Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part III
January 1812
The Emperor's Anger and the Generals' Defence
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
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An examination of the strategy behind the siege and the recriminations that followed with the help of the correspondence and despatches of the opposing commanders.
Letter from Prince Berthier, Major General, to General, Count Dorsenne, Commander of the Army of the North [1]
Paris, 11th February 1812
The Emperor is very displeased with the neglectful way you handed the Ciudad Operation. Why did you not manage to have news of the place twice a week? Why were you not making use of Souham's splendid division? It is an extraordinary way to make war, and His Majesty cannot hide from you the fact that the shame of this lies at your door. General Thiébalt should also accept some of the blame but he alleges that he has no forces, but Souham's division which was entirely at your service was not used. This humiliating setback can only be attributed to bad troop dispositions on your part and to the trivial measures you took while the English activities were in progress.[2]
Signed - ALEXANDRE The one to Marmont is no less vitriolic
From Prince Berthier, Major General, to Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa [3]
Paris, 11th February 1812
The best method of supporting the Armée du Midi [South] from your present position is to move your HQ to Salamanca and to concentrate your army there, detaching one division to remain on the Tagus, to re-occupy the Asturias, and to oblige the enemy to stay at Almeida, and in the north, in case of invasion. You could even push on to Ciudad Rodrigo if you have got the necessary siege artillery. [4]
Retake the place unless lack of provisions forces you to leave it alone until after the harvest. You could at least make an incursion into Portugal, and you could then move to the Douro and thence to Almeida. The threat of such action would keep the enemy quiet.
The Armée du Midi is very strong; the Army of Valencia which has its advanced posts at Alicante has nothing threatening its left flank.
The position you must adopt is to take the offensive from Salamanca to Almeida. The English know that your forces are now at Salamanca and they will not dare move because of this. If you stay at Valladolid, if your troops are lost in the backwoods, if above all your cavalry is not up to scratch after the rainy season, you will expose the whole of northern Spain to a potential catastrophe.
It is indispensable that you re-occupy the Asturias because we need many more people to guard the border of the plain, right up to Biscaya and to guard the Asturias.
While the English are split into two corps, one in the south, and the other in your area, they are weak, and you are much stronger than they are. The letter that I wrote to you and which you received on the 10th December, has told you exactly what to do. [5]
Threaten the English, and if you think for one moment that you are unable to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, prepare the roads to Almeida, fortify Salamanca, bring together your siege train; [6] send large detachments to Ciudad Rodrigo. This will contain the English, it will not tire your troops unnecessarily, and will be far less inconvenient than what you were doing before which you seemed to think was inappropriate.
I presume General Montbrun has arrived and that you have finally assembled your troops.
The Capture of Valencia has greatly strengthened the Army of the South and you would be right to think that the English are mad to march upon Badajoz with you at Salamanca, that is to say, for you to be in a position to reach Lisbon before they do. They will go south, following an ill thought out strategy, especially if you detach two or three of your divisions from the Tagus Valley. From that position you will be able to tell them that you bear them no ill-will and you respect their initiative in making such a defensive move.
I say again, the Emperor's order is that you do not leave Salamanca; that you re-occupy the Asturias, that your army bases itself upon Salamanca and that you threaten the English from there. [7]
(Signed) ALEXANDRE There seems to be confusion on one or two points. Under whose control does Souham's division come? In the first letter above, Dorsenne is castigated for ' … not making use of Souham's splendid division.' In the next letter, written on the same day to Marmont, Napoleon via Berthier ' … regrets … that with the Souham Division and the three other divisions which you have, you could not have stationed yourself at Salamanca to study the situation close at hand.' This after ordering Marmont to station himself at Valladolid. Napoleon has been credited with having a phenomenal memory for details of troop dispositions and regimental strength rolls. Perhaps his memory is somewhat selective on this occasion. Dorsenne's reply is full of injured pride and not a little anger of his own.
Letter from General the Count Dorsenne, Commander of the Army of the North to Prince Berthier, Major General [8]
Burgos, 23rd February 1812
If your Highness, before writing his letter to me of 11th February had deigned to read my reports of 15th, 16th and 23rd February, he would have seen that it is quite wrong to put the blame on me for the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo. I did not ask General Barrié to send me his news twice a week, but every day. As his letters and mine were intercepted by the enemy, is it really fair to blame me? I knew, and I made your Highness aware of the fact that we would run out of provisions. Also, I sacrificed everything to organise a solution to this problem; and when the Duke of Ragusa asked for my help in this operation, I had the satisfaction of telling him that everything had been taken care of. His Excellency arrived at Valladolid on 10th January and at that time took command of Souham's and Bonnet's divisions. I could do nothing about the former. His senior ADC had been at Salamanca since the 7th, to tell M le Maréchal on his arrival that he had been put in charge of the 6th and 7th Governments. He arrived on the 14th and was able to tell us nothing new on Rodrigo. On the 15th, His Excellency learned at 10 o'clock at night, via a letter from General Thiébalt that the English were besieging the place. By the 18th, it had fallen.
