The Native American Sioux who rejected the Fort Laramie Treaty numbered over 3,000 Sioux and 400 Cheyenne by 1876. They represented about ten percent of the total Sioux and Northern Cheyenne populations. These bands avoided government control, and any dependence on agency provisions, and were known as "winter roamers." They hunted and lived in the unceded territory in winter and summer and only visited trading posts and agencies for essential weapons and tools. Other bands, known as "summer roamers" drew rations from the agencies in winter and hunted with the "non-treaty" bands in the summer. The unceded territory was also a refuge for raiding parties into Indian and white settlements all around the Great Plains. The warlike Sioux and Cheyenne continuously raided, extorted tribute (forced trade) and fought with with Arikara Crow and Shoshone Bands. They frequently skirmished with railroad surveying expeditions and their Army escorts, and even with each other.

By 1870 Chief Red Cloud had retired to reservation life. The "non-treaty" Indians began to look to new leaders for inspiration. There were many. The most prominent personality , Sitting Bull, was a "medicine man" or spiritual leader. He adamantly insisted on isolation from whites and strict adherence to cultural and spiritual practices such as the Sun Dance and the visionary traditions of the Great Plains tribes. The enthusiasm was contagious. Word of these great leaders and their "medicine" spread through-out the unceded territory and the reservations. Young warriors flocked to follow them. Some even left their families on the reservations under government agency care. As the agency environments deteriorated Sitting Bulls popularity and influence continued to grow as he gathered the support of leaders such as Gall, Spotted Eagle, and the most uncompromising of all--Crazy Horse. Sitting Bull motivated his followers through religious leadership, while his Chief disciples advocated and executed warfare on a tactical level. This was a different breed of warrior than those who fought with Red Cloud. They were a younger generation of skilled warriors, better armed, and with more at risk than ever before. Many recalled Red Cloud's victory in 1868, but without Red Cloud's expert ability to negotiate, the 1876 resistance and the return to the "old ways" advocated by Sitting Bull was doomed.

The geographic independence and formidable military power of the Sioux and Cheyenne were serious obstacles to white expansion. However, as the railroad reached farther and the buffalo disappeared, so would the Sioux and Cheyenne obstacles. President Grant, and the Army recognized this and were willing to wait rather than commit military or economic resources into resolving the Plains Indian hindrance to expansion. What was considered to be a self-resolving problem took on a greater sense of urgency by 1874. A military expedition, led by Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer and his 7th Cavalry Regiment, was dispatched into the heavily forested Black Hills of South Dakota. The official mission was to find a suitable Army post location for monitoring the Sioux Reservation; however, the expedition included mineral surveyors who confirmed rumors of gold in the Black Hills. A gold rush followed, causing great problems for the Indians and the for the Army. The Black Hills were in the center of the Great Sioux Reservation.

By early 1875, two large mining towns, Deadwood and Custer City, boomed in the Black Hills despite their location in the center of hostile Indian territory and frequent attacks on isolated groups. The Army eventually ceased trying to keep civilians out of the area. The US Government negotiated with Sioux leaders but was unable to purchase the Black Hills. The agency Sioux chiefs were heavily influenced and threatened by the "non-treaty" leaders and no agreement was reached. The "non-treaty" bands, and followers of Sitting Bull, were against the sale of the Black Hills, and could not be negotiated with. Tension and violence increased for many months.

Forced War

Government officials of the Grant Administration and the Department of the Interior decided to force the Sioux to war; the War Department concurred. A "military solution" would result in their complete subjugation and inexpensive relinquishment of both the Black Hills and the unceded territory. On 9 November 1875, newly appointed Inspector E. C. Watkins, U.S. Indian Bureau, completed his investigation on the Indian situation in the Black Hills area of Dakota and Montana. His report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C. blamed problems on a certain rebellious faction of Hunkpapa Sioux, Oglala Sioux, and Northern Cheyenne. These "roamers" were labeled a hostile threat to the western expansion. Watkins reported that peaceful attempts to control the holdouts had proven ineffective. His recommendation was "...that the military, in strength of about a thousand, led by an officer experienced in Indian ways, be given the task of driving this few hundred recalcitrants back to the reservations."

The Federal Government issued an unanswered ultimatum on 6 December 1875 for those Sioux still in the unceded territory to "return to their reservations by 31 January 1876, on penalty of being considered hostile." These winter roamer "hostiles" had sought refuge in the richest of hunting grounds. Detesting Indian Agency corruption and widespread deprivations, they rejected the reservations to live in what they considered their home lands. They had ample buffalo meat and were wealthy in horses and robes. They had continued to trade with white enterprisers, and thus, were well-armed with rifles, revolvers and ammunition. These hostile roamers were, above all, defiant of the ultimatum. This same month, December 1875, the Great Sioux Reservation suffered from a grievous famine. Caused by a corrupt system, the famine only strengthened the resolve of many to depart the reservations as soon as weather permitted. On 18 January 1876 an agency embargo was enforced, restricting the sale of all arms and ammunition on the reservations. This signaled a government intent to commence hostilities and further subjugate those at the agencies. The mission of forcing them to return to their reservations and under Federal control fell to the United States Army. The second Sioux War, just as the first, was touched off by a gold rush, and began with initial tactical fiascos for the US Army.

