allies towards Paris. Everywhere the French corps are in retreat. Napoleon repulsed Blucher at Brienne (January 29) but was defeated at La Rothiere (February 1) where he faced Blucher who had 53,000 men supported by another 63,000 available in the vicinity. Napoleon had only 40,000 men, many of them raw conscripts. He lost 4,000 men to the Allies 8,000 and had to retreat even further to Troyes. During the retreat his army was further decreased by massive desertion. At that point, Napoleon with his understrength army did know how to stop the Allies ... unless they made a mistake. The second phase, known as "The Six Days Campaign of 1814" in which so many victories took place and is covered in the next four issues, extends from February 9 to February 26. During that short period the Emperor took full advantage of the series of strategic mistakes the Allies committed. As mentioned above, he almost succeeded in repulsing the Allies' invasion of France and saving his throne. The third phase starts on February 27 with the Battle of Bar-sur-Aube and ends on March 30 with the Battle of Paris. During that last period, the daily events once more turned against the Emperor. This last phase of the 1814 Campaign ends with Napoleon's first abdication at Fontainebleau. Particularities about the Campaign of 1814 Let us cover the effectives involved in the Campaign of 1814. The labels Brigade, Division or Corps are among the most misleading terms that can be used to quantify the effectives facing each other. Some formations numbering a few thousand are pompously called "Corps." [3] That practice is not limited to the French army but also the Allies and especially to the Russian army. For instance at Champaubert, we find Olsufiev's Corps' with a strength of only 5,166 infantry and 24 guns. How can we explain that? The Russian army had the habit of replacing battle casualties by not reinforcing regiments in the field but rather raising new units and sending these new complete armies or lesser formations to the front line. So, after a battle, if losses had been heavy, the Russians would simply incorporate the 2nd battalion into the 1st battalion. Olsufiev's Corps had been heavily involved at La Rothiere, consequently all of that Corps' regiments were afterwards only one battalion strong. A similar practice was used by the French who in addition fed understrength units into the front line often brigaded together under the name of Brigades, Divisions or even Corps. Although some French infantry formations numbering one or two thousand men were often called Divisions, the most misleading formations were the cavalry in which a few disparate understrength squadrons were brigaded together and called a Brigade or Division. Hence the description of a charge of a cavalry "brigade" may have involved only two or three squadrons. A very confusing state of affairs indeed! The beginning of the Campaign of 1814 from the French side The Campaign in France proper started with the French victories at Saint Dizier (January 27) and Brienne (January 29). However, on February 4, the news of the defeat at La Rothiere and the subsequent retreat of the Imperial army to Troyes threw France into a panic that lasted a week [4] All kinds of rumors circulated. Everyone expected the Allies to enter Paris at any time. On February 11, it was not the Allies' armies that reached Paris, but the news of the Emperor's victory at Champaubert. Joseph Napoleon received the courier from the Imperial Headquarters at 10 a.m. as he reviewed the 6,000 grenadiers and chasseurs of the Guard of Paris in the Tuileries. The militias' vivas and acclamations were continued by the crowd present watching the review on the Place du Carousel. [5] The victory bulletin of Champaubert was followed by those of Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry, Vauchamps, Nangis, Montereau and Troyes. Every day a new victory came to revive the enthusiasm of the preceding victory. The 1814 Campaign in France shows Napoleon, in spite of some major mistakes, at his best. On February 14, the first column of 5,000 Prussian and Russian prisoners entered Paris and were paraded on the boulevards. Every day, for over a week, new columns of prisoners were paraded through the city. On February 27, the enemy flags captured at Champaubert, Montmirail and Vauchamps 6 were presented to the Empress. The entire Paris garrison was present at the parade that took place on the Place du Carousel. So, at that time, France was confident that Napoleon would repulse the invasion. The beginning of the Campaign of 1814 from the Allied side The beginning of the Campaign in France was a "promenade militaire" for the Allies. After crossing over the Rhine River in several places from December 21, 1813 to January 1, 1814, the 250,000 men of the Allied armies pushed back the small French Corps spaced along the frontier without much difficulty. [6] On February 1, the Allies defeated Napoleon at La Rothiere and in addition to the 4,000 French dead or wounded that littered the battlefield, they captured some 2,000 prisoners and 50 guns. Napoleon retreated to