In early spring, 1941, the Royal Navy had, with its victory at Matapan, assumed full operational ascendancy over the Mediterranean. Britain's other fortunes were not as good. British air power was still very weak, particularly in light of the growing German involvement. In Africa, Wavell's brilliant riposte against the Italians was grinding to a halt due to supply difficulties, maintenance problems, and German intervention.

At the time of Matapan, Cunningham's force had been in the process of transporting thousands of troops into Greece to bolster Allied resistance there - from 4 March to 18 April nearly 58,000 troops were landed. But on 6 April, the Wehrmacht struck in the Balkans and within two weeks, the Albanian front collapsed.

On 25 April, barely a week after the completion of troop transport operations, the evacuation of Greece began. It was a beach operation this time as the only "safe" harbor the British controlled, Piraeus, had been virtually wiped out in a bombing raid that had blown up a fully loaded ammunition ship. But in the face of full Axis air superiority, the Royal Navy evacuated fully 50,000 men from Greece between 25-29 April. Half were transported to Alexandria while the other half went to Crete. By May the island held some 32,000 troops, most without their equipment. Once again, as at Dunkirk, the British and Commonwealth forces had been saved, but at high material cost.

On 12 May, Cunningham received word that an assault on Crete was expected shortly. His orders were simple - stop any and all seaborne landing attempts. As with other tacticians of the time, the thought of Crete falling solely to airborne troops was beyond reason, so to stop reinforcements from the sea would, in effect, keep Crete from falling.

To handle the task, Cunningham had at his disposal 1 carrier, 4 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 3 antiaircraft cruisers (4300 tons, eight 4" guns), and 32 destroyers. He divided his force into four battlegroups with orders to encircle the island. His positioning put cruiser/destroyer groups in line to interdict the Aegean sealanes, while his capital ships stood to the west to intercept any attempt by the Italian Navy to interfere. Opposing him was the Fliegerkorps XIII, mustering some 700 aircraft.

The air assault on Crete began on 20 May and need not be recounted here. In summary, it was the elite of the Wehrmacht against a disorganized, underequipped Allied force twice its size - a savage unrelenting affair. This savagery was mirrored on the sea lanes.

On the night of 21-22 May, British radar picked up the reflections of a large convoy headed for Crete. Composed of some 20 vessels, escorted by a single 1000 ton Spica class torpedo boat, the Lupo (three 3.9" guns,four torpedo tubes), they were totally outclassed by the intercepting naval force of three light cruisers and four destroyers. Despite the odds, the Lupo put up a tremendous defense of her charges, earning the respect of Allied and Axis alike. With smoke and torpeclos, the small ship was only able to delay the inevitable, however, and all but three ships were sunk. An excellent start to Cunningham's plan.

One final note: The Lupo had been hit by no less that 18 6" shells. She not only survived the action, but aided significantly in the rescue of the convoy's survivors - truly a bright spot in Italian naval annals.

During the day of the 22nd, Admiral King and his cruiser force of four light cruisers and three destroyers intercepted another convoy headed for Crete. But attacking in daylight was a different matter than the previous night action. A courageous defense by another Italian escort, the Saggitario, and merciless air attack by German bombers, forced the British to withdraw, leaving the convoy intact but retreating. During this withdrawal, bombers caused serious damage to three light cruisers and one destroyer of King's force. Even after joining with two battleships, the air attacks continued. HMS Warspite took a direct hit on a 6" secondary causing severe damage and a bad fire; HMS Valiant was hit but not seriously damaged.

The situation, already bad, was made worse as King made the same mistake Iachino had at Matapan - he split his forces. The first victim was HMS Greyhound, sent off to sink a lone Axis ship. The destroyer was overwhelmed and sunk in short order. King then dispatched light cruisers Gloucester and Fiji, and two destroyers to aid Greyhound's survivors; neither light cruiser survived. By splitting his forces, the weak antiaircraft batteries of the ships were simply unable to stem the bomber attacks individually.

Between the 23rd and 27th, Cunningham kept the bulk is forces safe in Alexandria, but the slaughter continued. Two destroyers were sunk on 23 May, including Lord Mountbatten's HMS Kelly, after bombarding German positions. The most damaging stroke came on the 26th, as a battle group was returning from a strike against German airfields in the Aegean. Carrier HMS Formidable was hit twice and seriously damaged in the air attacks and another destroyer mangled. The Formidable's loss would not be made up for months, depriving Cunningham of his greatest asset. On the 27th, his last battleship, HMS Barham, took a bomb on a stern turret.

On Crete itself, despite the failure of any seaborne troops to be landed, the Allied lines collapsed and on the 27th, evacuation was ordered. In the next four days, the Royal Navy did what it was fast becoming expert at: pulling men out of a lost battle. More than 17,000 men were rescued at a cost of two destroyers and an antiaircraft cruiser sunk, and two light cruisers damaged. Over 12,000 Commonwealth and British troops went into captivity.

Despite the early warning, despite the heroics of the Royal Navy and Freyberg's troops, Crete had become another major disaster for the Allied cause. Cunningham's forces had done exactly what they had been ordered to do, but they ended the campaign in grim shape.

Of the 48 ships he had started with on 20 May, 11 had been sunk and 20 badly damaged. His effective force on 2 June consisted of two battleships, one light cruiser, and 15 destroyers. He had lost over 2000 men and officers, 40 planes and crew and over 60% of his effective forces, including his only carrier. The Germans had suffered high infantry losses and over 200 planes, including transports.

Major Question

One major question persists concerning Crete - the nonappearance of the Italian Navy. With the Royal Navy in such bad shape, a naval sortie in strength could well have finished the British presence completely. Several reasons were given for the Italians not taking part. The first was the continued shock over earlier British successes. The second was that Supermarina still gauged naval strength in terms of battleships; and, of theirs, only one was in service at the time of Crete. The Taranto survivors were nearing the completion of their repairs and the Vittorio Veneto was still repairing the near-fatal damage from Matapan 6 weeks earlier.

But the most serious reason for Italian inaction was the relationship between Germany and Italy. To call it strained would understate the case; they were more like bitter rivals than allies and neither side made any real effort to change the situation. The command of Fliegerkorps XIII, quite frankly, didn't want the Italians to take part for two reasons. The first was he didn't want to share the victory, and the second (and more practical) was that the German pilots could not distinguish between British and Italian ships. It was a fact that Germany did not share her plans with Italy - Crete came as more of a surprise to them than to the British.

After Crete, there were no major fleet actions. The war became one of attrition, with light striking forces as the major weapons, and harbors and convoys as the major targets.

The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943

Italians and British
The Opening Moves - 1940
Battle of Crete
Light Forces: Italians and British
Battles of Sirte
Malta Convoys
End Game
Italy's War Aims
State of the Regia Marina