Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
Part I
January 1812
Opening Moves and Footnotes
Commentary by John Salmon, translations by Jane Hoyle
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By the beginning of January 1812, Wellington was already well on the way to investing Ciudad Rodrigo, but not without some frustrations mostly with his allies. He wrote to the Spanish General Castaños regarding additional Spanish troops who are being levied. Thiébalt mentions this levée in the last but one paragraph of his letter dated 3 January 1812 quoted above. General Viscount Wellington KB to General Castaños
Sir I have perused the letter from Don Carlos de España, which your excellency put into my hands yesterday in regard to the distresses of the troops under his command; and I am much concerned that they are of a nature to induce that officer to desire to relinquish his situation, more particularly as it is entirely out of my power to adopt any of the measures which he proposes for their relief. Don Carlos de España must have known that I had not the command of money in sufficient sums even for the wants of the troops under my command; he must have known that I have been obliged to send three divisions, and almost all the cavalry of this army to the rear, because I am unable at present to feed them [at the] front. And I am astonished that, on the eve of a great operation, which will require the exertion of every disciplined soldier who can be brought to the front, he should propose that I should be called upon to supply money, which he knows I have not, or food, which he knows I cannot get, for the support of 4000 recruits. Eight hundred of these recruits are now in Tras os Montes, and are supplied by a British commissary attached to them at great inconvenience and expense. I am willing to undertake to supply 800 more with provisions, provided they are sent into Tras os Montes, and provided a sufficient number of mules are attached to and sent with the, to carry the supplies which they will require from the magazine at St Joaõ da Pesqueira to the station which these troops will occupy in Tras os Montes. I have to inform your excellency that I have received intelligence that 4000 greatcoats, and other articles for 4000 men, being part of the requisition made by Don Carlos de España for these same men, have been embarked in the Thames, and may be expected daily at Oporto. I conclude, however, that as Don Carlos proposes that these men should be disbanded, he will not now require these articles. I have the honour to be &c WELLINGTON [38]
On the same day he was dealing with the niceties of transporting stores, a boring, but vital one in the Peninsular War. The memorandum below illustrates this, and shows Wellington's attention to detail.
MEMORANDUM
Freneda, 4th January 1812
1. Eighty carts, only of those which left Almedia yesterday, and are now at Gallegos, to be sent back to Almeida, to be there loaded with articles for Colonel Fletcher, [Wellington's Chief Engineer], and to proceed to Gallegos on the 6th.
2. Forty carts of those now at Gallegos to come to Freneda on the 5th, to be loaded with stores of Colonel Fletcher's at Freneda, and to go to Gallegos on the 6th.
3. Forty carts of those now at Gallegos to come to Freneda on the 5th, to be loaded with stores of Colonel Fletcher's at Freneda, and to go to Gallegos on the 6th.
4. The forty-five carts which were sent to Almeida this morning, to be loaded with powder and shot and to go to Gallegos on the 5th and there remain; the powder and shot being laid down at Gallegos.
5. All the carts which shall go to Gallegos, excepting the eighty and forty ordered away by the 1st and 2nd articles of this memorandum, to be detained there, and loaded with materials and stores of the engineers' department.
WELLINGTON [39]
In other correspondence with Lord Liverpool he expresses more of his frustrations and hopes.
General Viscount Wellington KB to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State
My dear Lord
The contents of my last letters will have inclined you to expect that by this time I should have invested Ciudad Rodrigo. I thought that I should, after a fair calculation of the work to be done preparatory to that operation, and of the means at my disposal to perform it; but after every allowance is made, we must expect disappointments where we have to deal with Portuguese and Spanish carters and muleteers, and therefore I cannot invest the place till tomorrow.
What do you think of empty carts taking two days to go ten miles on a good road? After all, I am obliged to appear satisfied, or they would all desert!
I shall not write my weekly report till I shall return from investing the place tomorrow.
At this season of the year, and depending upon Portuguese and Spaniards for means of having what is required, I can scarcely venture to calculate the time which this operation will take, but I should think not less than 24 or 25 days. If we do not succeed, we shall at least bring back upon ourselves all the force which has marched away, and I hope we may save Valencia, or at all events afford more time to the Asturians, Galicians &c. If we do succeed, we shall make a fine campaign in the spring.
According to your Lordship's desire I will endeavour to have a communication with General Lacy in Catalonia. I have not a sufficient knowledge of affairs on the eastern coast to be able to decide whether it would be practicable to employ a detachment in that quarter with advantage, on the principles of my dispatch to General Cooke, a copy of which I enclosed to your Lordship.
I have frequently turned over in my mind the practicability of making an attack (combined land and sea) upon Barcelona, but I understand the place is one of the first order. It is sufficiently garrisoned, and an attack would require a very large and efficient force, and much time would necessarily elapse in the operations. In this time the French Government would have it in their power to send, even from France, an army for its relief.
Believe me &c
WELLINGTON [40]
Even Wellington thinks that the siege will take 24/25 days. This is clearly based on the time it took the French to reduce the place during the first siege back in July 1810. But he is clear about the effect of his movements on other events in Spain, especially on the siege of Valencia and the actions of the guerillas. His opinions on landing a diversionary force on the Spanish east coast are almost clairvoyant. Britain did indeed land forces there in 1813, the progress of the campaign was almost exactly as he foretold.
On the 8th January 1812, Wellington's forces arrived outside Ciudad Rodrigo and the siege commenced.
To be continued in the next issue. A full bibliography and acknowledgements will appear at the end of Part III.
[1] This report is inaccurate as there were two breaches. Marshal Marmont was nowhere near Ciudad Rodrigo at this time.
More Ciudad Rodrigo
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