On the 9th, the Emperor arrived at Sezanne where, to his great disappointment, he found Marmont (at right). [1] At right: Marshal August-Frederic-Louis Viesse de Marmont thought that he was being unfairly criticized by Napoleon for failing to achieve what he believed were impossible results with a much weakened French army. Favoring a wound that refused to heal properly, demoralized by Allied superiority in numbers, and convinced of Napoleon's injustice, Marmont would defect with his corps on April 5. This was a spectacular act of betrayal that would contribute to Napoleon's realization that continued military action was useless. Marmont declared that it was impossible to advance on such roads but Napoleon angrily ordered the advance to go on at any price. He had expected Marmont to be in a much more advanced position and to be in control of the bridge and defile at St. Prix, the only point at which his army could cross the Petit-Morin River and come out of the SaintGond marshes to attack the Allies. At this point, Napoleon had expected to be able to unleash his troops via Baye on Champaubert. On the eve of February 8, Marmont had sent 150 lancers to occupy Baye, but on the morning of the 9th that town had been retaken by the Russians. Furthermore, perhaps because he had not understood the importance of the bridge near that town, or perhaps because he was discouraged, the Marshal remained in Sezanne when his cavalry patrol was repulsed. [2] At 9:00 a.m. on the 10th, Napoleon was with Marmont in front of the defile of Saint Gond. From the heights that dominate St. Prix, a nervous Marmont looked out at the swampy Petit-Morin's valley, the critical bridge crossing it, and at the opposite slope. An enemy battery and two battalions would have been sufficient to hold the bridge and ruin Napoleon's plans. Fortunately, the bridge at St. Prix was intact and the opposite slope unoccupied. Napoleon ordered Major Sachon with 100 dragoons of the Guard to take some prisoners. They rode through the mud to the village of Bannay where they surprised 500 Russians and forced them to lay down their arms. By 10:00 a.m., French cavalry elements were probing the Allied positions at Champaubert, driving in Olssufiev's pickets. That unfortunate general, recognizing his error of not occupying St. Prix, immediately sent four battalions under Major-General Udom toward that village. But it was too late. These four Russian battalions, the 10th, 38th, 12th and 22nd Jaegers supported by six guns, were pushed back some 500 yards from the river toward Baye by Marmont's troops. General Olssufiev had only twelve understrength regiments (all reduced to one battalion each) and fifteen guns3 [3] (approximately 5,000 men) at his disposal, but he decided to fight it out and deployed his troops in front of Baye. His left was in a small valley with difficult access. His front was covered by a wood and strongly defended. Marmont realized that the wood was the key to the Russian position. He sent the 113th Regiment of the Line [4] ahead of Ricard's Division entirely deployed in skirmish order [5]and supported by two brigades in columns. Then he deployed La Grange's Division on the left, with the order to push two battalions against the Russian right. At a given signal, they all advanced and carried the wood. Olssufiev tried to rally his troops in Baye, but that village was too open. He had to withdraw while fighting and redeployed his rallied troops on a line extending from the Andecy farm to the Bannay wood. By doing so, Olssufiev still held the road from Sezanne to Epernay that crosses the road from Chalons to Paris at Champaubert. Ricard followed the road from Baye to Champaubert and La Grange pushed forward on the left. The Russian position was most accessible on that side of the French line and the next French attack took place there. However, the Russians had deployed all fifteen of their cannon at this vulnerable position and La Grange's Division broke off in disorder. No French artillery [6] had yet been able to come up, but then Napoleon and Ney appeared with the Guard artillery, rallied La Grange, and stopped a Russian counterattack. Some 2,000 cavalry that had been sent by Napoleon on a wide flanking movement through Fromentieres suddenly appeared on the Russians' rear and at the right of their line. Renewed Attack Then, La Grange, after rallying his troops, renewed his attack. He was wounded, but only after he had the pleasure to see the Russians forming squares to oppose the French cavalry, slowly withdrawing toward Champaubert. The Russians were able to keep the French at bay with steady musket fire. Marmont, with Ney's help, had unleashed his columns toward Champaubert, colliding with the Russian infantry on the plateau while the Young Guard kept them occupied between Bannay and the forest, and the Horse Guard attempted to surround them. Ricard's Division then captured Champaubert, lost it, and finally could only secure the first houses. It was a bloody combat with an unusual amount of bayonet fighting. The Russians finally were thrown out of Champaubert and broken into two groups. By 3:00 p.m. the situation was desperate and Olssufiev, too late, was considering retreat toward Etoges. The direct route toward Etoges was now cut off by the French infantry and cavalry and he was unable to break through. Olssufiev's infantry was steadily pushed back from position to position behind Champaubert toward the village of La Caure. Withdraw The only thing that Olssufiev could do was slowly withdraw toward Epernay via the village of La Caure, trading ground for time until night fall. But instead he tried to withdraw by the road to Chalons toward Blucher. He decided to follow a trail through the Grande Laye Wood that might lead him to the road. This maneuver, however, had what was left of his divisions shift front to the left, and by doing so opened his right flank to the French as he entered the swampy wood. Seizing on Olssufiev's mistake, Marmont ordered a brigade of cuirassiers to attack the Russians' exposed flank. The cavalry attack cut the Russian column in two, routed the entire corps, and several thousand men scattered, throwing away their weapons and backpacks. During the panic, most of the fugitives entered the wood. But all the outlets had already been blocked on Marmont's order. 3,000 Russians were killed or captured. Some drowned in the pond of that wood. 1,500 more Russians were taken prisoner by the French peasants. By nightfall, Olssufiev was captured along with another general, all the Russian artillery and some 200 wagons. A mere 1,000 men of his command made good their escape. French losses were very light, about 200 total casualties. It was a very promising beginning for Napoleon's counter-offensive. Champaubert was the only battle of the 1814 campaign in which the French enjoyed a numerical advantage. Blucher, although he heard the sound of gunfire to the west, made not the least attempt to move to his subordinate's aid. The result was predictable. More Champaubert Part II Battle of Champaubert Introduction French Accounts of Battle of Champaubert Russian Accounts of Battle of Champaubert Battle of Champaubert Order of Battle Champaubert Battlefield Photographs Large Map 1 (slow: 64K) Large Map 2 (slow: 152K) Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 8 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com