The year 1941 ended in total disaster for the British Navy. In November, German U-boats torpedoed and sank carrier Ark Royal and HMS Barham (at right, Barham sinks). In December, battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant, light cruisers Galatea and Neptune were lost. Adding to this carnage were the losses of the Prince of Wales and Repulse to the Japanese and the onslaught in Malaya.

By 1 January 1942, only three light cruisers and some destroyers were operational out of Alexandria. The return of a large Luftwaffe presence in Italy put the Central Mediterranean in jeopardy and with it, Malta. Cunningham was forced to withdraw his surface forces from the renewed blitz, and keeping the island supplied became a major problem.

A taste of these problems came in the Gulf of Sirte on 17 December 1941. A British cruiser force of three light cruisers and four destroyers escorted a large supply ship to Malta. En route they were met by the then-intact Force K. Also at sea was an Italian convoy of four ships with a Doria class battleship, three light cruisers, and ten destroyers in close escort. Trailing this vital African convoy was another force consisting of battleships Littorio, Doria, and Cesare, two heavy cruisers, and ten destroyers as added escort. Very late in the day the Littorio group brushed briefly with the British cruisers. The "action" lasted all of 10 minutes, with no damage to either side before the Italians retired from the potential of a night action. So ended the First Battle of Sirte.

Both sides claimed victory from the clash, and both had good reason. Each convoy had made its respective ports safely, providing valuable supplies to their forces.

For the Italians, this was a significant success, given the slaughter of their merchants in October and November. But the use of 100,000 tons of warships to convoy 20,000 tons of supplies was exceedingly costly in oil and effort. The level of effort was a credit to the effectiveness of the British campaign against the African convoys.

For the British, their claim was based on their supply ship getting to Malta safely and having survived an encounter with a wholly superior force. Admiral Vian's tactics of harassment and maneuver worked well, although it certainly was not tested significantly. Had the encounter taken placed earlier in the day, the story might well have had a different ending. The true significance of the battle was the fact that the Italians came out at all. It signalled the fact that the Central Mediterranean was again to be contested.

By early spring, 1942, things were bad and getting worse. New cruisers were trickling in, but HMS Naiad was sunk, almost taking Vian with her. Malta was under severe bombardment and getting closer to absolute starvation. It was apparent that another convoy to the battered island was needed and, in March, it set out. Four supply ships, carrying 26,000 tons, sailed, escorted by light cruisers Cleopatra, Dido, and Euryalus, and four destroyers. Antiaircraft cruiser Carlisle and five destroyers provided close escort for the convoy, and Force K survivor Penelope joined in route.

Alerted to the convoy's departure, Iachino sailed to intercept with heavy cruisers Gorizia and Trento, light cruiser Bande Nere, and ten destroyers, flagged in Littorio. The weather was deteriorating rapidly as the two forces converged. At 1400 on 22 March, the Italian heavy cruisers found the escort group and engaged at long range. Vian's force spread smoke, which blew directly toward the oncoming Italians, and began weaving in and out of the cloud, sniping at the enemy. The heavy cruisers retired to the north, hoping to draw the British after them in the ruse they had used at Matapan. Vian instead rejoined the convoy and pressed westward.

Iachino united his command and closed in. At 15,000 yards, Littorio opened fire on the reappearing cruisers. Vian again made smoke and opened fire, dodging in and out of the smoke. Gunnery was bad on both sides as smoke and spray combined to block the fall of the shot. The wind continued to blow directly at the Italians, keeping the smoke screen between the converging lines. Vian occasionally lost sight of some of the enemy ships and had to dodge eastward to ensure that no ships were attempting to slip around the rear of the escorts to fall upon the convoy.

Several hours into the engagement very little damage had been done. Bande Nere had planted a 6" shell into Cleopatra's bridge. Euryalus was peppered by a 15" near miss and another 15" shell passed completely through destroyer Kingston. For this, the Italians had received minor damage to Littorio, the primary target of the British gunners. lachino had closed to within 11,000 yards and was forcing the British to veer south away from Malta.

Toward dusk, Vian ordered his destroyers to attack with torpedoes. The valiant destroyers charged the enemy line, closing to within 5000 yards before launching their deadly fish. There were no hits scored for the 25 torpedoes launched, but lachino had to evade and discontinue his attack. As darkness fell, the Italians withdrew, following their orders to avoid night actions, and the British watched the surface threat to their valuable convoy disappear into the stormy darkness. The Second Battle of Sirte had ended.

Epilogue

An epilogue is in order before analyzing the action. Of the four supply ships in the convoy, only two fought their way through the Axis air attacks to actually reach Malta. Both were sunk at their moorings in Grand Harbor after off-loading only 5000 tons. The Italians were severely punished by the storm that worsened after the battle - two destroyers sank and Bande Nere was damaged so extensively that major repairs were required. (She was sunk by submarine on her way to those repairs.) Two of the damaged British destroyers were laid up and ultimately sunk at Malta.

In retrospect, the battle could be considered an outstanding British tactical success, but the results of the battle are much less conclusive. Vian's aggressive harassment of a superior enemy was extraordinary in all respects - such a battle early in the war would have been unthinkable by the period's tacticians. The Italians did not get to the convoy, despite 4 hours of trying.

But that convoy was ultimately destroyed from the air, having delivered only a fraction of its cargo. Malta was certainly spared by the action but not saved by any stretch of the imagination. The Italians had pressed their attack vigorously, despite the weather and return fire - given better weather, they could have well blown the escorts aside and attacked the convoy. This fact was acknowledged by the British Admiralty. The weakness of the British in the eastern Mediterranean was such that the Lords decided not to risk a convoy in April or May, due to the continued threat of the Italian fleet and the lack of British air cover. For this alone, the battle could well have been awarded to the Italians.

On the Italian side, while frustrated in his efforts to reach and destroy the convoy, lachino did push the British far out of their intended line of sail, allowing Axis air superiority more time to operate. So, while the immediate goal was not met, the overall objective was. The Italian commander has been severely criticized for not sending a force windward to flank the British line.

This is certainly a valid point. Had he done so, the British smoke screen would have been worthless, and wholesale slaughter in all probability would have ensued. He chose instead to keep his force intact together between Vian and his destination, a totally valid tactic, and not risk damage and delay by sailing ships into the teeth of a 27 knot wind to flank the enemy line. As the post-battle weather damage proved, his was a genuine concern.

In summary, the British won an impressive tactical victory against superior odds, granting them another badly needed morale boost, but they had that victory nullified by the inability to protect themselves from the Axis air blitz. The situation remained very much in doubt. Admiral Cunningham in the last days of his reign over the eastern Mediterranean could still only muster 3 light cruisers and 15 destroyers against the combined strength, both surface and air, of the Axis. The battle of Sirte had not delivered enough supplies to Malta, and the island remained close to surrender. The gauntlet would have to be run again.

The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943

Italians and British
The Opening Moves - 1940
Battle of Crete
Light Forces: Italians and British
Battles of Sirte
Malta Convoys
End Game
Italy's War Aims
State of the Regia Marina