The land war in North Africa during World War II has been discussed and dissected by writers and historians at length for the past 40+ years. Less well known than the fluctuating fortunes on land was the 3-year struggle for naval supremacy between the British Royal Navy and the Italian fleet. Most people dismiss the Italian Fleet's role in the conflict, citing the battles of Matapan and Sirte.

Top photo: The Italian battleship Vittorio Veneto, of the Littorio class at her commissioning.

To a large extent, they have a point - the Italian battle record is less than auspicious. But it is a fact that from the outbreak of the war to the Italian surrender in 1943, Italian and British ship losses were nearly dead even - 193 Italian ships lost compared to 191 British vessels sunk. And of these British losses, the Italian Navy can lay claim to over half.

The naval conflict in the Mediterranean was characterized by large inconclusive engagements with no clear cut decisions to lopsided victories, such as Matapan. The saga includes acts of extreme heroism against heavy odds on both sides: the 48 British fliers against the Italian Fleet at Taranto or the 6 Italian frogmen against the British Fleet at Alexandria. As will be seen, the outcome was determined by luck, miscalculation, missed opportunities, leadership and, ultimately, by the men who fought.

The Italians

The commencement of hostilities in June 1940 caught Italy's war machine only partially prepared for war. Mussolini was far short of the stockpiled materials needed to sustain an all-out war effort on the scale of which he dreamed. Most significant in this shortfall was the fuel oil for the Navy -- the country had only a year's supply and no real hope of conquering any more. In addition, Italian industry, while known for its quality, could never hope to compete in quantity with its soon-to- be foes. This shortcoming would be magnified by the lack of raw materials.

Of all the military services, the Navy was perhaps the most prepared, although the declaration of war caught many ships still undergoing refits. The Fleet was built around four modernized WWI battleships sporting 12.6" guns, two brand new 15" battleships (with two more under construction), and seven new 8" cruisers. With its escorts of light cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and the famed MAS torpedo boats, the Italian Navy was a formidable force. To compare rival ships:

a. Battleships The new Littorio class battleships were armed with 3x3 15"/50 guns with a maximum range of nearly 46,000 yards. The main British battleships in the Mediterranean were the modernized Queen Elizabeth (QE) class with 4x2 15"/42 guns having a maximum range of only 32,000 yards. It is worth noting that while the accuracy at these ranges approached the "extreme luck" stage, the difference was a real concern to the Royal Navy. Of more importance was the speed of the rival ships; the Littorio class was designed for a speed of 30 knots and achieved a sea speed of 28 knots. The QE class had speeds in the 22-24 knot range, depending on how well the ship's machinery had been cared for. With the older Italian battleships capable of 26 knots, the Italians held the edge in speed and power.

b. Cruisers The Italian cruisers were even more threatening. The Trento class' main armament consisted of 4x2 8"/50 guns ranging between 30-34,000 yards. Their best wartime speeds were held around 31 knots. The British countered with their 6" light cruisers, comparable in speed (32 knots), but their 6" /50 main rifles were outranged by a good 10,000 yards. The Italians also built fast light cruisers of their own. One big advantage the Italian heavy cruisers had that was unknown at the time was their resemblance to the older Italian battleships. This resemblance would plague British spotters throughout the war.

Apart from the main vessels, the Italians had a group of ships that gained most of the glory for the Italians and put them in a class by themselves as far as innovative use. These were the light craft. The motoscafi antisommergibili (MAS) torpedo boats played havoc on enemy submarines, convoys, and ports when used aggressively. Armed with two 17.7 torpedoes and six depth charge and capable of speeds of 40-44 knots, these boats and their complement of assault craft turned out to be the most effective weapon the Italians had.

Four main types of assault craft were used with the MAS forces.

The first was the pocket submarine' carrying torpedoes and two men, very similar to the Japanese midget subs used at Pearl Harbor.

Second were the "hogs", piloted torpedo carrying two men and a detachable 200-300 Kg warhead.

Third were the explosive boats, motor boats packed with explosives and piloted by a single man, essentially modern fireships.

Finally, there were mines capable of being towed by swimmers.

Material Edge

Materially, the Italians held the edge in newer equipment throughout the conflict. Their opponents rated them highly for gunnery, speed, torpedoes, communications, and maneuvering. However, the Fleet had four main drawbacks. First was the lack of aircraft carriers. Mussolini steadfastly refused to authorize the building of one, deeming Italy and her Air Force an unsinkable carrier.

