By 1876, the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne had been warring with the Army for some time and were eventually forced to adapt. Most recognized the differences in fighting the soldiers. The Army focus in battle was on killing the enemy and destroying his resources. The Army waged total war; the Indians did not at first, and they never totally adapted to this level. In some cases Dog Soldiers and small war bands wiped out homesteads and mining camps, but the concept of totally exterminating an enemy was rarely considered. Many warriors longed for the old days of fighting each other in skirmishes and raids with much bravado, and with few casualties.

The Sioux and Cheyenne were supreme at individual war-fighting skills. Their group tactics were dependent on individual initiative. They were most effective raiding in small tiyospaye and/or akcita bands. The Sioux frequently attacked with massed warriors against the Shoshone and Crows, but this was usually with such surprise and numerical superiority that their intimidating presence would drive their enemies to flight. Prior to the 1860's, firearms, other than muzzle loading trade-muskets, were rare for Indians. This resulted in an emphasis on individual hand-to-hand combat between warriors. Limited firepower also promoted massed groups and intimidation tactics, enabling warriors to ride down and dispatch fleeing enemies.

When they began to fight the Regular Army in larger numbers, these tactics were not always successful. The Spencer repeaters and rifles of the post-Civil War Army gave the soldiers a significant lethal advantage over the lightly armed Sioux. In repeated engagements, even when the Indians won or gained a decisive advantage, Army firepower caused unacceptable casualties. At the Wagon Box, Hayfield, Beecher Island, and Prairie Dog Creek fights, Sioux and Cheyenne warriors charged en masse and many, including several chiefs, were shot and killed. This would change by 1876.

War chiefs and reputable warriors played special roles in battle. Each was unique in his dress, preferred weaponry, display of personal courage, and combat ability. This combat ability can be further described as tactical skill, initiative, and the magnetism to encourage other warriors into combat with him. Sometimes tiyospaye and akcitas leadership overlapped, but by 1876 the tiyospaye was the higher priority. The more able leaders were able to motivate and coordinate other tiyospaye leaders to follow them. Prominent leaders, such as Crazy Horse, had tiyospaye and akcita leaders within their personal followings. In any raid, campaign, or combat, the Indian leaders had limited tactical control over their small personal followings.

Numbers and influence rose in concordance with the extent of the external threat and the leaders' prior successes. The summoning of a leader's personal following served to attract other individual warriors on the battlefield. A feathered war bonnet might serve as a rallying point, but a respected warrior such as Crazy Horse was readily recognized and followed without such ornamentation. Once there was an assemblage, a leader could take some tactical initiative, but it was not until their methods and technology changed that they reached peak effectiveness.

When certain leaders made an aggressive move their personal followings and other warriors nearby would join them. Those less enthusiastic fell behind or wandered off. Impetuous warriors pressed ahead to "count coup" or attempt heroic feats. Whenever warriors succeeded in hand-to-hand combat some invariably stopped to scalp and take trophies from the dead and wounded. Others following the main mass then joined the scalping or pursuit of fugitives. Leader casualties were "bad medicine" and had a significant negative effect on warrior aggressiveness. Increased firepower on both sides made individual acts of bravery and massed charges very dangerous.

Eventually, Crazy Horse, and other Sioux war chiefs, began to advocate a change in method. Crazy Horse had been fighting the Army since before Red Cloud's War. He participated in the Fetterman Fight and later saw the futility of charging into the soldiers' firepower at the Wagon Box Fight. By 1876, Crazy Horse was teaching Sioux and Cheyenne warriors more aggressive, lethal, and effective (though less traditional) tactics. These evolved tactics gradually became more widespread as the Sioux became better armed, and their life-style and homes became seriously threatened. The changes were both innovative and of necessity. The evolution would come from several needs: increased firepower, protection or evasion from Army firepower, a tactical method to exploit mobility advantages, and leaders who would follow this method with enough discipline to enable them to defeat the Army. These evolved Sioux tactics form a model of their tactical acculturation.

Offensive Tactics

The principal offensive tactic eventually used against the soldiers exploited four dynamics of combat power: firepower, mounted mobility, protection (or stealth), and combat leadership. The evolved Sioux tactics were not a formal tactical doctrine, but rather a recurrent process or technique reported repeatedly in battle accounts of the later Plains Wars. These tactics were the result of their cultural strengths and human nature, coupled with a few engagement principles and the abilities and bravery of certain warriors who strove to gain a tactical advantage.

The combat process that evolved was as effective as any formal military drill, capitalizing on the natural flow of individual human stimulation and response under the excitement and stress of combat. The usual pattern developed something like this: Initially large groups of warriors would rapidly advance on their foe in the old style, hoping to cause disruption. If the enemy fled, the warriors would pursue and take full advantage of their speed, mounted firepower and superior horsemanship. If the enemy held fast, the party would stay out of effective range and attempt a "fluid encirclement." Encirclement was followed by mounted and dismounted infiltration and sniping from individuals and small groups of warriors.

This infiltration practice was extremely effective in the Little Big Horn battle. As Kate Bighead, a Sioux woman, recounted: "The Indians all around were gradually creeping closer to the soldiers.... At this stage, the fighting was slow and few were killed as both sides remained hidden." Other mounted warriors would continue to circle and harass. When enemy individuals were isolated, warriors would rush or ride forward to dispatch them in close combat.

As one correspondent noted at the Rosebud battle: "So closely did the Indians approach our skirmishers at times that they inflicted several wounds from battle axes, lances and arrows, and in one or two instances they closed in upon a brave soldier and got his scalp before comrades could rush forward to the rescue." The warriors kept their ponies nearby, retaining mobility, in order to mount and aggressively pursue any and all enemy who fled. At any point, when faced with a superior force, the warriors were easily able to evade contact, regroup in safety, and start the same routine all over. The group actions were only accentuated by old-style individual acts of bravery such as coup-counting, riding in front of the enemy, and riding through his lines. Collective activities included burning grass, stampeding horses, and attempting to lure small bands into an ambush. True to their fluid style of warfare, mounted warriors would flee or scatter when charged by a comparable mounted force. The most effective tactic was to evade, split, and encircle the flanks of the charging foe. If Indian leaders did not take the lead and set the example, the group would scatter and begin sniping and infiltrating individually, or they might go home.

One account of the Rosebud battle describes the tactics: When necessary, they charged home on the soldier's flanks, engaging in ferocious hand-to-hand combat. They "attacked by fire" to pin and suppress concentrated forces. They isolated and pursued smaller detachments and fled from the larger ones. The warriors remained mounted and mobile, but they were able to rapidly dismount and snipe at stationary enemies. These same tactics were again successful later at the Little Big Horn. Both Reno and Benteen were decisively defeated, and Custer was killed.

Put simply, this was the evolved tactical pattern or model: (1) encirclement (2) infiltration and isolation (3) attacks-by-fire (4) mounted pursuit. Through personal magnetism, leading warriors translated their individualistic style of warfare into a tactical advantage.

More Sioux Wars

Part 1: Introduction: Warfare on the Great Plains
Part 2: Collision Courses: The American and Sioux Empires
Part 3: Strategic and Operational Crisis
Part 4: Military Acculturation and Tactical Evolution
Part 5: The Tactical Acculturation Model: The Evolved Sioux Tactics
Part 6a: The Great Sioux War of 1876
Part 6b: Battle of Little Big Horn
Part 7: Conclusion: Demise of the Plains Warriors
Part 7: Bibliography: Primary, Secondary, and Government Sources