Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part I
January 1812
The French Grand Strategy
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
 |
The fall of Valencia to the French came about because Napoleon in September 1811 had determined that the critical point of the war in Spain was in the east against the Spanish forces under Blake. His plan was to crush the remaining Spanish armies by attacks in the east and south of the country. For that to happen Valencia must fall and in the process drag down a large part of the Spanish regular army with it. Napoleon sent Marmont a flurry of orders via Berthier. On 18th October, Berthier informs Marmont that he will be required to furnish troops to the Army of the Centre (King Joseph, and his Chief of Staff, Marshal Jourdan). These would be for the garrisons of New Castille from whence other troops would be sent to help Suchet in his attack on Valencia. By 20th November this had changed, and Marmont was expected to supply 6,000 troops as part of the expedition. The order was changed the following day, ordering Marmont to supply "such a force as, united to the column supplied by King Joseph, would provide a total of 12,000 men for the diversion." [28]
As Joseph could only supply 3,000, Marmont had to find the remaining 9,000 and the 3,000 to guard the communications. There is a saying in military circles, order, counter-order, disorder. Marmont's only course of action was to obey the last order he received to the letter, which he did. When it all went wrong, this did not stop Napoleon from criticising him for detaching 'an army corps and thirty guns … [instead of] … a light flying column.' [29]
It is worth studying the two letters dated 20th and 21st November because it is in them that Napoleon's plans appear to have been communicated to Marmont by Berthier. It should be noted that in this instance, as in many others, connecting Berthier's correspondence to those of the commanders in the field is an art not a science. Dispatch dates are often not given in further correspondence.
Major General to Marshal Marmont
I am sending you, M le Duc, your ADC, Colonel Jardet. The Emperor has commanded me to tell you that the most important matter at this time is to capture Valencia. You must already be aware of the advantages that Marshal Suchet has over General Blake's army, and of the capture of the forts of Sagonte [French version of Spanish name]. I am enclosing with this letter some copies of "Le Moniteur" [the official government newspaper] in which you will see the details. You will also see that the English have 18,000 sick, and appear to have decided to go on the defensive. It is absolutely necessary, if we do not succeed in capturing Valencia, that you organise a detachment of 6,000 men, which can join the Army of the Centre, to be available to march to the support of General Suchet. Once Valencia has been taken, many more troops will be available, and they will be able to give you considerable reinforcements so you will be able to start your army's "grandes opérations".
At this time, that is to say, towards the end of January, after the rainy season, you will be able, together with the Army of Portugal and part of the Army of the South, be in a position to attack Elvas and to overcome Alentejo while the Army of the North, reinforced by the reserve army, will parade on the Coa and Alfaintés; but the most important objective at this time is the capture of Valencia; the Emperor has, therefore, M le Maréchal, decreed that you release one of your divisions to this end. Please keep me in touch about your deployments. [30]
Major General to Marshal Marmont
The Emperor has instructed me to emphasise to you, Monsieur le Maréchal that the most important objective at this time is the capture of Valencia. The Emperor has decreed that you provide an addition to the forces that the King will have detached from the Army of the Centre in order that it may support Marshal Suchet's army until he has captured the city.
Please put this disposition into effect immediately in co-operation with the HM the King of Spain, and let me know what you have done in this respect. We have been advised that the English have 20,000 sick and that they haven't even got 20,000 men under arms, with the result that they are in no fit state to do anything. The Emperor's intention, therefore, is that 12,000 men, infantry, cavalry, and sappers will consequently march on Valencia; that you should detach between 3-4,000 men from your rear to maintain the communications, and that you, M le Maréchal shall be in a position to support the capture of Valencia. The town, having fallen, Portugal will be near to collapse, because at the appropriate time the Army of Portugal will be increased by 25,000 men from the Army of the South, together with 15,000 men from General Reille's Corps, and thus, as a result, we can bring together a force of 80,000 men. In such a situation, you will be receiving an order to go to Elvas and to seize Alentejo, at the same time as the Army of the North goes to the Coa with an army of 40,000 men
The bridge-building gear, which is at present at Badajoz, will be used to throw bridges over the Tagus. The enemy will be totally unable to oppose such a force which has such a good prospect of success unless it takes grave risks. On the 6th November we were masters of the suburb of Valencia; there is a strong chance that we shall be able to capture the place in December, which will place you in the position, M le Duc, of finding yourself before Elvas during the month of January. Send me your thoughts on the operational plan for this exercise. Once the Emperor has received news of the capture of Valencia, we can send you positive orders on the next steps. [31]
Berthier.
Reduction
All of which will greatly reduce the Army of Portugal's availability for the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo. At the time Marmont was happy to supply the troops which he wanted to lead himself, ever hungry for more glory. But what of Wellington? According to Napoleon, he was suffering from over 18,000 sick, or in the later dispatch 20,000, and winter would make transport difficult if not impossible. The British and their Portuguese allies could be left to suffer on their own.