Your Highness noted that there had been no direct report on all this. The Duke of Ragusa should have received reports and acted on them. General Thiébalt presumed that he was no longer under my command. When M le Maréchal asked me to second some-one to his staff I didn't bother to report to you that I had no-one available to help. As I was ordered to return to force march the Guard Fusiliers and the Tirailleur Division from Burgos, these troops were assembled at Toro before the Army of Portugal could be assembled. I put a great deal of energy into this exercise. But neither the Duke of Ragusa nor myself had any idea that the Rodrigo siege would hold out for four days [?]. As to the rest, when I knew on the 21st December that the Army of Portugal was to move on Valencia, I warned your Highness and His Excellency of the disasters that could arise from this exercise. And my fears have all too soon been justified. None of these facts can be denied. They are well known to the Army and the Duke of Ragusa. My conscience is absolutely clear and I have nothing to be ashamed of.
I cannot deny, Monseigneur, that your letter to me has made me very bitter. I am simply not prepared to accept blame for something which does not even concern me when the defence of Rodrigo would have been in the orders received by the Duke of Ragusa on the 13th December last, and besides, once I was under his command, I had to carry out his orders as commanded by your Highness.
I would ask you, my Lord, to show this letter to the Emperor, and if His Majesty holds to his original view on this, I would entreat him to post me back to Paris, because it would be impossible for me to remain in Spain, knowing that I had not acted in accordance with his wishes, I who have always been his most obedient servant.
I await the goodness of your Highness with impatience and hope that you will deign to reply to my dispatch.
I am, with the most profound respect - etc.[9]
(Signed) COUNT D'ORSENNE The letter to Marmont takes a little longer to get to Valladolid but is no less unwelcome in its criticisms. Marmont, while being a little more diplomatic, is no less strident in rejecting the blame for events. In the letter below, he seems to be making a strong case for putting the blame back to Paris, on Napoleon's doorstep.
Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, To Prince Berthier, Major General [10]
Valladolid, 2nd March 1812
At the very moment when I was mounting my horse to go to Avila, I received the letters that Your Highness did me the honour of sending me, dated 18th and 21st February. His Majesty's orders are so categorical that whatever the original reasons why I was not keen to obey them, I think that it is my duty to do so today, so I have ordered the cavalry of the 4th and 6th Divisions, which are at present in the Tagus valley, to go once more to Old Castille. I have left only the 1st Division there, according to the Emperor's orders, and it will be relieved eventually by the Army of the Centre. But as it is clear that the siege of Badajoz has been postponed on account of the presence of these three divisions, my view is that the movement proposed would put the town at risk. The least I dare hope is that if there is any misfortune, I shall not be blamed for it. Your Highness writes that the Emperor considers that I am interfering in other people's affairs and not carrying out the orders he has given me personally. Up until now, I have considered it my duty, as laid down in twenty of your despatches, and emphasise yet again the order I was given to leave three divisions in the Tagus Valley. As I have crossed it today, my position has become much easier and has improved.
The Emperor seems to have much confidence in the effect that the manoeuvres will have had on Lord Wellington's morale. I would respectfully disagree with him, given that the English general knows full well that we are short of ammunition, and is aware of the enormous difficulties that this country presents us with, by its very nature, and our lack of provisions.
Lord Wellington knows full well that the Army of Portugal, with no-one fit to fight, is not battle-ready, and were it to advance at this time it would need to return to its present position after only four days' fighting, because there is nothing for it to do in the country at this time, especially having lost all its horses. I will do everything in my power to fulfil his Majesty's wishes; but all the military activity will need to take place between the Agueda and the Tormes, and this would be within range of the Ciudad Rodrigo cannon. In any case, the Agueda is not fordable at that point, and so to cross this river I would need boats which I do not have.
Lord Wellington cannot possibly be thinking in terms of an offensive battle at this time of year, due to lack of available magazines and fodder for his horses. He cannot be thinking any more about a fresh siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, even taking into account our heavy artillery at Salamanca. He has more pressing problems. For example, if he intends to besiege Badajoz, he has the means to do so. If his preparations have already been made, he might consider returning to support Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus, he will probably not be greatly affected by our current movements.
His Majesty considers that, with the superiority of our numbers over those of the enemy, I am wrong to leave the initiative with Lord Wellington. The Army of Portugal is certainly strong enough to beat the English as far as numbers are concerned, but it lacks the means [transport, ammunition etc.] to do so. The English Army has a very good supply of ammunition and sufficient means of transport and is in good order everywhere. Our Army of Portugal is without ammunition, with very little transport and no money and can only survive by scattering itself [i.e. by living off the land at bayonet point]. It will need to devote all its efforts to survive and is in no position to take any military initiative. The situation is likely to continue until the harvest.
While Your Highness reproaches me for allowing Almeida to be recaptured, I also expect to be reproached because I have not organised magazines at Salamanca and Valladolid, but those places were not under my command at the time. I really cannot accept blame for these complaints however damaging they may seem.
