Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part II
January 1812
The Siege Begins
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
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Large Map of Ciudad Rodrigo (slow: 92K) Colonel Jones, one of Wellington's senior engineers gives a technical description of the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo and its defences.
At right, the site of siege batteries. Foreground, fortress walls with replica cannon. The flats (apartment buildings) are the Lesser Teson--just behind them is the Grand Teson and the Renaud Redoubt.
The exterior enclosure is a modern fausse-braie of a low profile, as to afford but little cover to the interior wall; and from the same defence of the rapid descent of the hill, the fausse-braie itself is very imperfectly covered by its glacis. On the eastern and southern sides there are ravelins to the fausse-braie, but in no part is there a covered way, nor are there any countermines.
Without the town, at the distance of 300 yards, are the suburbs; they are enclosed by a bad earthen retrenchment, hastily thrown up by the Spaniards during the investment of the place in 1810, and the French, since they had been in possession of Rodrigo, had made strong posts of three convents, one on either flank of the suburbs, and one in the centre, and they had also converted into an infantry post the convent of Santa Cruz, situated just beyond the glacis at the north-west angle of the place. The works of the suburbs, therefore, though of little strength in themselves, being supported by these convents, were considered fully equal to resist a coup-de-main [surprise attack].
The ground without the place is generally flat, and the soil rocky, except on the north side where there are two hills called the upper and the lower Tesons. The one at 180 yards from the works, rises nearly to the level of the ramparts, and the other, at 600 yards distance, to the height of 13 feet above them. The soil on these hills is very stony, and during open weather in winter, water rises at the depth of six inches below the surface. The French had erected a small redoubt on the highest hill, which from its situation prevented any attack on the northern side till it should be taken.
The redoubt was supported by two guns and a howitzer in battery on the flat roof of the fortified convent of San Francisco at 400 yards from it, and a large proportion of the artillery of the place (particularly mortars and howitzers placed behind the rampart of the fausse braie) was in battery to fire upon the approach from the hill.
The difficulty of contending with a rocky soil, and the fear of delay in gaining possession of the suburbs, rendered an attack from the north most advisable, notwithstanding the superior fire of that front, and the opposition the redoubt would offer, particularly as it was known from the recent siege by the French that the walls of the place might be breached on that side from the lower Teson over the glacis, whereas on the eastern and southern sides it appeared doubtful, from the fall of the ground, if enough of the walls could be seen to breach them, without the tedious and difficult operation of erecting batteries on the edge of the counter-scarp.
Moreover, on the northern side a small ravine at the foot of the glacis, and its consequent steepness, would conceal the workmen from the view of the place during the operation of mining to blow in the counter scarp, should it become necessary; which circumstance could not but have great weight in forming the plan of attack, where not a single officer had ever seen the operation performed.
Wellington's opening move was to take the Renaud redoubt, so called after the previous governor who had been captured by the guerrillas. The attack was a complete success, Wellington's description of this operation in his report to Lord Liverpool is brief but gives tantalising hints of a daring action carried out with resolve.
General Viscount Wellington KB to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State
Gallegos, 9th January 1812
My Lord
According to the intention which informed your Lordship that I entertained, I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday.
Since the enemy have had possession of the place, they have constructed a palisade redoubt on the hill of San Francisco, and have fortified three convents in the suburbs, the defences of which are connected with the work on the hill of San Francisco, and with the old line by which the suburb was surrounded. By these means the enemy have increased the difficulty of approaching the place; and it was necessary to obtain possession of the work on the hill of San Francisco before we could make any progress in the attack. Accordingly, Major General Craufurd directed a detachment of the Light Division, under the command of Lieut Colonel Colborne of the 52nd, to attack the work, shortly after it was dark. The attack was very ably conducted by Lieut Colonel Colborne, and the work was taken by storm in a short time. Two captains and 47 men were made prisoners, the remainder of the garrison being put to the sword in the storm. We took three pieces of cannon.
I cannot sufficiently applaud the conduct of Lieut Colonel Colborne, and of the detachment under his command upon this occasion. I am happy to add that our loss in this affair has not been severe; 6 men having been killed: Captain Mein of the 52nd, Lieut Hawkesly, 95th and Lieut Woodgate, 52nd, and 14 men having been wounded.
The success of this operation enabled us immediately to break ground within 600 yards of the place, notwithstanding that the enemy still hold the fortified convents; and the enemy's work has been turned into a part of our first parallel, and a good communication made with it.
It is impossible for me to conjecture the length of time which will be required to bring the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo to a successful conclusion. Our means of transporting our stores and materials depend upon the Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and the movements of this description of persons are very uncertain. The weather, also, which may be expected at this season of the year, may interrupt or retard our progress; and the enemy may have time to bring back to this part of the country the troops which have been removed from hence in order to aid the operations of Marshal Suchet in Valencia, and I may be obliged to raise the siege. If this effect alone should be produced, we shall have rendered a great service to the Spaniards.
I think it probable that Marmont will return immediately, as I understand that great doubts were entertained by the Ministers and Generals at Madrid of the expediency of his movements to the eastward, in consequence of intelligence which had been received that I had constructed a bridge on the Agueda; and that in the end of last month he had not left Madrid.