They could be dealt with later by combining the French armies once the Spanish were out of the way. Wellington put his casualties for the whole year at a much smaller number. Clearly, there was some fudging of the statistics on the effectiveness of the enemy taking place between Spain and Paris. However Marmont largely concurred with the Emperor's views regarding Wellingtons likely inability to interfere with these manoeuvres. A letter from Berthier, dated 13th December, sums up the French view of Wellington's ability to interfere with these moves.
"If General Wellington, after the rainy season is over [i.e. after February] should determine to take the offensive, you can unite all your eight divisions for a battle: General Dorsenne from Burgos would support you by marching up from Burgos to your assistance. But such a move is not to be expected. The English, having suffered heavy losses, and experiencing great difficulties in recruiting their army, all considerations tend to make us believe that they will simply confine themselves to the defence of Portugal. [32]
Wellington had rejected such a defensive option. Napoleon sent more orders which Marmont received on 20th December. These instructed him to move his headquarters to Valladolid, and the greater part of his remaining army to Old Castille. Montbrun was to command the expedition to support Suchet at Valencia. Napoleon had yet more changes to thrust upon his commanders in Spain. Marmont received instructions from Berthier regarding a reorganisation of Army commands on the 29th December;
"Considering the importance of placing the command of the whole frontier of Portugal [north of the Tagus] under a single general, His Majesty has decided that the provinces of Avila, Salamanca, Plasencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, the Kingdom of Leon, Palencia and the Asturias, shall belong to the Army of Portugal." [33]
Marmont was to receive Souham's division which was in the area of Zamora, Benevente and La Babeza. He also got Bonnet's division but with instructions to leave it in the Asturias. Balanced against the forces he had to despatch to the east, he had a much larger area to cover with a very small increase in manpower. The main result of these changes was the withdrawal of two divisions of the Guard from Dorsenne's Army of the North. They were to go to Russia, leaving Dorsenne without enough men to hold off Wellington and the guerillas. The Army of the North would now concern itself with the area north and east of Burgos. Crucially, Thiébalt's division and the garrisons of Leon, and Ciudad Rodrigo, were to go to Dorsenne. Marmont would have to use his own forces to hold these places. His room for manoeuvre was even more restricted by a host of instructions from Napoleon telling him what forces he should put where.
So while Wellington was preparing and concentrating his forces, the French were either reorganising or dispersing theirs. This considerable shift of forces away from Ciudad Rodrigo greatly alarmed General Thiébalt in Salamanca. The following correspondence is worth quoting in full because of the insights it gives us into many aspects of the war. On 1st January, Thiébalt writes to General Dorsenne, commander of the French army of the North;
General Thiébalt to General Dorsenne
M le Général
Events of Ciudad Rodrigo have become so serious that I am enclosing a duplicate of my letter No 126.
Following what I was told by my Prefet [Town Clerk], I am sending you a list of facts which I am certain are true, in support of its contents.
About three weeks ago, the enemy threw a bridge over the Agueda between Rodrigo and Felices el Chico. The bridge when nearly finished, fell to pieces and those working on it were drowned. I am quoting this fact because of the English operations that followed. At the time of writing, they have constructed two more to enable artillery to cross the river, one at San Felices el Grande and the other, two leagues further up the river. A short while ago, we saw equipment arrive for one of the constructions. I mention this fact as evidence of what we believe to be the enemy's intentions. Enormous convoys of stores and large herds of cows have reached the English army, having passed through the province of Avila and part of Salamanca at present occupied by the Army of Portugal. I have written to General Thomières at El Barco about this matter. I should add that, a fortnight ago, the market at Tamames was virtually empty and all we were able to buy was 1000 fanegas of corn.
Plasencia and Bejar have been evacuated and from what General Thomières has told me, it would appear that he had to retire following an offensive movement by the enemy upon Avila where his Divisional General, Maucune, now is.
Don Carlos, making terrible threats, has just ordered a big movement of his troops in the area of the 7th Government [Salamanca], following which the magistrates were re-established in the name of the Regency [Prince Ferdinand, imprisoned like his father Charles IV in France.] New Alcaldes [mayors] were sworn in; and all the flocks and herds were taken to the mountains and the inhabitants were evacuating their villages at our approach. They took with them an enormous amount of corn, bread and salt pork and under pain of death, all available vehicles went with them. They used all available resources to build new ones; the order to do this was carried out with considerable activity on the banks of the Tormes where a great number of carts has been assembled and this number increased daily.
I asked the Prefet what we could do to thwart these activities. He had no suggestions to make. Not being able to give the impression by our silence of condoning these audacious activities, which were terrorising the whole country more and more, I drew up an order, copy enclosed, which I am submitting for your consideration.
This being the state of affairs, an offensive movement by the combined army [Wellington's] has been announced. I do not think that it will take place on the Tormes although it might just happen; but bearing in mind that the Army of Portugal [Marmont's] has been withdrawn and all the country round here is exposed, I think that the attack on Rodrigo will begin very soon. All the evidence I have reported in this letter supports this consideration.
The general rumour is that Rodrigo is in a bad way and that desertion is increasing day by day.