Troyes. For the Allies it was a battle won over Napoleon on French soil! Napoleon's charm of invincibility that had been broken at Leipzig would not be reborn. After La Rothiere, the Prussians and the Russians were overconfident. The Austrians, especially the careful Schwarzenberg, were somewhat less exuberant. Czar Alexander congratulated Blucher by saying: "That victory crowns all the others" and Sacken finished his report with these words: "From that day on, Napoleon ceases to be a dangerous enemy. Their morale boosted by that relatively easy victory over an understrength Napoleon, [7] the Allies thought that they would reach Paris without difficulty. The Czar told French General Reynier coming back from captivity after an exchange: "We'll be in Paris before you!" On February 2, during a war council held in the Chateau of Brienne, the Allies decided to march directly to Paris. It was decided they would move in two parallel columns. The Army of Silesia, reinforced in Chdlons by the Corps of Yorck, Kleist and Kapzewitsch, would move toward Paris along the valley of the Marne. The Army of Bohemia would move to Troyes and then toward Paris by the two banks of the Seine River. In spite of a plan by which the main armies were to be linked by Wittgenstein's Corps and Seslawin's Cossacks, the two commands operated independently. The forward movement of both columns were made without coordination, with too much enthusiasm and overconfidence by the Prussians, and much too slowly by the Austrians under Schwarzenberg. In all fairness, the prudent Schwarzenberg had reasons to be careful. From the very beginning of the operation, things began to go wrong for the Allies. On February 3, General Wrede was outmaneuvered by Marmont near Arcis-sur-Aube. An attempt to cut off the Troyes-Arcis highway by the Russian cavalry was foiled by Grouchy. General Yorck found that the defenders of Vitry were well entrenched and far from cowed. In addition, a probing attack by Platov's Cossacks against Gener Allix's garrison holding the line of Yonne River at Sens ended in a sharp rebuff for the Allies. The rebuff of the Cossacks at Sens made Schwarzenberg very cautious. A reconnaissance in force by Mortier from Troyes (February 6) on the Austrian left, seemed to suggest other dangers to the southern flank. He began to edge Wittgenstein's Corps and accompanying Cossacks to the South to improve his own security. However, in moving Wittgenstein's Corps with the Cossac] to his southern flank, Schwarzenberg eliminated any linkage between Blucher and his command. Apparently, Blucher ignored or was not informed of this development which meant that a widening gap was developing between the two Allied armies. Always eager to move "Vorwarts, " Blucher had started move his large command immediately. On February 3, he was at Braux, the 4th at Sampuis, the 6th at Goudron, pushing the Corps of Sacken toward Chateau-Thierry, followed by two days of march by the Corps of Kleist and Kapzewitsch. In this process, Blucher's army became excessively strung out. That was dangerous. In fact, the Allies were committing a cardinal error, especially when facing an adversary like Napoleon, by giving him the opportunity to regain the initiative and to attack them on their flank while on the move. During that time, Schwarzenberg, constantly stalling, moved very slowly toward Troyes. Instead of vigorously pursuing the French army, he hesitated, sent orders and counter-orders and countermarched, to such an extent that he allowed Napoleon time to rest his men, concentrate new reinforcements, and reorganize his army. The Emperor evacuated Troyes only on February 6. To be complete, after Mortier's aggressive moves on February 6, Schwarzenberg ordered his troops to withdraw at full speed toward Bar-sur-Aude. But for Napoleon that Austrian retreat was only a temporary relief. The events from the French side after February 2 Initially, after the defeat at La Rothiere, Napoleon's plans were to hold Blucher (whom he thought was heading for Nogent on the Seine River) while he was dealing with the Army of Bohemia. Consequently, on February 5, he ordered Marmont to occupy Nogent-sur-Seine and to prepare for defense. Two Divisions of veterans from Spain were due to reach that city in the near future and were to be formed into a new corps, the VIIth, under Marshal Oudinot. Napoleon estimated that by the 6th, some 21,000 infantry, 2,400 cavalry and 46 guns would be concentrated in Nogent. A force sufficient, he felt, to hold Blucher while with his 40,000 men he would fall on Schwarzenberg. Later that same day reconnaissance reports started to unfold a different picture. Blucher was not heading for Nogent-sur-Seine but toward Chateau-Thierry, Meaux and Paris along the Marne River. In fact, in the light of new reports, it became evident that Blucher was engaged in a very risky lateral march in which his four corps were spaced out from each other by a day's march. Napoleon's fertile mind was quick to see the opportunity. [8] Macdonald's weak force was no match to stop Blucher's army. Paris itself was in danger and Napoleon had no choice