Battle of Montmirail

Part III
French Accounts of Sacken's Movements

The Six Days Campaign
of the 1814 Campaign in France

by Jean Lochet, Jean-Philippe Sanjet and George Nafziger

We have seen above how Sacken deployed his command, and, on that point, the French accounts are in complete agreement.

In addition, Sacken further extended his left (toward the Prussians) by occupying the ground north of the road to Montmirail with his cavalry and another infantry Division.

Sacken persevered in his eastward course, apparently discounting the magnitude of the French opposition he was likely to encounter, making no effort to move north along the Chateau-Thierry road where he could expect to make his junction with Yorck. Instead, he did exactly the contrary. He dispatched his command south of that main road toward the village of Marchais where he ran into stiff opposition, and further south by the road following the swampy valley of the Petit-Morin to Montmirail via Pomesson (see photos # 1 and #2). General Prince Scherbatov was in charge of Sacken's right.

It is always easy to criticize a general after we know the results of his maneuver. However, war is the application of certain principles. Basic tactical or strategic errors when facing an adversary like Napoleon were usually very costly. Perhaps Sacken should have waited for Yorck to attack the French right. At the very least, he should have attacked on his left to keep the road open for Yorck to reinforce him. Instead, he attacked on his right through very bad ground toward Marchais and Pomesson (see map #2).

This critical error seems even more flagrant when one has the chance to visit the battlefield. A brief look at the map shows the very hilly poor ground and the absence of good roads from l'Epine-aux-Bois (the point of departure for the Russian right) and Marchais and beyond toward the swampy valley of the Petit-Morin and Pomesson. Here, we are speaking at best of dirt tracks across the fields.

Let us not forget that it had been raining steadily for five days and these tracks were impassible to artillery. Hence the Russian right beyond l'Epine-aux-Bois was denied artillery support during the battle.

At the beginning of the battle, because of the difficulties of movement over the muddy fields, Napoleon was at a considerable numerical disadvantage. His force was limited to one Old Guard division and two Guard cavalry divisions (about 5,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry), 1,800 conscripts commanded by General Ricard, and thirty-six guns (twenty-four from the Old Guard and twelve from Ricard's command). Reinforcements were on their way but the situation was precarious.

Napoleon was well aware of the gamble he was taking by moving between the scattered elements of Blucher's army. He had no choice but to face the 15,000 men of Sacken's corps with his 11,000. In addition, he knew that Yorck might appear at any time with more Allied troops on the road from Chateau-Thierry since the Prussian vanguard had been encountered by Nansouty's cavalry patrols at Viffort.

At first glance, a French defeat was very much a possibility, but Napoleon had only to delay Sacken's advance and gain time for his reinforcements to come up.

At 5 a.m. Napoleon left the Montmirail castle and after stopping at la Dogerie farm he moved forward on the road near le Tremblay. The time was 10 a.m. There he was informed by Nansouty that his cavalry vedettes had spotted Sacken and that Vassiltchkov's hussars and Karpov's cossacks were somewhere between VielsMaisons and La Haute-Epine. In addition, Yorck's cavalry had reached Viffort. It was obvious Sacken and Yorck were converging on Montmirail.

The Emperor's cavalry was deployed in the plain on his right, behind the cross road with its right resting on the small Bailly wood. He had sent Krasinski's lancers and chasseurs ahead with Nansouty, keeping with him as a reserve Guyot and Dautancourt with the horse grenadiers and dragoons.

Shots and shells began to fall on the staff and Ricard's first brigade was drawn up beside the Fontenelle road. Then, Napoleon sent the Old Guard chasseurs and grenadiers to the hamlet of Coulgis and Ricard's second brigade to le Tremblay. An anxious Napoleon could see the Russian cavalry and artillery already deployed on the plain north of la Meuliere.

Napoleon deployed his troops in the following order: Ricard's 8th Division (VI Corps) stood behind Marchais in regimental columns. Marshal Ney, with his two Young Guard divisions (1st Voltigeur Division under Meunier and the 2nd Voltigeur Division under Decouz), stood behind Ricard's 8th Division, right and left from le Tremblay. Nansouty's cavalry stood on the right between the road to Vieux-Maison and Chateau-Thierry. Two light infantry regiments [8] were deployed in the small woods to the right of Plenoy. Friant's lst Old Guard Division stood in battalion column on the road running from Montmirail to Vieux-Maison in reserve. On their right flank stood tne seven cavalry squadrons of Defrance's Gardes d'Honneur.

Sacken realized his numerical superiority and decided to attack immediately. L'Epine-au- Bois and the La Haute-Epine formed the center of his line. He protected it with three divisions and forty guns. On his left, all his cavalry was deployed in front of the French cavalry. He pushed his infantry forward as far as the les Greneaux farm near the crossroad to ChateauThierry (see map #3).

