Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part II
January 1812
French Moves
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
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Blinded by the Fog of War
At right, the Bell Tower of the Cathedral, just behhind the Great Breach. Marmont to the Major General [Berthier] Valladolid, 13th January 1812 Monseigneur On reading your letter of 21 November, I find that I have not obeyed the Emperor's orders to the letter, and that I have used more discretion than he might have wished in order to complete the transfer of 12,000 men to the Army of the Centre, ... which exercise has achieved next to nothing. It seems that it was His Majesty's intention that I place 4,000 men in echelons in order to maintain communication. The division which I command at the moment and of which His Majesty presumes I am in control, has actually been detached in order to fulfil the orders which you sent me. General Montbrun was not able to pass through Lucena. He should have had mountaineering equipment, and this I have not got. It would seem that it was impractical for him to go to Requeña via Tarazona. Apart from moving along the roads, and of finding subsistence, the route selected presented us with considerable difficulty. The road near Requeña was fortified, and occupied by the enemy whose positions would have been difficult to overcome. Therefore Montbrun took the Alboute road, and manoeuvred himself to the right bank of the Xunar, threatening the enemy's only means of retreat. His arrival in these parts will probably provide a convenient diversion for Marshal Suchet and would have made the investment of the city much easier by separating the garrison force and making it easier for them to return to Murcia. Thus, anything connected with army operations seems to have been promptly sorted out. And if Valencia continues to resist us, we can only capture the city by means of a methodical operation for which General Montbrun's force would be inappropriate. On the other hand, the English will probably not move before the end of February, which will enable me to use all the available troops to carry out my instructions. Thus, I have ordered General Montbrun to organise his people so that he can come and join me. Apart from his two divisions, he has all my light cavalry without which I really cannot manage any kind of operation. His Majesty seems to have the idea that I have three divisions in the Tagus valley, but having seen how spread out they are, and considering the time it would take to draw them together, including what is necessary to set the movement orders in motion, I would need at least 15 days to do so. I have no other means of making my army combat ready, that is to say, bringing all my army together from today's positions. My aim is to keep troops on both banks of the Duero, to be able to hold back operations until all my troops can be reunited. But these considerations apart, I really cannot occupy the whole country allocated to me, establish sources for supplies, and set up a communications regime if only half my army is in the Tagus valley. As a final consideration, the catalyst, which has helped to change the army's situation, is one which I find impossible to live with. I have a considerable body of men who are expected to live off the provinces of La Mancha and Segovia, but this is the source of provisions for the army of the Centre. Nowhere is it possible to organise patrols or even a minor diversion, but somehow I have managed to do so. But despite the superhuman efforts I made before my departure to procure subsistence for my division, it could in no way survive until the harvest, but I suppose nothing is impossible! I arrived at Valladolid the day before yesterday to find that General Dorsenne had prepared a provisions convoy for Rodrigo; thanks to his presence I was able to mitigate one or two of my problems and was able to send the convoy to the city immediately. At the same time I decided the garrison needed reorganising and a new governor appointed. As I have no light cavalry, General Dorsenne lent me what he has here and this, together with the dragoons, will give me sufficient cavalry for this operation. I am supporting them with four divisions which I can do from my own resources. I have no reason to think that the enemy will do anything to hinder their entry to the city. But should the English army cross the Agueda and engage us in battle, I would bring up the division that is now on the Tagus., together with the troops that General Dorsenne is letting me have. But I am sure this will not be necessary. Rodrigo, thanks to the plans outlined above, will have enough provisions to keep it going until harvest time, and there need be no worry about the possibility of a siege. When this operation is complete I will return General Dorsenne's troops to him and the 7th Government without delay. Sanchez's guerillas are doing a fine job of keeping Marmont in ignorance of the true state of affairs. As Wellington prepares to assault the fortress Marmont is not even aware that it is under siege. More Ciudad Rodrigo
Part 1: The French and the Allies Part 1: Wellington's Grand Strategy Part 1: French Grand Strategy Part 1: Opening Moves and Part 1 Footnotes Part 1: Large Map of Spain (slow: 103K) Part 2: The Siege Begins Part 2: French Moves Part 2: The Assault Part 3: Emperor's Anger and the Generals' Defence Part 3: What Went Wrong for the French? Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #41 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
Meanwhile in Valladolid Marmont is in blissful ignorance of events on the boarder, he is more interested in keeping an eye on the Emperor's wishes.