Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part III
January 1812
What Went Wrong for the French
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
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The short answer is almost everything, but why? The autumn of 1811 and the winter of 1812 would be busy ones for the Emperor who was preparing for the largest campaign of the war against Russia. For most people, this would have left little time for dealing with Spanish affairs for most people, but the energy and genius of the French Emperor enabled him to attempt to fight the war from Paris and beyond. This had a number of repercussions for his commanders in the Spanish theatre. First, he was withdrawing experienced units from the Peninsula for the armies he was taking to Russia. These troops were largely, but not completely replaced with inexperienced and poorly equipped units. This was in part why he reorganised the areas of responsibility for the various French commanders in Spain, especially Marmont and Dorsenne. Secondly he attempted to give detailed direction to the commanders from Paris. With despatches taking three weeks each way, this meant that the Emperor's guidance was not based on local knowledge and changing circumstances. Commanders on the spot had to decide between following the Emperor's orders, which could easily lead to disaster for the French cause, or using their own initiative. With each commander juggling Napoleon's orders in the light of their local knowledge central direction of operations broke down. Latter in his memoirs Marmont was to deliver a commentary on these events that is both damming and reviling. Even if we make a large allowance for his bitterness there is much truth in his comments. Marshal Marmont's Comments on the Official Correspondence Regarding the Fall of Ciudad RodrigoThe gist of the letters above should be seen against the wider picture. From this moment, it was clear that Napoleon was living in an ideal world, created by his imagination. He was living in a vacuum . His wishes were the stuff of dreams: he issued orders taking no account of the way things actually were. Nobody dared to point this out to him! The Army of Portugal has a strength of 32,000 men and with it a vast territory for subsistence purposes. But this rich and productive territory is more than 60 leagues from the frontier and the army is without transport for the simple reason that there is none available in the area. But for survival both transport and subsistence are necessary. Either one brings subsistence to the troops or they need the transport to go and look for it. Only the provinces of Toledo and Avila have anything to offer as far as this sort of thing is concerned. The rest of the country is a desert. The Emperor expects us to occupy Alcantara, which is on the very frontier of Portugal and is an open town where one needs to build a defensive fortification. But to protect such a set-up you need a large number of first-class troops in a constant state of battle-readiness. For subsistence for 10,000 men to survive for a month, you need an area of 30 leagues before you can start moving troops around. Thus, to talk about a long stay at Alcantara was completely impossible. In any case, Napoleon had decreed that one third of the army and cavalry were to occupy Trujillo, a sparsely inhabited area with no culture, ... and very dirty as well. The Emperor wanted daily communication with Rodrigo, 60 leagues away, which could only have been achieved with a large number of troops for escort duty, and he forgets the state Spain is in, that is to say that it can only be kept under control by the regular use of bayonets. Thus, to obtain the smallest amount of assistance, to make the most of the minimum of resources, we needed troops. From thence an essential dispersal on a grand scale, which would remove all consistency and mobility from the forces of which our army in Spain was an historic example, unique in history. This was the state of affairs during all my time in command of troops in Spain and Portugal. As if that was not enough! The Emperor wanted me to occupy Merida yet again; he said that I was to fortify this town, 30 leagues from the Tagus, with which I could only communicate via yet another desert, by marching parallel to the Portuguese frontier. . . . He wanted me finally to build a fort at Baños, thirty leagues away, on the opposite side of the Tagus. On reading these instructions, I seemed to be part of the Emperor's dreams. He realised, meanwhile, that considerable forces were needed, and that we were a long way from sufficiency. He told me about reinforcements, among the early ideas was a column of 6,000 men and 800 cavalry lead by General Vandermaesen, which consisted of infantry regiments from the corps of the Army of Portugal. But this column was restricted by its desperate needs (it was being employed on fatigue duty). It only rejoined the Army of Portugal at the end of the year with half the number of troops that I had expected. An announcement was made that the Army of the North was to be reinforced, and that with effect from 15th August, it would be able to take up its position on the Coa to cover Rodrigo; and meanwhile, this army is in such a distressed state, which can be seen from the letters of the Duke of Istria, that it not only held on to General Vandermaesen's column, but also men from the Army of Portugal, who had left hospital, and organised provisional corps which could form part of the Army of the North. There were similar dreams which formed the basis of a war campaign and plans for operations which formed the basis of our future security. Then there were the King's agents active in all the Portuguese provinces which could supply the Army of Portugal. They emptied the shops, selling the provisions, which were stored until the troops were due to arrive and it in such a manner that they provided for our needs. Meanwhile of all the dispositions, only one was put into effect and that concerned the Rodrigo garrison: this place was no longer the direct concern of the Army of Portugal - it was under the command of the Army of the North. It was the general of this army who received all the reports furnished by the troops who specifically named the commander concerned. It was up to him to keep a watching brief on the city and to provide for its protection, except in the case when the Army of Portugal might have to come to the aid [of the French garrison]. Such were the preliminary instructions for a campaign based on contradictory orders, followed by rapidly growing illusions which turned into serious errors of judgement. Observations on the 1811 correspondence related to 1812, and an historic record of the causes of the siege of Rodrigo, and the capture of the city by the EnglishThe articles above present the picture of unequalled contradictions, and of a confusion in the plans which give a very adequate summary of the cause of all our Spanish ills and demonstrate my good faith in the discussion of these events. Correspondence of 1811
