[7] According to A. Mikhailofsky-Danielefsky (hereafter Mikhailofsky), Olssufiev had been ordered by Blucher to take up quarters in or around Champaubert to give his troops time to recover from the fatigues and losses suffered at Brienne. At right, view of the Champaubert crossroad looking toward Montmirail. The Napoleonic monument is on the left. The cannon are iron navy guns of a later period. After the battle, Napoleon ate his supper in the house on the left. Olssufiev's command did not include any cavalry (except for some sixteen horsemen) so he could not send cavalry patrols toward Sezanne. He was totally unaware of the storm that was about to burst on him. On the eve of February 22, [8] Baye had been occupied by 150 lancers of Marmont's command. The next morning, these lancers were dislodged from Baye and pushed back as far as Sezanne by Sacken's cavalry as his corps moved on toward Montmirail. The ease with which the French were repulsed encouraged a false sense of security and Olssufiev neglected to destroy the bridge at St. Prix and/or occupy the defile at St.Prix. On the morning of February 24, [8] Olssufiev was informed that substantial French forces were coming up from Sezanne, and he sent Major-General Udom [9] with six battalions to occupy Baye. At 9:00 a.m. the French deployed twelve guns and attacked Udom. The French strength increased steadily as more troops continued to arrive. Olssufiev then brought up the rest of his command closer to the Udom's vanguard and deployed his corps between Baye and Bannay. Ricard's Division and Bourdesoulle's cavalry took Baye, while the Imperial Guard took Bannay. Olssufiev then received word that the French were approaching Champaubert from both flanks. Oufflanked on both the left and right, the Russian commander formed his corps in a large block and slowly withdrew toward Champaubert with the intention of withdrawing from there toward Etoges. He also sent nine guns to Champaubert. Olssufiev was informed that a French movement through a wood had cut off the road to Chalons. By now, Olssufiev had brought back most of his troops toward the main highway, and, after ordering MajorGeneral Poltoratzki to hold Champaubert with two regiments (Nachebourski and Apcheronski) and nine guns, decided to reopen the road to Etoges by attacking the French that were holding it. He failed in his attempt to break through. The French brought up several artillery batteries against the Russians while the French cavalry continued its slow outflanking movement over the muddy fields. Poltoratzki placed his artillery at the crossroad and successfully repulsed several cavalry charges. Short of ammunition, the Russians were pushed out of Champaubert by Ricard's Division. Poltoratzki was now cut off from the rest of Olssufiev's command. He withdrew toward a wood two kilometers (about 1.3 miles) from Champaubert. With his command's ammunition exhausted, his troops had to cut their way through with the bayonet. Unfortunately, the wood was occupied by French tirailleurs and the surrounded Russian regiments were captured, losing their nine cannon. Olssufiev was then attacked near the village of La Caure by Ricard's Division and Doumerc's cavalry and defended himself with the bayonet. His troops were routed and in the resu1ting disorder, Olssufiev was captured along with Poltoratzki and a certain number of troops. The remaining Russian regiments still able to fight were now under the command of Major-General Kornilov and Udom. After withdrawing through the forest, the Russian survivors reached Port-a-Brisson late that night. Kornilov took command of what was left of Olssufiev's 9th Infantry Corps. Russian losses were about 2,000 men, nine guns and some ammunition wagons. French losses numbered about 600. Mikhailofsky's Criticism of Blucher There is no doubt that the Russians fought bravely at Champaubert. Mikhailofsky is extremely critical of Blucher and his account of the battle of Champaubert can be found in his work from pages 98 to 108. The Russian author reports that Olssufiev sent several couriers to Blucher to inform him of the severity of the French attack upon his small command and of the presence of Napoleon, but, "the Field Marshal always answered that his apprehensions were groundless, that Napoleon could not be present, and that the detachment acting against our troops could not amount to more than 2,000 men commanded by some