After the 1866-1868 wars, the US Army changed many things. The passive concept of fortified outposts was abandoned, and the Army sought to impose more offensive and proactive methods. As Russel Weigley says in The American Way of War:

"The new policy, in contrast, implied that the Army would be mainly on the offensive, to force the Indians into their Reservations and to punish them if they did not go promptly or if they wandered astray. On the offensive, the Army could choose its targets, and by concentrating its limited strength make that strength count for more."

The offensive policy was a theoretical change, but the practical application of how to find or "choose targets," as well as how to "make that strength count for more" was yet to be determined. The Sioux territories were vast, unpopulated, and exceptionally remote. The Sioux were also signifcantly more numerous compared to Southern Cheyenne, Comanche and other Army foes. This was a different enemy who could live and wage war from these harsh isolated regions. The Army continually failed until they found and applied the most effective offensive methods to "concentrate its limited strength." Army tactical, operational, and logistical changes were required to cope with the Sioux way of warfare in this wilderness.

The Cavalry became the decisive arm for raiding Indian camps and destroying their resources. Tactical and Operational methods were standardized, and logistical innovations were implemented Army-wide. The post-war frontier Army, previously inclined to conducting surplus campaigns during the Civil War, was forced to adopt more economic methods. However, the frontier itself changed in the short ten years after Chief Red Cloud's War. White settlements and mining communities rapidly encroached on land and resources which were once left to Indian dominance. The great buffalo herds diminished, and Black Hills gold drew thousands of white prospectors into the very heart of the Great Sioux Reservation.

The US economy was growing, steamboats could navigate the Yellowstone River and other major waterways, and railroads reached farther. All of this facilitated campaign logistics for the US Army, but once an expedition was launched into "Indian territory" modern modes were left behind. The vast wilderness of the great plains still strained most Army logistical efforts, and gave the Indians a continued impression of isolation.

Scouts and Indian allies began to play a more indispensable role in tracking and engaging the Army's elusive enemy. Indian scout detachments, led by Army officers and civilian guides provided leaders with sound navigational guidance, terrain knowledge, and intelligence on the enemy's location, size, and disposition. The Indian scouts were not expected to fight, though some of the more loyal ones did. The rest were released and allowed to capture ponies and spoils as a reward.

However, the capture of the Indian pony herds was not always entrusted to the scouts. White scouts, interpreters and guides, normally better marksmen than the average trooper, were important in insuring the proper translation and validity of intelligence reported by the Indian scouts. By 1876 the Army was slowly beginning to recognize the essentiality of Indians as scouts and also as a viable combat force. Eventually large numbers of Shoshone, Arikara, and Crow, all traditional enemies of the Sioux, were included to fight on campaigns and for essential reconnaissance and surveillance.

The Sioux and Cheyenne effectively conducted their own forms of reconnaissance and surveillance, but this was principally on a local, tactical level. Most information was disseminated through word of mouth, but influential leaders kept messengers at key locations (such as the agencies and Army posts). Usually isolated factions and combined camps had only a general idea of where their own kinsmen and allies were and of their activities. At times specific warrior society bands were sent to "observe" distant threats, such an observation of Crook's and Gibbon's base camps during the 1876 campaign. Cheyenne scouts compromised Crook's advance inviting a Sioux spoiling attack (the Rosebud Battle) while the Little Big Horn strike was a surprise. The same combat-oriented culture that generated great individual expertise also allowed one of its collective weaknesses. While they needed no orders to engage, and could not be ordered into or out of combat, Indian individuality led to occasional lapses security of their camps. Normally the expected discipline and peer pressure of the more elite Akcitas handled this need, but as Tiyospaye numbers swelled some individuals and less skilled and less disciplined Akcitas would become involved in the war.

Sioux technological, economic, and military methods had changed significantly in the ten years following the Laramie treaty. Quite arguably, the 1868 Agency and Reservation system directly caused this heyday of Sioux prosperity and military power. The tiyospaye bands and the elite akcita societies no longer had to bear the more burdensome tribal necessities of caring for the more needy members of the tribe. Old, widowed, and nonproductive members of the tiyospaye were left on the reservation. Those less enthusiastic for the constant raiding, warring and rituals of the warrior societies also stayed behind. Those fit for a demanding nomadic lifestyle could still hunt buffalo, raid other bands, and steal and trade horses with peak efficiency. They could also take full advantage of any additional rations and trade items available. While some extremists such as Roman Nose would not so much as eat food with the white man's metal fork, none rejected access to tools and lethal weapons such as arrowheads, knives, revolvers, muskets, ammunition, and the most coveted items of all--Winchester and Henry repeating rifles. This situation was clearly a direct result of the US government Indian Agency System, and was also the golden age of Sioux hegemony.

During the "Agency Period" the Sioux and Cheyenne military system required three things: weapon and tool trade with whites, their "horse-and-buffalo" centered economy, and the protective isolation of their environment. The tiyospaye camps were self-contained and never stationary. They had to constantly move, hunt game, and keep their ponies grazing. They also had to track the diminishing buffalo herds and stock up on preservable items for the winter. They also moved for their own protection. The loss of their ponies, winter provisions, and camp materials left them destitute and entirely dependent on agency rations. The winter roamers were progressively more dependent on trade with white men or agency Indians for have weapons ammunition, and manufactured goods.

The akcitas rose to paramount importance as a direct result of external threats. Previously a leader and his tiyospaye of 5-20 lodges would roam and hunt independently, only banding together with others on special ceremonial or military occasions. As the threat of Army raids increased, more of the independent bands came under the control and influence of the reputable soldier akcita leaders such as the spiritual leader Sitting Bull and the war chief Crazy Horse. As a matter of survival the soldier akcitas came to dominate the culture. Other changes included the increased importance of intertribal membership in Akcitas, a change which enabled the seven factionalized Sioux tribes and the Cheyennes to work together militarily despite a long history of contention and rivalry.

The military and political struggles of the Sioux and Cheyenne Indian Nations were strategic in definition because they entailed the demise of an entire race and culture in a total war. Ironically, even Sitting Bull did not recognize the totality of this war. With strategic defeat at stake, they had no unified strategy beyond a goal of survival. Their general unifying goals were simply self-preservation and a traditional nomadic occupation of the unceded territories. It is questionable whether or not these geographically scattered bands could have ever been united to accept and/or execute any mutual strategy. None had full authority over another, and no group or individual was required to follow.

The Sioux and Cheyenne response to white expansion was effective tactically but never realistic strategically. This is noteworthy because their tactical solutions were aimed only at immediate threats and never at a strategic long-term solution. This is in contrast to the Crow and Shoshoni Indians, who strategically allied themselves with the whites against their traditional enemies, the Sioux and Cheyenne. This resulted in less tragic results for those tribes.

More Sioux Wars

Part 1: Introduction: Warfare on the Great Plains
Part 2: Collision Courses: The American and Sioux Empires
Part 3: Strategic and Operational Crisis
Part 4: Military Acculturation and Tactical Evolution
Part 5: The Tactical Acculturation Model: The Evolved Sioux Tactics
Part 6a: The Great Sioux War of 1876
Part 6b: Battle of Little Big Horn
Part 7: Conclusion: Demise of the Plains Warriors
Part 7: Bibliography: Primary, Secondary, and Government Sources