Your Highness accuses me of having been the cause of the loss of Rodrigo; I find this very strange. We lost Rodrigo because the garrison was too small and because the principal general of the Army of the North was unsupervised and suffered from lack of foresight. I could not keep an eye on the place myself when I was separated by a chain of mountains and a desert resulting from six months occupation by our army which had been formed in the Tagus valley.
The Emperor, you say, is astonished that I did not march on the 17th/18th January with the 30,000 men I had assembled. This is nonsense because I had no troops available for such an exercise on these dates. The troops were on their way to relieve their colleagues in the Army of the North in their cantonments, and had on their way received orders to divert to Salamanca on the 22nd. There were, in any case, only 24,000 of these troops and they could not have reached Rodrigo any earlier. We had lost the place four days previously. To have defended it in a pitched battle would have been impossible, given that we could not have blockaded the city because the river was not navigable at that point. I could neither cross it nor stop Lord Wellington from communicating with the place.
Thus, the English army, without being forced into battle would have been able to defend Rodrigo. The Army of Portugal, which had neither heavy artillery, nor the provisions for a drawn-out action, would have had to endure a long and pointless march, which would have meant us losing what little provisions, ammunition and transport we have. What I have learned from the war in Spain is that the most important thing is to look after our men, their provisions and equipment, and I feel very strongly about this.
The Emperor considers that I tire my troops by unnecessary marches. No-one tries harder than I do to spare my men from unnecessary fatigue and I do not consider that this remark applies to the detachments in the Tagus valley, because I did not send them there, but I was happy to keep the troops in La Mancha at the time we lost Ciudad Rodrigo, when I realised on the 21st January that Lord Wellington had ordered two divisions to Estremadura. I regard it, therefore as one of my duties to support the Army of the Centre. These dispositions are very logical ones. When General Hill marched upon Merida, I realised that this was a diversionary tactic and made little change in my plans except to strengthen the Salamanca garrison, in order to try and rescue Rodrigo. I left only a thousand men in the Tagus valley.
His Majesty appears to think that Lord Wellington has some magazines a short distance from the northern frontier. His magazines are at Abrantes and Estremadura. He has hospitals at Lisbon, Castelbranco and Abrantes; thus there is nothing to interest him on the Coa. Your Highness says that the real route to Lisbon is via the North. I think that those who know the country would disagree with him. For my own part, I am convinced that every time the main part of the army takes this route, there will be all kinds of most fearful problems, and I therefore suggest that the best route for this exercise is via Alentejo. I had the honour to put this very point to you three months ago.
Your Highness talks about relieving Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. The country between the Agueda and the Tormes is a vast plain which is impracticable in every sense.
The Emperor blames me for having returned to the valley of the Tagus, having been repulsed by Lord Wellington on the other side of the Coa. But this move was made in response to a positive order from the Emperor. Rodrigo was occupied by troops of the Army of the North and His Majesty gave me the duty of keeping a watching brief on this place. Had I been in charge, I would have established myself at Salamanca -the military reason being that the enemy was in that area. The same holds good from a subsistence point of view since this countryside has potential resources but there is nothing more to be gained from the Tagus valley. It would seem sensible for the Emperor to devolve complete responsibility to his generals, or at least give them more latitude when carrying out his orders.
The Emperor seems to think that I am not resolute enough. I am going to ignore this remark. When I think it is useful to engage the enemy in battle, nothing will alter my determination to do so. And if one never fights, it is because this war Is like no other, either in its nature or in the circumstances that accompany it. I could not act in any other way.
The Emperor has commissioned a big fortifications building programme at Salamanca. He wants 12,000 men to be involved in these works. It would appear that he ignores the fact that we can neither feed nor pay them and we are everywhere without basic services.
It is the Northern Provinces which provide the greater part of the needs of the 6th [Valladolid] and 7th [Salamanca] governments This situation is deteriorating in a terrible manner, and it will not change for the better until we are in territory more suited to supply our needs.
As for the magazines, these are the cornerstone of my efforts and I am very concerned about the problem. But it is no easy matter at this time. If His Majesty will increase my resources to enable me to feed my army for at least a month, I think I could achieve a satisfactory result. If this situation were to continue we would be able to engage the enemy in serious battle rather than making simple military points.
I am writing to the Duke of Albufera [Suchet] to acquaint him with the current situation, and I have ordered General Bonnet to return to the Asturias by the Leitariegos Pass, which will put him in a strong position where he can make an offensive move against Gallicia. I consider the occupation of the Asturias is important, and I intend to continue sending troops there to that end.
Monseigneur, it only rests for me to express to your Highness the pain that I have as a result of the Emperor's view of the efforts that I am constantly making for the good of the service. As for His Majesty blaming me for the loss of Almeida, I am not prepared to accept any blame for this.
I have the honour to be &c [11]
MARSHAL DUKE OF RAGUSE This was not Marmont's last word on the subject.
Ciudad Rodrigo Continued: What Went Wrong for the French?
More Ciudad Rodrigo
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Although not listed amongst the casualties, both Dorsenne and Marmont felt the pain of losing Ciudad Rodrigo. Two letters, both dated 13th February, are stiff with imperial anger.