On the Russian right, Prince Scherbatov pushed as far as the Petit-Morin and secured at least part of Marchais with the detachment of MajorGeneral Heidenreich (Pskof, Vladimir, Tambov and Kostroma infantry regiments, two companies of the 11th Jaeger, the Don cossacks of Colonel Loukovkin and six light guns, a total of 2,360 men). Sacken considered Marchais as the key position since its possession by the French could prevent Scherbatov's movement along the river. Scherbatov was supposed to march parallel to the Petit-Morin and clear out everything in his way. Sacken expected to hold the French in the plain, while his right made its way to the Montmirail road, pivot on the center and push the French in the direction of Chateau-Thierry where Yorck's Prussians would complete the victory.

Napoleon had no choice but to initially fight a defensive battle. By watching the Russian movements, he understood Sacken's plan from the very beginning. The Emperor's opinion was that the decision would be determined in the center--that is, on the main road where he placed Friant and the Old Guard with about 4,000 men. On his left he deployed near and in Marchais the Young Guard Divisions of Decouz and Meunier, and in Pomesson the Division of Ricard which had its extreme right anchored on the PetitMorin. The French right was protected by the cavalry deployed in the plain between the road to Montmirail and the Bailly wood.

Heidenreich's infantry crossed the ravine near La Haute-Epine and captured Marchais around 11 a.m.. As he occupied Marchais, he extended his right flank south of the village up to a small wood. His artillery was unable to cross the ravine and could not participate in the fight around Marchais.

In the late morning the battle escalated. Sacken sent forward more and more troops in repeated attempts to blast his way through the French line. The Emperor launched only limited counterattacks toward Marchais, where furious combats took place between Ricard's conscripts and Sacken's infantry. The farm on the eastern part of the village changed hands several times (see photos).

By 2 p.m., Ricard's outnumbered conscripts, supported by a battalion of the Old Guard, were forced back from Marchais to le Tremblay. The French left was giving way. Napoleon gave the order to slowly withdraw. By doing so, he expected the Russian right to further extend itself.

In the plain, (west of the road to ChateauThierry) the French cavalry and the Guard infantry awaited the order to move forward.

Cavalry patrols now reported the approach of Yorck's infantry toward Fontenelle. Napoleon posted newly-arrived General Michel's Division (six battalions of the Old Guard) and part of Nansouty's cavalry on his right to watch for Yorck's arrival. Fortunately for the French, the Prussian general approached with great caution and only with a portion of his small corps.

Yorck sent his 8th Brigade under Prince Wilhelm and all his 12-pdr guns to Chateau- Thierry to prevent Macdonald from seizing its important bridge over the Marne and to secure a line of retreat. Then he resumed his advance toward Fontenelle, currently held by his vanguard, with his remaining two brigades under Pirch and Horn.

It is interesting to note that on the morning of the 11th, Chateau-Thierry was not occupied by the Prussians. If Macdonald had reacted quickly to Napoleon's orders, he may have very well been in a position to seize the bridge over the Marne Riverthere as he had been ordered. Instead, Macdonald did nothing. If Macdonald had seized the Chateau-Thierry bridge, Sacken and Yorck, with their retreat to Epernay cut off, would have been forced to surrender or to fight another battle under extremely unfavorable conditions on the 12th.

Napoleon now withdrew Ricard's Division and evacuated Pomesson in the Petit- Morin valley to lure the enemy further toward Montmirail. Sacken, aware that the French left was falling back, thought that his plan was successful. Consequently, he weakened his center between LaHaute-Epine and l'Epine-aux- Bois by sending additional troops to support Scherbatov on his right and reinforce his success there. He then further weakened his center by sending some infantry to reinforce his left in order to keep his communications open with Yorck. Napoleon had expected this and was now about ready to break through the weakened Russian center.

By 2 p.m., Marshal Mortier at last appeared on the field, at first with Defrance's Guards of Honor. Assured of a reserve, Napoleon sent Marshal Ney to the center with Meunier's and Decouz's Divisions which were deployed on Ricard's right. Nansouty stretched his cavalry on the right between the highway to Viels-Maisons and the road to Fontenelle, threatening to turn Sacken's left.

Still further on the French right, two infantry regiments occupied a wood near Plenoy. Friant, supported by seven squadrons of Guards of Honor moved four battalions of the Old Guard in closed columns, parallel to the road from Montmirail to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, opposite the farms of la Chaise and les Greneaux, to attack the Russians who were entrenched in les Greneaux and supported by numerous artillery. Lachouque says:

    "Thirty guns of the Old Guard artillery went into action. Carrying their muskets with priming pans open, [9] the grenadiers [10] marched off at the double by battalions, 100 paces apart, behind the Prince of the Moskova."

The French attacked the farm and overwhelmed the Russians. Infantry and gunners fled, leaving their cannon and soup kettles behind them.

