Aftermath

"The march to Italy was much as I have described it. The army reached the frontier in the fifth month, as records have it, after leaving New Carthage. The crossing of the Alps took fifteen days. There is great difference of, opinion about the size of Hannibal's army on his arrival in Italy; the greatest recorded estimate puts it at 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse; the lowest at 20,000, 6000 Horse"

(Ed Note. The lowest are Hannibal's figures based on the inscription seen by Polybios in the temple of Lacinian Juno close to Croton. [Polybios Book III 33] We assume them to be accurate.)

"I should myself be most agreeable in accepting the statements of Lucius Cincius Alimentus (who mentions in his account that he was taken prisoner by Hannibal) if only he did not confuse the issue, by including Gallic and Ligurian troops. These included, puts the total numbers of the army led into at 80,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry; but I think it more likely and other writers support my view that the Gauls and Ligurians joined voluntarily later. Alimentus further states that he learned from Hannibal himself that, after crossing the Rhone, he lost 36,000 men and an enormous number of horses and pack-animals, having descended into Italy via the byway of the Ligurian Taurini, on the borders of Gallic territory. As this latter fact is generally accepted, I cannot understand why there should be any doubt about the route he followed over the Alps, or why it is often supposed that he crossed by the Pennine Alps (which got their name by the fact of his crossing) farther north." (Ed Note This is assumed to be the Large St. Bernard pass).

"The historian Coelius Antipater says that he crossed by Mt Cremo (Little St Bernard sfp) but neither of these routes would have brought him to the Taurini -- they would have led through the territory of the hill dwelling Salassi to the Libuan Gauls. Nor is it likely that those more northern passes into Gaul were then open; the route, especially, which leads to the Perinine Alps would have been blocked by Germanized tribes, and there is another thing which anyone to be disposed to believe in the Pennine route might well consider that the Veragri, who live thereabouts, know nothing of the derivation of the name 'Pennine' from the circumstance of the 'Punic' crossing. On the contrary, they derive the name from Penninus, the divinity to whom they have consecrated a shrine on the mountain top.

Conveniently for the start of Hannibal's operations, war had broken out between the Taurini and the Insubrian Gauls. Hannibal was not, however, in a position to use his troops in armed support of either party, as they were not yet fully recovered from their tribulations and the early stages of convalescence are often worse than the disease. The men had become as filthy and unkempt as savages, and the sudden change from labor to that of leisure, from starvation to plenty, from dirt and misery to decent living had affected them in various ways.

It was this that offered the Consul P. Cornelius Scipio a chance of coming to grips with them before they were properly fit again, and for that reason, after reaching Pisae, he took over had hurried northward to the Po, having taken over from Manlius and Atilius a body of inexperienced troops, still somewhat confused by their recent defeat by the Gauls (Boii).

By the time he reached Placentia, Hannibal had moved on and had already taken by storm the chief town of the Taurini who had refused to ally themselves with him; he might have secured by intimidation the support -- or even the willing support -- of the Gauls in the neighborhood of the Po, had not the consul's appearance surprised those tribes still looking round for the best moment to secede.

At the same time Hannibal left the Taurini feeling that his presence would induce those Gauls who had not yet made up their minds as to which side to take to follow him." [Livius Book XXI 38-39] 

The stage was set for the first major clash in the Second Punic War.

Conclusion

So ended one of the most audacious marches in history, immortalizing Hannibal and stirring up considerable controversy in the process. The proposed route centers on the belief that Hannibal was not interested in wide marches into the hinterland of Gaul--that he wanted to get to Italy and get there as quickly as possible. The Gallic tribes north of the Pyrenees may have delayed him and a Roman consular army under Scipio may have caused him to detour north, but the hypothesis that Hannibal would ever head eastward as soon as possible to clear the Alps before winter remains solid.

Exaggeration in the name of Roman patriotism played a part in the recording of Hannibal's exploits. Both Polybius and Livy are suspect in this arena, and if numbers count, lower rather than higher estimates should be used. Just as distances might be stretched, so too are the distances marched stretched. The further an army--ancient or modern--marches, the greater the attrition rate. The faster it marches, the greater the attrition rate. The rougher the terrain, the greater the attrition rate. Hannibal knew this, which is why he stopped to let stragglers return and rest for the next segment.

Hannibal would go on to become one of the great captains of history, keeping a coalition of troops together for 15 years, winning improbable victories while ultimately losing the war.

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Hannibal Crosses the Alps A Route Examined and a Proposed Alternate Route

Introduction
The Sources
Hannibal's March: Polybios and Livy
Polybios vs. Livy: Debate Over Details
A New Route Proposed: Begin at the End
A New Route Proposed: Start at the Beginning
A New Route Proposed: Where is the Druentia?
A New Route Proposed: The Pass in the Alps
Aftermath, Conclusion, and Bibliography