The need for a carrier was brought out early in the opening skirmishes and hammered home at Matapan (more on the Air Force later). Second was the lack of radar, which affected their long-range gunnery and their night fighting capabilities (Matapan again). Third, the Italian designers built for speed and sacrificed armor to do it. This made the Italian ships fast and powerful, but it adversely affected their sea handling. In rough weather the Italian ships, particularly the light cruisers and destroyers, had severe problems.

For example, the Italians suffered more damage from the foul weather than from British gunnery at the second battle of Sirte. Finally, the most important flaw was in the command structure of the Italian Fleet. The officers were well informed, trained and competent, but received their orders and instructions from Rome through a chain of command that effectively stifled individual initiative.

A discussion of the Italian Fleet's preparedness for war would not be complete without a brief discussion of the Italian Air Force. As mentioned previously, Commando Supremo (the Italian High Command) felt an independent air force could do anything required by the Navy. There were, unfortunately, two problems with this thinking.

The first involved the interaction between forces, in particular Supermarina and Superaereo. If a fleet commander needed air support, he had to request it from Supermarina who passed the request along to Superaereo. If the Italians were taking the initiative, cooperation was slow but reasonable. But if the fleet was reacting to enemy moves, this chain of command was extremely cumbersome - and generally futile.

But aside from a few reconnaissance aircraft, the fleet was bound by this process. The second problem lay with the Air Force's tactical doctrine of over-water attacks. The Air Force trained in and used high level, small bomb attacks, ignoring the tactics of dive bombing and torpedo bombing virtually throughout the war. Although intensively trained in these tactics, Italian airmen displayed little accuracy in battle and even worse target recognition. Both these problems came to light as early as off Punto Stilo in July 1940, where the Italian airmen bombed both fleets for hours and inflicted a single dud hit on a British cruiser.

But perhaps the single biggest problem the Navy faced during the war was Commando Supremo's opinion of its strength and capabilities. Rome held the opinion that the fleet was weaker than its opponents and therefore relegated it to a passive defensive role. The principle laid down by Supermarina for fleet use reflected these high level attitudes:,

1. The battleline was to be kept ready to intervene in case of an important enemy initiative. (Belot, "The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-1945" (Greenwood 1969))

2. Operations were to be carried out with light, fast elements; mines were to be laid across enemy lines of communication, especially in the Sicilian Channel.

3. The greatest emphasis was to be placed on air action in direct or indirect collaboration with the Navy.

4. Assault craft were to be developed and used in surprise attacks.

So the picture of the Italian Navy as it began the 3-year struggle shows a fleet well-armed, well-trained, and well motivated, with its good and bad points. But it was saddled with a higher leadership which doubted its capabilities and commanded absolutely, with poor direction and planning.

The British

Prior to 1937, the Mediterranean was virtually an Allied lake; despite the Italian presence, the British and French held sway over the region. The Royal Navy was based at Malta and Alexandria, with responsibility for the eastern portion, while the French fleet in Algeria and her own south coast covered the west. For the British, the Mediterranean was vital as it offered access to her oil interests in the Middle East. Without that control, the British would have to ship around the horn of Africa, adding some 8000 miles to the journey. In addition to the importance of her oil, British strategists saw the Mediterranean theater as the most likely choice for a counterattack against a continental foe, underscoring their belief that "who holds the Mediterranean holds the world." This philosophy was to cause considerable argument with American strategic planners.

In 1937, Mediterranean politics underwent a radical change as the Italians launched their assault on Ethiopia. From this act it became clear that Italy could no longer be considered a friendly power. The Royal Navy's base at Malta came under close scrutiny from London. While the tiny island was centrally located and perfectly placed for interdiction of the Central Mediterranean, it was also terribly vulnerable from the air, especially with Sicily only 90 miles to the north. The island required the importation of 75% of its food, so that a major supply effort would be needed to keep the population from starving, much less keep a battle fleet at combat readiness.

The reluctant decision was made to rebase the Malta ships at Alexandria. The decision was based on comparing the Royal Navy presence to that of the Italians. Combined, the Royal Navy was more than a match for the Italian fleet, but split into two sections 2000 miles apart, each half became weaker than its potential enemy, situated directly across their lines of communication. Each half could then be subjected to defeat in detail, should a major fleet action take place. It is ironic that the Italians continued to compare their fleet strength with the combined Royal Navy. Both sides entered the conflict thinking itself the weaker.