Wellington has often been accused of being too sparing with his praise, but not on this occasion. Note that he does not totally immerse himself in the action before him, he is also looking at the bigger picture with his references to Suchet and Valencia. As is also usual Wellington is also seeing to the welfare of his men, a special order is drawn up which specifies how each division will take its turn in the siege trenches. Instructions to General Officers commanding divisions, employed in the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo Gallegos, 8th January 1812 The Commander of the Forces proposes to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, and in order that the troops may suffer as little as possible from exposure to the weather, he intends that the operations shall be carried on by each of the divisions of the army employed, alternately, for 24 hours. Brigadier General Pack's brigade, with the exception of the 4th Cacadores, will do duty with the Light Division. The 4th Cacadores will do duty with the 1st division. When a division is ordered for the duty of the siege, each of the battalions belonging to it is to march from its cantonments before daylight in the morning. The troops from the several cantonments of the division [march] separately, by the shortest and most convenient route, which the General Officers commanding divisions are requested to ascertain. The troops will be able to cross at the fords above La Caridad, and all the fords below the ford of Carboneros inclusive. The troops are to have with them a day's provisions cooked, and they are to be followed by two days' spirits, and no other baggage. A sufficient number of men to cook the provisions for the day the division is relieved are to be left in the cantonments. As soon as the first battalion of the relieving division shall arrive on the ground, the General Officer commanding the division which has performed the duty for preceding 24 hours, will commence the relief, by sending off to their cantonments a proportionate number of troops, those of course first which have the greatest distance to go to their cantonments, and the relief will proceed in proportion as the troops shall arrive. The Chief Engineer will require daily from each division
30 artificers, or persons accustomed to work with a proportion of non-commissioned officers These men will be fixed upon before the troops march from their cantonments, and are to be placed under his directions (with a list of their names and the regiments to which they belong) on the arrival of the troops on the ground. Each regiment is to take along with it the intrenching [sic] tools belonging to it. There will be orders daily respecting the working parties, covering parties, guards &c. The musket and rifle ammunition attached to the Light Division is to be taken to the ground the first day, and remain there. The 9-pounders attached to the 4th division will likewise be taken to the ground on the first day, and remain there. The artillery men are to be relieved daily, by those belonging to the brigades and troops attached to the 1st, 4th and Light Divisions. The engineers will order to the ground a sufficiency of cutting tools, to enable those men not immediately on duty to supply themselves with firewood. These tools to be handed over from the relieved to the relieving division. Each division to be attended by the Medical Staff belonging to it. A place will be fixed upon to which men who may be wounded are to be carried to be dressed, and means will be provided for removing them from thence to their cantonments. Besides the men's welfare, Wellington is keen to get the siege guns up. He writes to Major Dickson of the Royal Artillery commanding the siege train. General Viscount Wellington KB to Major Dickson RA Gallegos, 9th January 1812, 5 pm My Dear Sir You will have heard that we carried the redoubt on the hill of San Francisco last night, and we have opened our parallel within 600 yards of the place. Colonel Fletcher expects to be ready for the guns, possibly by the 11th, at night, or 12th in the morning, as he intends to begin his batteries this night. I think it probable that the gun bullocks will have arrived this day. If they should, I beg you to make an effort to get the guns here in one day. They will certainly require a day to go from hence to the ground of the siege. Believe me &c He is also keeping an eye on events in the south. He writes on the 9th to Lieut General Hill, commander of the forces monitoring those of Marshal Soult. General Viscount Wellington KB to Lieut General Hill Gallegos, 9th January 1812 Sir I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 6th instant. … As your advance to Merida must by this time have had all the effect expected from it, and as I observe that General Drouet has retired upon Llerena, I request you to move your corps back to the frontiers of Portugal, and place it with its right at Portalegre, its centre and your headquarters at Niza, and two brigades of infantry at Castello Branco. My reason for wishing you to take this position is that I think it probable that when the enemy shall find that I have attacked Ciudad Rodrigo, they will endeavor to divert my attention from that operation by movements by the valley of the Alagon towards the frontier of Lower Beira. The effect of these movements would be entirely frustrated by your being in the position pointed out, as you will be able to cross the Tagus at least as fast as the enemy can advance, by the vale of Plasencia. It is very desirable to destroy the enemy's works at Merida; and I recommend you to destroy them if you should find that you can do so without inconvenience. As you will probably move by cantonments, those troops which will leave Merida the last night might be employed to perform this service. I am desirous, however, that no time should be unnecessarily lost in marching the troops to the opposition I have above pointed out. I invested Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday, and broke ground before the place last night. I enclose the extract of a letter to the Secretary of State, giving an account of a very handsome operation performed by a detachment of the Light Division, commanded by Lieut Colonel Colborne. I have the honour to be, &c For Wellington the siege has started well and he is co-ordinating his forces so as to cover possible French counter moves. More Ciudad Rodrigo
Part 1: The French and the Allies Part 1: Wellington's Grand Strategy Part 1: French Grand Strategy Part 1: Opening Moves and Part 1 Footnotes Part 1: Large Map of Spain (slow: 103K) Part 2: The Siege Begins Part 2: French Moves Part 2: The Assault Part 3: Emperor's Anger and the Generals' Defence Part 3: What Went Wrong for the French? Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #41 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
Ciudad Rodrigo is built on rising ground on the right bank of the Agueda, and has a double enceinte all round it. The interior wall is of an old construction, of the height of thirty-two feet, and is generally of bad masonry, without flanks, and with weak parapets, and narrow ramparts.
At right, closer view of cannon in the area of the Great Breach, though which Picton's 3rd Division stormed.