but to abandon his preparations against the Army of Bohemia. [9] In addition, the news of Schwarzenberg's withdrawal to Bar-sur-Aude allowed Napoleon to begin switching troops immediately. In a few days, the Emperor had been able to concentrate 70,000 men in a central position. He was ready to strike. However, as of February 6, Napoleon had yet to find the exact whereabouts of the Army of Silesia. He believed that Meaux had to be Blucher's next objective. There were three roads to Meaux by which Blucher could advance: (1) the highway from Chdlons through Epernay and Chateau-Thierry was the most northernmost and most unlikely; (2) the most direct road was the one from Chalons through Vertus, Champaubert and Montmirail; and (3) from Chalons to Sommesous and Sezanne. On February 7, Napoleon had already issued some orders. Marshal Victor, with Marshal Oudinot on a second line, was to hold the line of the Seine and especially Nogent-sur-Seine in case of an eventual attack by the Army of Bohemia. Then he ordered Marmont with his 8,000 men to move to Sezanne to clarify the situation there. The Guard and Grouchy's cavalry were to follow Marmont to Sezanne, to be in a position to attack the Army of Silesia for he felt that Blucher would not be far from Sezanne. The Emperor had under his personal direct control some 30,000 men. [10] Time was precious. He did not want to rush anything and make some false maneuvers. He had calculated that Blucher, Yorck and Sacken had between them some 45,000 troops. Macdonald should be able to tie down at least 5,000 of these. So Napoleon was left to deal with 40,000 Allied troops which he expected to meet and destroy in detail. To be successful, he wanted to be absolutely certain that Blucher had irremediably compromised his command by spreading it out in several parts. He expected news from Macdonald, who was in contact with Yorck's Corps, to clarify the murky situation. Next Issue: Part II, The Battle of Champaubert Footnotes [1] Our close relatives live near Meaux, about one and a half hours away from Montmirail, and our young great-nephew Jean-Philippe (a second year medical student and also a wargamer), who was in recess for Christmas, was enthusiastic about that visit. After some de rigeur, research at Vincennes and at the Archives Nationales we were ready strike. In his spare time Jean-Philip does some research for me (and other in the French archives. [2] These small Corps under Ney, Marmont, Macdonald and Victor had the following strengths: Marmont: 12,726 men; Macdonald 10,200 men; Ney: 7,240 men; Cavalry (1st, 2nd, and 5th Corps) 9,750. Total: 46,216 men. Ref. Situation de la Grand Armee au 1er Janvier 1814. Archivi Nationales. AF IVe, 1347, and Situations of 1814, Archives Guerres, Vincennes. [2] At Champaubert Lt. General Olsufiev commanded the 9th Russian Infantry Corps. Each regiment had only one battalion. 9th Infantry Division: Major-General Udom; included the Apcheronski Rgt (486), Nachebourski Rgt (563), Riajski Rgt (620), Iakoutski (533), 10th Jaeger (335), 38th Jaegef (472). 15th Infantry Division: MajorGeneral Kornilov; included Vitebski Rgt (372), Kozlovski (504), Kolyvanski (417), Kourinski (417), 12th Jaeger (447) and 22nd Jaeger, both from the 13th Infantry Division. Total 5,166 plus 24 guns. [4] Houssaye, 1814, p.35. [5] The Place du Carrousel is part of the Tuilleries gardens and next to the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel. [6] According to Houssaye 1814, p.41 "Ten officers presented the ten flags, one Austrian, five Russian and four Prussian." [7] At La Rothiere, the French were outnumbered about 3 to 1. [8] Napoleon's state of mind is well reflected by a quotation from Fain (Fain quoted by Houssaye in 1814, p. 87). During the night of February 7 to 8, the Duke of Bassano entered Napoleon's office to have him sign some dispatches for Chatillon. Bassano found Napoleon flat on his belly looking at his maps pricked with colored pins: "Ah, here you are. Now we are dealing with an entirely different matter. I am at this very moment in the process of defeating Blucher." [9] In a letter to his brother Joseph dated February 6, Napoleon said: "I am very annoyed by the moves, for I wanted to attack Bar-sur-Seine and defeat the Emperor Alexander (accompanying the Army of Bohemia), whom I believe to have made some false dispositions. But I sacrifice everything to the need to cover Paris." [10] The 30,000 men, called the "whatever necessary" in his dispatch to Joseph, consisted of Marmont's Corps, Doumerc's 1st Cavalry Corps, Bordessoule's, Pire's, and DeFrance's horse, and the foot and horse Guard totaling 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry with 120 guns. Mortier remained in Nogent with Michel's Old Guard Division in a state of alert. More Part I: Opening Situation Large Map (83K) Jumbo Map (very slow: 205K) More Six Days Campaign of 1814 Part I: Opening Situation Part II: Battle of Champaubert Part III: Battle of Montmirail Part IV: Battle of Chateau-Thierry Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 7 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com