When war broke out in 1939, Italy, by staying neutral, gave the British some breathing space. Not having to counter an immediate threat to her Mediterranean pipeline allowed her to strip away much of the fleet strength to meet commitments elsewhere in the world, particularly against the ill-prepared, but powerful Kriegsmarine. With the French fleet still controlling the western Mediterranean, the British were lulled into a false sense of security - soon to be shattered.

In June 1940, Britain was faced with a very serious, unforeseen situation. She had not expected that the fall of France would carry with it all French foreign holdings AND the French fleet. In addition, the Royal Navy had been in effect blockading Italy's colonial trade, stifling raw material importation and pushing the neutral country closer to war. With France on the verge of falling in an incredibly short period of time, Mussolini declared war to get in on the action, catching the British with their proverbial "pants" down.

Instead of having the French fleet to aid the battle with the Italians, Britain now saw the distinct possibility that those same ships would be operating against them under Axis control. When Mussolini declared war, the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean was weak, divided, and alone. At the outbreak of hostilities, the fleet based at Alexandria consisted of three QE class remodernized battleships, five light cruisers, two destroyer flotillas, and eight submarines. This surface fleet was augmented by the old aircraft carrier Eagle.

By the end of June, this force was strengthened with Force H at Gibraltar, consisting of HMS Hood, 2 QE battleships, 2 cruisers, 12 destroyers, and the carrier Ark Royal. However, these ships not only had responsibility for the western Mediterranean but also had to contend with the areas in the Atlantic vulnerable to German raiders. Far more significant to the British than the difference in ships available was the difference in area air power. British air strength in the Mediterranean that June totalled no more than 200 aircraft, mostly obsolete biplanes such as the Swordfish bomber and Gladiator fighters. These few planes had to oppose an Italian air force nearly ten times larger. It was no wonder the British felt uncertain about their future in the Mediterranean.

Ship comparisons with the Italians have already been mentioned. The Italians could, by virtue of their speed and armament, determine when and where to seek action, when to break off, and when to avoid. An additional disadvantage of the British ships was their wholly inadequate antiaircraft batteries aboard ship. The sole material advantage the British held was in better sea handling and heavier armor - but not enough to offset the difference in guns, especially with the cruisers.

Advantages

The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean did have two advantages over its numerically superior foes. One was its aircraft carriers.

Rather than be chained to land-based air support, as were the Italians, the fleet was able to function with an air arm under its direct control, considerably enhancing cooperation between surface and air units. The second advantage was radar, although the early sets were primitive, hard to decipher, and prone to malfunction if the vessel fired or was fired upon. The equipment gave the fleet valuable early warning of incoming air attacks and allowed vessels to "see" the enemy in night actions.

There were also several Royal Navy advantages that were not technological. The first was its command structure. While the Admiralty in London set down the basic strategy for the fleet, it left the implementation of those directives to the field commanders. And, as always, exceptional leaders emerged when Britain needed them to see her through the crisis. Cunningham, Somerville, and Vian, to name three, displayed the qualities necessary to achieve their goals against the odds. The Royal Navy's field commander had all segments of the fleet under his direct control, again enhancing the coordination between the various arms of the service.

This advantage even the Italians agreed was significant. Added to this advantage was the morale of the British sailor. Even when faced with terrible odds, the British tar felt superior to his Italian counterpart. This feeling translated into extraordinary efforts which the Royal Navy took as part of its tradition.

The final advantage the Royal Navy held was in its naval tactics. The Italians felt that night engagements between major surface units was infeasible due to technological problems; they concentrated instead on developing their night destroyer torpedo attacks. The British, on the other hand, aided considerably by radar and large caliber flashless powder, developed and practiced night fleet engagements. Italian air tactics were limited to high level bombing runs. The Royal Navy used its "Stringbag" (Swordfish) bombers in a torpedo bombing role, gaining a distinct advantage despite the obsolescence of the aircraft.

Both contestants felt themselves at a disadvantage at the start of the war. Italy, with her emphasis on the battleship, felt outnumbered. Great Britain felt inferior in air power and the fact that her enemy held the central position. The difference between the two nations lay in their response to this inferiority complex.

As mentioned, Italy adopted a defensive posture, robbing it of most of its very real advantages. The British decided to mask their weakness with an aggressive policy, led largely by Admiral A. B. Cunningham, the Mediterranean Fleet Commander. This decision to push instead of wait was to pay tremendous dividends and would totally alter the course of the war.

The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943

Italians and British
The Opening Moves - 1940
Battle of Crete
Light Forces: Italians and British
Battles of Sirte
Malta Convoys
End Game
Italy's War Aims
State of the Regia Marina