Two battalions of Old Guard chasseurs, which previously had formed squares to repulse Russian cavalry charges remained in reserve.

The four battalions of the Old Guard captured one position after another and reached la Meuliere where, on their right, Ney deployed Meunier's and Decouz's Young Guard Divisions, ready to attack La Haute- Epine. Their flank was protected by the seven squadrons of Defrance's Guards of Honor. Nansouty stretched his cuirassiers on the right between the roads to La Haute-Epine and Fontenelle.

It was past 2 p.m. when the Emperor gave the signal to attack the Russian center which had been weakened by Sacken. With Friant's Old Guard battalions and the divisions of Meunier and Decouz, Marshal Ney struck with his usual impetuosity and the Russian center was broken. Forty Russian cannon were silenced.

Sacken, who a few minutes earlier had thought that victory was his, reacted quickly. He rallied and reformed some of his troops. Then, from l'Epine-aux-Bois, he counterattacked toward La Haute-Epine with Lieven's XI Corps, trying to close the hole in his center. The French Old Guard held firm and the Russians were repulsed.

Sacken started to push part of his command to the left. Napoleon saw that movement and immediately ordered all the cavalry he had at hand to charge. Dautancourt formed the dragoons of the Guard in column on the road [11] and took off at a brisk trot. The charge included the heavy cavalry of the Guard, [12] even the Emperor's service squadrons and those of Nansouty. They galloped up to the enemy lines and broke several squares. Guyot followed with the horse grenadiers and a company of Mameluks, chased the Russian fugitives on the right of the road as far back as the la Borde wood, about 500 meters beyond La Haute-Epine, while Dautancourt rallied his dragoons on the left of the road, opposite I'Epineaux-Bois. But Vassiltchkov's cavalry counterattacked Nansouty, repulsed the French, and reopened the line of communications with the Prussians.

With the Russian center practically broken and their right in retreat, the Emperor decided that now he could take care of Marchais. [13] Retaking Marchais would remove any remaining hope for Sacken to reach Montmirail as he had been ordered to do.

On the French left, everything appeared to be decided. Apparently, the only thing left to do was to roll up the enemy wing dangerously extended in the valley of the Petit-Morin. The contrary took place! Indifferent to the noise of the battle behind them, the Russians continued to push forward, changing Meunier's and Ricard's initially voluntary retreat into an involuntary rout.

Napoleon ordered them to counter-attack, but their young soldiers were exhausted. So he sent two battalions of chasseurs under Marshal Lefebvre to attack Marchais from north to south while the rest of Ricard's Division marched from le Tremblay and attacked from east to west along the crest road.

The Russians were thrown out of the village and recoiled in disorder back toward their own artillery and l'Epine-aux-Bois. Noting their disorder, Dautancourt, who had just reformed his Guard dragoons south of the road, charged, wreaking havoc among the unfortunate Russian infantry, taking many prisoners. Although the fighting continued until night fall, the battle now degenerated into a pursuit. Sacken's command was effectively broken and in full retreat.

In the meantime, Krasinski with some of the Guard cavalry, made a sweep around Marchais on the Russian right and advanced as far as Viels-Maisons by nightfall, taking more prisoners.

Half an hour later on the French extreme right, Yorck, finally responding to Sacken's repeated calls for help, committed twelve battalions [14]. It was far too little and far too late. Marshal Mortier's six Old Guard battalions attacked Yorck's force furiously, pushed it back to the village of Fontenelle and captured some Prussian artillery. General von Pirch was wounded leading his brigade. Yorck withdrew during the night to Chateau-Thierry. Nevertheless, Yorck's limited intervention probably saved Sacken's command from complete destruction.

More Montmirail Part III

Footnotes


[8] French sources indicate that these were the 2/2nd and 7/4th Legers.
[9] Note the attack of the six Old Guard battalions with the priming-pan open. This is one more instance of the Old Guard tradition to attack with the bayonet without firing a shot. A point that has been noted in many past issues of EE&L. (The quotation is from Lachouque The Anatomy of Glory, p.354).
[10] Lachouque should have added "chasseurs," as that attack was carried on with a mixture of grenadiers and chasseurs of the Old Guard.
[11] That is the road from Montmirail to La Fertesous-Jouarre.
[12] The Guard light cavalry under Krasinski was involved on the French left.
[13] The village of Marchais is located on a hilltop and dominates the junction of the roads from Montmirail to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre and Chateau-Thierry. In addition, a road from Marchais runs on a crest parallel to the road to Montmirail and constitutes an alternate route to Montmirail, which was Sacken's objective. Hence, it can be considered a key position which is why Napoleon had to expel the Russians from it.
[14] Yorck may not have been in a position to field more than sixteen battalions from Pirch's and Horn's brigades, i.e., about 7,000 men -- Houssaye, 1814, p. 70.

Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 9
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com