Wellington's Grand Strategy
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
Wellington had been preparing for an attempt on Ciudad Rodrigo since the summer of 1811. On 18th July 1811 he wrote to the British Secretary for War, Lord Liverpool explaining his intentions for the coming year. At right, Ciudad Rodrigo viewed from the west. In the center is the square outline of the castle, left is the bell tower of the cathedral. 'The next operation which presents itself is the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.' [18] In the Peninsular War, Wellington kept his plans close to his chest, too many of his senior officers could not be trusted to keep secrets. They were fond of gossip and wrote home without thought to the consequences. Such information often found its way into the press which Napoleon regularly regarded as a source of information about activities of the English.
However, from the correspondence I have read between Wellington and Lord Liverpool he seems to have been open and candid about his plans and problems. He was also free with his opinions and was often consulted on diverse subjects, from the advantages or not of landing a force on the Spanish east coast to obtaining corn from North America. It was not until 7th August that he began to explain his strategy to selected Generals. In a letter to Beresford he said,
"From what I have heard of the state of the provisions and of the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. I propose to shut it up as soon as I can. ... It must be expected that the enemy will adopt all the means in their power to oblige us to desist from our object and we must be prepared to adopt measures to resist them whenever they should attack us. One of their plans will be to collect the whole of their force; that is Bessière's Army of the North, the Army of Portugal, and the 5th Corps, and fight a general action, to oblige us to relinquish our object..." [19]
As Rathbone comments in Wellington's War, "Ciudad Rodrigo is not so much the object as the bait." [20] Marmont concentrated 60,000 men to enable him to supply the fortress. Wellington's hopes of catching a portion of this force were in the event frustrated. He had, however, forced the French to reduce their presence over much of the country, a reduction of which the guerrillas took full advantage. He wrote to Lord Liverpool on 30th October - He wrote to Lord Liverpool on 30th October -
"It appears from all accounts which I have received, that the guerrillas are increasing in numbers and boldness throughout the Peninsula. ... Both the Empecinado and Mina were very successful against some of the enemy's outposts and detachments, when their [French] armies were lately collected for the relief of Ciudad Rodrigo; and Longa was likewise very successful in the neighbourhood of Vitoria." [21]
All this by merely threatening Ciudad Rodrigo. The areas which had escaped French control, if control is the right word for so tenuous a hold, would now have to be re-occupied, at the cost of numerous lives and large amounts of supplies which they could ill afford.
On 6th November, Wellington wrote again to Lord Liverpool about the French forces needed to replace Governor Renaud, captured by Sanchez's lancers.
"The new governor [of Ciudad Rodrigo] … General Barrié, moved from Salamanca on the 30th October … escorted by one division of infantry and 600 cavalry. … and brought with him a considerable number of cattle for the garrison. The state of the fords on the Agueda … prevented our troops from making any movement to prevent his communication with the place, and the enemy had marched on their return before daylight." [22]
The number of men needed to escort Barrié and his cattle to the fortress seems ample evidence of the effectiveness of Sanchez's guerrillas and the reputation of Wellington's outpost.
At right, Wellington's HQ in Frenada, now a sleepy little village.
The French in planning their strategy took into account the difficulties of laying siege to a fortress such as Ciudad Rodrigo in mid-winter. Conventional wisdom decreed that movement of heavy guns in winter on the impassable roads of the Peninsula was not practicable. At any time, movement of the siege train overland would be very slow, but for Wellington's plans it was essential that it was as near to Ciudad Rodrigo as possible. If overland transport was a problem, Wellington would use water. The siege train, or battering train as Wellington calls it had been brought to by sea Oporto from Lisbon. During the autumn, Wellington had arranged for the Douro river to be surveyed with a view to making it navigable as far upstream as possible. As usual, he spared no effort to gain a military advantage. On 28th November, he wrote to a member of the Portuguese government, Senhor Joaõ Carlos Oliveira Pimentel -
"Understanding that you have from His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal the power to destroy the mill dams in the River Douro, which are the principal obstruction to the navigation, I request you to co-operate with Captain Ross in the performance of this work." [23]
As the December days passed, the state of readiness of his army increased. On 18th December he wrote to Lord Liverpool -
"As Almeida is becoming a place of security, I have brought up our battering train; and in order to prevent the enemy from turning towards Valencia, I have directed materials for a siege to be prepared, and I propose to lay down a bridge on the Agueda. I am also making an effort to get up the stores of our battering train to Almeida, and if I can succeed, I shall be in a situation to attack Ciudad Rodrigo on any day I please, without risk or inconvenience." [24]
By 1st January 1812, he is writing to Lord Liverpool again with more good news.
"I have received reports that the cavalry of the Guard had returned to France, and the infantry of the Guard had likewise moved from Valladolid in a northerly direction [en route to Russia]. … I propose therefore to make an attack on Ciudad Rodrigo. [25]
He continues,
"If I do not succeed I shall at least bring back some of the troops of the Army of the North [Dorsenne] and the Army of Portugal [Marmont], and shall so far relieve the guerrillas [Mina, Longa and Portier] and the Spanish army at Valencia." [26]
At best he could capture the fortress, and the least that could happen was that the French lost much ground to the guerrillas, and possibly Valencia. However the Spanish army under Blake, which was being besieged by Suchet in Valencia on the far side of Spain, capitulated to the French on 9th January. [27]
More Ciudad Rodrigo
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