The same correspondence
But hardly had the detachment to Valencia been arranged, when Napoleon changed his mind. Not content with having broken up the Army of Portugal, he recalled part of the Army of the North to France, and ordered an upheaval of the arrangements and changed all the strategic placements, which meant that there were not enough troops in any one place to achieve anything! On the 13th December, 22 days after the orders about which I have just written, the Prince of Neufchâtel wrote to acquaint me with the following deployments which the Emperor had ordered. He posted the Army of Portugal to Old Castille; he divided the territory into six or seven governments, that is to say, the provinces of Salamanca, Placencia and Valladolid, Léon, Palencia and the Asturias; he increased the army by two divisions but withdrew five infantry regiments and two cavalry troops and ordered me to occupy the Asturias. In reality these deployments resulted in a diminution of the forces because of the area of territory in relation to the task allocated to me. I was to return to Valladolid. I was ordered to increase the Astorga fortifications, to fortify Salamanca; he realised, that, in addition to this, no offensive against Portugal could be undertaken before the next harvest, and was kind enough to give me the next approximate departure date of the Guard. During all these marvellous deployments which disseminated confusion everywhere when they were put into effect, the English, with their eyes wide open proceeded to open up their campaign. I received on the 4th January 1812 a letter from the Duke of Dalmatia [Soult] which not particularly worrying, and shortly after that, a letter from General Dorsenne on the 5th, in which the news was much more serious. Not being used to the Rodrigo set-up which, I say again, was negligible as far as my command was concerned, I could only receive news of it via General Dorsenne who never gave me any. The letter I received on the 5th was the first time I got any news of the dangers that were to come. What seemed so important in his letter was the sentence concerning General Barrié which made me worried about his laid-back approach to the defence of the city. Although General Dorsenne knew the character of this general, he really didn't have to choose him for such an isolated but important command. The bad news didn't stop there. On my arrival at Valladolid, I received a letter from General Thiébalt, Governor of Salamanca, which announced the entry of the English into the campaign, and the fact that they had crossed the Agueda, so I sent messages via officers in all directions to different columns of troops who were on the way to their new cantonments, the order to change direction and go to Fuente-el-Sauco and Salamanca, and I made preparations myself to march on Rodrigo as soon as the troops had come together; but events moved so fast and Rodrigo's resistance to the attack was so brief (eight days of siege operations during which time there were only two days of firing) that there was no chance of us arriving in time to rescue the garrison, such was the result of the deployments that had already been made. But here was something really odd! It was the way in which Napoleon approached the question of this defeat in his letter of 23 January to me, when he heard that the English had opened up their campaign. The Prince of Neufchâtel told me that the Emperor had noted with anger the way I had deployed General Montbrun. "He had," he added, "given the order to send only 6,000 men to support the Valencia operation, who were supposed rejoin General d'Armagnac", but he seemed to have forgotten that he had effectively given these instructions in his letter of 20th November. He ordered me, through a letter next day, 21st November, to send a corps of 12,000 men to Valencia, supported by a division of 3-4 thousand men, to be placed in reserve. Such is the effect of Napoleon's bright ideas, his memory and his good faith. Wellington undertook the siege of Rodrigo because he saw how widely scattered the French forces were, the departure of part of the Army of the North for France, and the movement of our detachments to Valencia. The city of Rodrigo had been relieved so rapidly by the English because General Barrié was not dynamic enough, and did not make the simplest of deployments which resulted in such a wretched defence; and the surrender was so quick that it gave us no time to engage the enemy in battle. [12]
By possible deployments in the midst of all this confusion, I should have been in a position to face the English army on the Agueda on the 26th/27th January with 32,000 men, and by the 1st/2nd February, 40,000.
But, to return to what I was saying. I was ordered in the same letter [?] to send one of the divisions from the Army of Portugal to the Army of the North, without changing anything in its organisation, in exchange for three "régiments de marche" which belonged to one of my army corps, reinforcements which had already been taken into account and whose movements had already been announced. Five Polish regiments were withdrawn from the Army of the South, and their return to France was being accelerated. A vigorous imperial order was issued for all members of the Guard to return wherever they were, and it was the same for the Army of Portugal. These movements resulted in an overall diminution of our forces, which meant that any help that could to the Army of the North and the Army of Portugal while the English army was advancing in Castille was simply not possible. Nor were the Generals in their independent commands any more helpful. And all this at the time when the English were besieging Rodrigo. [13]
MARSHAL THE DUKE OF RAGUSA Marmont's pen showed little sign of his friendship with Napoleon. The confusion regarding responsibilities is evident in these commends. This is a confusion which starts with Napoleon and has bitter consequences for the generals and soldiers at the sharp end in Spain. The other point which Marmont labours is how out of touch Napoleon had become from the reality of the war in Spain. Which leads to the crucial question, why did Napoleon not install one overall commander? To a certain extent he had done this by creating his brother Joseph King of Spain, with a military adviser in Marshal Jourdan. Unfortunately the other Marshals refused to follow his orders. As an example, there is a great deal of correspondence between Dorsenne, Joseph and Berthier regarding the former's refusal to follow Joseph's orders. Much of this fell into Wellington's hands. [14]
Napoleon also frequently undermined Joseph's position by issuing his own orders directly to commanders. If they used their initiative it could equally easily have led to personal disaster for themselves if their actions did not produce good results. Napoleon was an unforgiving master as Marmont was to find out. Oman's judgement on Napoleon in this matter is damming.