The Prefet, who is not alarmist and who knows the country very well, tells me that the situation is very grave. I have ordered him to send several man to confirm this information. Last year, time was on our side when it helped us save Almeida and Rodrigo, but now it is on the side of the enemy in his present positions, which could be potentially fatal as far as we are concerned.
As to the rest Mon Général, sending food to Rodrigo is no longer a divisional operation. It is a very big and difficult one and must be for the whole army. If the Army of Portugal is not prepared to take up the matter, the final outcome could be very doubtful as far as we are concerned. But how on earth can the Army of Portugal leave its current operation [re-enforcing Suchet at Valencia] where clearly its presence is necessary? On the other hand, how could it forget that one of its most important priorities is to keep Rodrigo in our hands.
THIEBALT [34]
To back up the point, Thiébalt writes again to Dorsenne two days later.
General Thiébalt to General Dorsenne
Mon Général
I learned the following information from a man who came to us from the left bank of the Agueda on the 30th December.
Castaños, [Spanish General] to whom he spoke, is at Fuentes de Oñoro, which proves that he is not using the place as a cantonment.
Every single vehicle that they [the English] can get hold of is being brought here. On the 30th there were 260. This number is by now probably nearer to a thousand. The driver of each cart on arrival at the rendez-vous, seems to have food and forage with him. From this one can only assume that action will start very soon.
The bridge at Yecla has been cut, that at Cerralbo has been mined, and the surrounding area is covered with trenches on which 1500 men are continuing to work. I understand that these are to cover the enemy's left flank and to threaten the right flank of any of our troops that are likely to march on Rodrigo.
They are also talking about works at Tamames, but I am not giving this report any credence, given a possible attack on Rodrigo, which is, as it were, in a sort of cul de sac of about six leagues in length on a very narrow front, and which offers the enemy a very good combat position, particularly suitable for an operation which would not last long.
I continue the Spy's report.
An enormous number of fascines are being manufactured on the left of the Jeltes and the Agueda.
There are at present two bridges on the Agueda; all the villages on the left bank are full of troops. The English cavalry is at Fuente de Guinaldo. The enemy force appears to consist of about 24,000 men.
There is heavy siege artillery at Almeida where much work is being carried out.
The general impression is that the siege of Rodrigo will be starting soon. Nearly all its inhabitants have left. The corregidor [the King's representative] is among them and the spy has spoken to him. He is a person who is most up to date on what is going on.
There has been a general levée of men [Spaniards] who are in a fit state to march.
A rebellious junta at Sobradillo is charged with this operation; more than 80 curés and monks are assembled there, making up the Court of Don Carlos. Near Sobradillo is a useful communication link with Portugal. [35]
THIEBALT
Again Thiébalt is demonstrating his ability to get intelligence of Wellington's preparations. Alas for the French General Dorsenne is not convinced, but he is sufficiently worried to ask for Marmont to return with his troops. He writes:
General Dorsenne to Marshal Marmont
I have the honour of addressing to your Excellency two letters in the original, dated 1 and 3 January from General Thiébalt, Governor of Salamanca. I don't doubt their contents for I have been receiving similar reports for the past six months. I think it helpful that you should be aware of them. Your Excellency is better informed than I am on the situation in the Ciudad Rodrigo area, but I cannot hide the disgust I have for General Barrié as governor, and his character gives me a good deal of worry. I think that the first thing we need to do in the interests of the service of the Emperor is to retire him immediately.
If, contrary to my opinion, the English do make a move towards Ciudad Rodrigo, or even Salamanca, and Don Julian intercepts our convoys, we could relate such a move to their perception of your operation on Valencia. Your Excellency's unexpected return here could well affect their plans.
Before receiving the Emperor's orders vis à vis the reorganisation of the Armies of the Portugal and the North, I have taken some precautionary moves to get more subsistence to Rodrigo. But, presumably you will be very busy settling in and re-organising the 6th and 7th governments, so I thought I'd better lend a hand. I am happy to tell you, M le Maréchal, that because of reorganisation changes, we can organise a convoy containing up to six months' provisions for Rodrigo. The only problem with this operation is the question of transport. It would be helpful if Your Excellency could co-operate by supplying all your available vehicles to get the stores to Rodrigo.
Your Excellency can truly count on my help whatever the circumstances and I can assure him that I want nothing more than to serve and please His Majesty. [36]
The impression one gets from reading this letter is that Dorsenne is offering help and advice to Marmont about the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo, the inference being that he thinks that the fortress now lies within Marmont's command. If we refer back to Marmont's memoirs quoted at the beginning of this article, we get the impression that Marmont considers that it is Dorsenne's responsibility. He says, 'General Dorsenne, who was in charge of the defence of the city…' [37]Here we have a key to the French mismanagement of the whole affair. As Dorsenne is marching eastwards towards Burgos, Marmont is juggling his few remaining troops and moving them northwards into the valley of the Douro. The handover of responsibilities is not being carried out smoothly and seamlessly. Napoleon's reorganisation of commands is spreading confusion and paralysis just at the moment Wellington is going to confound them all.
More Ciudad Rodrigo
|
