The anthropological and behavioral sciences are only a part of understanding the military history of the wars for the North American Plains, but they are undeniably a foundational part. To conduct any analysis of a battle or campaign without cautious clarification of the culture, economy, technology, tactical models, and practice or war, will lead to an erroneous appreciation for the events, and false conclusions. It is equally imperative that this clarification fits logically and consistently with the human experience and nature of warfare in general.

The methods of trooper and tribal warfare, strategy, and tactics, from 1866-1877 serve as prime examples of tactical and technological evolution and of the acculturation of two violently clashing warlike cultures. Clifford J. Rogers defines even the most dramatic military changes (which others call "military revolutions" ) as "punctuated evolution equilibrium[s]" where the introduction of one superior method or technology generates a countermeasure. Rogers also identifies periods of military innovation as "dependent on socio-cultural conditions. " Accurately understanding this foundational model of military evolution is an essential first step in the analysis of any campaign, past, present or future. Omission of these symptoms of military evolution prevalent during the Sioux Wars has been responsible in no small part for what Roger Darling calls "a century of misconceived history."

In his article "What is the Western Way of War?" Geoffrey Parker identifies five cultural distinctions found in the European conduct of war. Claiming that, when combined, these five principal foundations provide a formula for military success: technology, discipline, a highly aggressive military tradition, a remarkable capacity to innovate (and to respond rapidly to the innovations of others) and a unique system of acquiring war resources through "war finance." This is how Parker accounts for the extraordinary success of Western [European] military endeavors against Eastern and indigenous enemies by giving both strategic and tactical examples. The eventual application of these principles enabled the US Army to succeed tactically and operationally against the Sioux in 1877, where they had failed in 1867 or 1876.

Later Army advantages included: Availability and use of superior technology, appointment of more aggressive and trained institutional military leaders, adaptation to counter Sioux methods through total warfare, and a commitment of overwhelming ("financed") war resources. The Sioux apparently excelled at four of Parker's five principles. They adopted and adapted to the most critical and necessary forms of technology, maintained a military system of individual and group discipline in their warrior societies, developed a highly aggressive military tradition in their religious and tribal bonds, an also showed a tactical capacity to innovate, responding to the innovations of their enemy. The fifth principle of "war finance" was inconceivable to the Sioux and unattainable with their culture and military system. Acculturized war resources for the Sioux depended on three irreconcilable components: a buffalo and horse economy, technology from white traders, and an isolated refuge. By 1877 these were were gone.

Sioux and Cheyenne military methods evolved between 1866 and 1877 through acculturation: increased technological availability, and the increased threat and mode of white encroachment, and the near extermination of the bison herds of the American Great Plains. Their initial successes and failures and the conditions provided through U. S. Government peace initiatives caused them to adapt war-fighting techniques which in turn changed the nature of their entire culture (which also changed drastically again after white subjugation). The Army changes were a direct result of this successful Indian acculturation and economic expediency, which again had a profound effect on the institution of the United States Army.

It is ironic that in reaching the apex of their combat effectiveness and successfully synthesizing their combat methods, the Sioux and Cheyenne hostiles hastened their own strategic defeat. Their success induced effective changes in US strategy, Army methods, and available resources. The result was a very severe response, and the eventual complete military subjugation of all of the plains tribes. As the Crow medicine woman, Pretty-Shield described the Plains Indians' postwar plight: "Because we were used to listening to our chiefs in the buffalo days, the days of war and excitement, we listened to them now; and we got whipped." In the ten short years after the American Civil War the American West and Great Plains had changed significantly, and warfare on the plains had changed with it. The "buffalo days" and "the days of war and excitement" were a period of significant change for warriors of both the US Army and Teton Sioux.

More Sioux Wars

Part 1: Introduction: Warfare on the Great Plains
Part 2: Collision Courses: The American and Sioux Empires
Part 3: Strategic and Operational Crisis
Part 4: Military Acculturation and Tactical Evolution
Part 5: The Tactical Acculturation Model: The Evolved Sioux Tactics
Part 6a: The Great Sioux War of 1876
Part 6b: Battle of Little Big Horn
Part 7: Conclusion: Demise of the Plains Warriors
Part 7: Bibliography: Primary, Secondary, and Government Sources