"It was precisely Napoleon's determination to dictate such operations as Montbrun's Alicante expedition, or the transference of Marmont's headquarters from the valley of the Tagus to Valladolid, without any possible knowledge of the circumstances of his lieutenants at the moment when his orders would come to hand that was the fatal thing. With wireless telegraphy in the modern style [Oman was writing in 1914], he might have received prompt intelligence, and sent directions that suited the situation. But under the conditions of Spain in 1812, such a system was pure madness. [15]
Which is possibly what a few of his Generals and Marshals thought privately. Despite this there was an element of exasperation and impertinence in their correspondence with Berthier, which they knew was virtually writing to the Emperor direct. This is apparent opening sentence of Dorsenne's letter of 23 February quoted above. ''If your Highness, before writing his letter to me of 11th February had deigned to read my reports of 15th, 16th and 23rd February, ...''
What alternative did Napoleon have? Initiative in subordinate commanders had been neither encouraged nor developed. It did not suit the Emperor's style as Head of State and Commander-in-Chief to have subordinate commanders in competition. While the Marshals bickered amongst themselves, they could not unite against Napoleon. It would take the disasters of Russia, Leipzig and the invasion of France itself to weld them together in a semblance of unity strong enough to force the Emperor's abdication.
No better demonstration can be found for the delicate balancing of forces that influenced affairs in the Peninsula than the events surrounding their loss of Ciudad Rodrigo. The French advance against the Spanish on the east coast, drawing reinforcements away from the Portuguese border and Wellington advancing to bring those same forces back and so relieve pressure on the Spanish army. In the event, the Spanish lost Valencia on the 9th January while Wellington gained Ciudad Rodrigo on the 18th. On balance, the French lose more than they gain for the guerillas are playing fast and loose with their communications and supplies. In addition, the British are one step nearer to a strike into central or northern Spain, an advance that would have immense strategic consequences as the events in 1812 and 1813 would prove.
The point of view of the commanders concerned a close examination of their correspondence has given me new insight into the difficulties commanders on the spot had to put up with. This is especially true of the French whose problems were increased by their fractured command and communications systems. The contrast between the British approach and the French is striking. The British government appointed a commander in whom they had full confidence, and interfered very little. Wellington did have political problems, but by and large he had the backing of his government and was allowed to conduct the war as he saw fit, provided that is he did not incur too heavy losses and the costs were not too high. The French commanders problems were the more complex. The fact that there were so many of them competing for limited resources in a hostile country not to mention glory and imperial favours is significant. Especially with constant interference from the Emperor in Paris.
Oman's hypothesis that if Napoleon had had a modern communication system he and his generals might have fared better in the Peninsula is an interesting one, (the book was published in 1914). Perhaps he is right, perhaps not. If there had been communications at 1914 level or even at today's sophistication, the most dreaded phrase that a harassed French commander might have heard would be, "General, the Emperor is on the line for you again".
[16]
Journaux des Sieges faits ou soutenus par francais dans la Peninsule de 1807-1814 par J Belmas - Paris, chez Firmin Didot Freres st Cie MDCCCXXVII Jane Hoyle for suggesting the article in the first place. Her comments, contributions and corrections, especially on the actual siege, have greatly improved the final article. Jane holds the copyright for her translations of the following French language documents;
Major General to Marshal Marmont, 20 November 1811, MMM Vol 4, p 254 Jane Hoyle also for supplied me with vital information from;
J. Jones, Journals of Sieges in Spain and Portugal, 2nd edition, London, 1866, and the Duke of Wellington's Despatches from 3rd January 1812 (Vol VIII. pp 509-534).
Lionel Leventhal of Greenhill Books, for the Napoleonic Library, especially Chandler's Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, reprints of Oman and a host of other Napoleonic books. Where would we be without them?
Many thanks to Alan Rooney and Ian Fletcher of Midas Battlefield Tours for a most interesting and enjoyable trip to Spain in 1995. This allowed me to view many Peninsular War battlefields and fortresses including Ciudad Rodrigo.
First Empire editor Dave Watkins, his help with tracking down pictures etc., was invaluable, and of course for printing this article.
Finally my wife Elizabeth Salmon who has corrected numerous spelling errors and shown extreme patience.
All photographs used were taken by myself and I retain the copyright.
[1] Translation © Jane Hoyle 1997
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