partizan. He further confirmed his previous order to keep possession of Champaubert." It should be noted that at around 1:00 p.m., Olssuliev had called a council of his generals. In their opinion the situation was so bad (as they were in the risk of being outflanked and cut off) that they proposed an immediate retreat to Etoges. However, the Russian commander answered he could not consent, having been ordered by Blucher to maintain control of Champaubert. Finally, on page 104, Mikhailofsky clearly blames the destruction of Olssufiev's command on Blucher's faulty dispositions. Conclusion Both French and Russian accounts are remarkably close overall, with the notable exception of the losses, which is not at all unusual. The French probably overestimated the Russian losses while the Russians underestimated theirs. However, a quick calculation can give us probably a fairly accurate estimate of the Russian losses: At the beginning of the battle, Olssufiev's command included 5,717 infantry (Mikhailofsky says 3,690 infantry) plus the artillery for a total of about 6,000. At Vauchamps, on the 14th, we find Olssufiev's survivors as part of Blucher's command numbering 1,500 men. So, 6,000 less 1,500 gives a difference of about 4,500 between the effective strength of the Russian 9th Infantry Corps on February 10 and 14. These are most likely the true Russian losses at Champaubert, i.e., not too far from the French claims which were taken from Houssaye. (Houssaye is usually a very reliable source.) Napoleon could now turn his attention to Sacken's corps. More Champaubert Part II Battle of Champaubert Introduction French Accounts of Battle of Champaubert Russian Accounts of Battle of Champaubert Battle of Champaubert Order of Battle Champaubert Battlefield Photographs Large Map 1 (slow: 64K) Large Map 2 (slow: 152K) More Six Days Campaign Part III: Battle of Montmirail Part IV: Battle of Chateau Thierry Footnotes [1] According to de Segur in Du Rhin a Fontainebleau, p. 173: "Marmont told Napoleon that his troops were understrength, exhausted, hungry, discouraged and the ground rotten in which guns and horses were stuck, unable to move. But, as the Master speaks, all these impossibilities disappear, courage comes back and patriotism fires up...." [2] It appears that Olssufiev had been fooled by the ease with which Sacken had pushed back Marmont's lancers all the way to Sezanne and thought Sacken had dealt with only a simple reconnaissance cavalry party. [3] Houssaye says fifteen guns, Chandler says twenty-four guns, and Lachouque claims forty guns. Houssaye is probably closer to the truth. [4] The 113th had just joined Marmont's corps and was entirely composed of recruits. Their "uniform" consisted only of a gray greatcoat and a forage cap. They had almost no cadre of veterans. [5] Even in 1814, we still find instances of full regiments (not necessarily light infantry) being deployed in skirmish order, i.e., tirailleurs en grandes bandes, when circumstances called for it. In this case, it is the 113th of the Line formed in this manner to move through the wood defended by Russian infantry. [6] The French artillery, its horses exhausted by the march over the bad roads, had not come up yet. [7] The Russian sources used are A. Mikhailofsky's History of the Campaign in France in the Year 1824 and Zweguintov's L'Armee Russe. In these accounts, both authors always significantly reduce Russian casualties and inflate French losses. [8] In 1814, the Russians were still using the Julian calendar, while the French and other western countries were using the Gregorian calendar. Hence the difference of 14 days with the French accounts. [9] This Russian force consisted of the 10th, 38th, 12th and 22nd Jaegers supported by six guns. Sources De Segur, Comte Philippe, Du Rhin a Fontainebleau, Nelson, Paris, date unknown. Houssaye, 1814, Perrin, Paris, 1888. Lachouque, Commandant Henri, translated by Anne S. K. Brown, Anatomy of Glory, Brown University Press, 1961. Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon. Numerous miscellaneous notes from French Archives (Archives Guerres and Bibliotheques Nationale). Mikhailofsky-Danielefsky, A., History of the Campaign of France in the Year 1814, 1992 reprint by Ken Trotman Ltd., Cambridge., England. Zweguintov, L'Armee Russe, Paris. Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 8 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com