The Great Plains portion of the United States fell under the Military Department of the Missouri, directed by General Philip H. Sheridan. On 8 February 1876, after waiting for expiration of the ultimatum deadline, Sheridan ordered his subordinate department commanders, Brigadier Generals Terry and Crook, to "Prepare for operations against the hostiles" reminding them: "Unless they can be caught before early spring, they cannot be caught at all." The Army mission was to converge on and break up the concentration of "hostile" Sioux and Cheyenne believed to be in the Bighorn Valley and force them back to the reservations. The method of execution of such missions was sometimes unspecified, and the Indians were camped with their families, which increased the potential for noncombatant casualties.

Army minor tactical victories such as the Powder River raid galvanized Indian resistance, while defeats such as the Rose Bud increased Indian confidence. The camps' locations, often deep in the heart of a nearly inaccessible wilderness, were usually a complete mystery to Army Commanders. Army Decisive victory was unknown prior to 1877. While Army objectives seemed difficult but clear cut, they were also politically contaminated. Legislative and executive officials were bitterly divided over Indian policies. Some called for earnest peace initiatives, while others (including Army Chief of Staff General William T. Sherman, and General Sheridan) frequently called for complete extermination of hostile tribes. Corruption reigned at all levels, diluting the meager resources available.

Negative and sensationalist media attention was a constant problem. Newspapers did not always support the Army and were often critical of the presidential administration of Ulysses S. Grant. Military Commanders, often against orders, brought journalists on campaign as part of their own "Press Agenda." The War Department was still imploring Congress for control of the Indian reservations and agencies. The Army sought to absorb the Bureau of Indian Affairs' budget, which had been under the Department of the Interior since 1849. The Department administrated Indian affairs while the War Department enforced them. Few in the Government or the Army knew how to handle the military mission of bringing the "recalcitrants" back to the reservation. A quick, decisive, and inexpensive solution was best but was never attained until after the 1876 Wars, and then at great expense in lives and resources.

The logistical barriers were extensive. For the 1876 Summer campaign, General Terry used river steamers as much as possible. General Crook typically set up a series of forward supply bases stretching to the railroad. Army columns moved very slowly when burdened with wagons. The major operational logistic limitation was the Army's diminished budget. Department commanders were hard pressed to purchase and shift meager resources to the remote and scattered places where they were critically needed. A normal expedition on campaign included a huge logistical tail of several hundred wagons, civilian packers, thousands of horses and mules, and tons of fodder, food, and ammunition. In a column of fours, the wagon train would extend half a mile. When a cavalry unit moved to strike independently, they stripped down to a bare minimum, carrying essential supplies on a train of pack mules. A pack train was the most mobile logistical method, but it were still slow and unwieldy. Pack mules were also of limited duration. A mule eats all the grain he can carry in 20 days and unlike the Indian Pony cannot survive on prairie grass. The 7th Cavalry, with 600 troopers, needed over 175 mules to carry 15 days minimum supplies.

Since summer campaigns at the peak of Indian mobility and combat power frequently resulted in fruitless or disastrous results for the US Army, Sheridan's orders in 1876 were intended to initiate a winter campaign with three columns, two of Terry's and one of Crook's, finding the winter roamers in their immobile winter camps, their ponies weak from poor grazing. The Indian Bureau Report gave an estimation that between 400 and 800 hostile warriors were dispersed in winter camps across the unceded territory. This winter estimate was fairly accurate, but accounts only for the winter roamers. The numbers would swell by over 200% with the coming of spring. The primary Army concern was not the number of potential hostiles to be faced, their tactical abilities, nor their armament.

The principle challenge was simply locating and bringing their enemy to battle. This was especially difficult during the summer when Indian Ponies were stronger, and the more mobile Indian bands could easily scatter if closely pursued. After Washita, winter campaigns against hostiles had become the established Army method of defeating them. Only General George Crook, Commander of the Department of the Platte, took to the field before the end of winter. Terry's Department of Dakota expeditions were delayed by severe weather and Terry's logistical worries. Crook anticipated the necessity of a winter offensive and had planned accordingly. Prior to authorization he consolidated units from various posts and stockpiled supplies at forward bases.

Crook departed Fort Fetterman (Near Douglas Wyoming) the first day of March moving north on the Bozeman Trail. His force (nearly 900 cavalry, infantry and civilian mule packers) brought a small herd of cattle, carried 100 tons of fodder for their mounts, and had ample winter clothing. Despite blizzards and sub-zero temperatures Crook's approach was detected and harassed by the hostiles. The cattle herd was stampeded their second day on the trail. On 7 March Crook sent his wagons and infantry to establish a base camp at the Fort Reno ruins. Eluding Indian scouts, Crook pushed on with a cavalry force of ten companies and minimal subsistence.

After ten days of searching along the Tongue River the cavalry force was critically short on supplies. When scout Frank Grouard found signs of an Indian camp in the Powder River Valley, Crook dispatched Colonel Joseph Reynolds with his six most effective companies (300 men) to attack. At dawn on March 17th Reynolds' force surprised Old Bear's camp of about 110 lodges and up to 200 warriors. The Sioux lookouts were bypassed in the night and the attackers quickly captured most of the pony herd and the village. The warriors fled to nearby bluffs overlooking the village and began to return fire and counter attack.

Correspondent Robert E. Strahorn reported that "Bullets and casualties were then bestowed upon us with a will that showed plainly we were not to sweep the field without paying a penalty." Only 47 troopers initially charged in. Reynolds' plan to encircle the camp failed, and he lost his nerve in the face of determined hostile resistance. He ordered the troopers to burn the camp and destroy all stores, but this was a hurried attempt. In their hasty departure one wounded trooper was abandoned. Four soldiers were killed and six wounded during the engagement. Reynolds knew that the entire expedition was short on food, but destroyed over a thousand pounds of buffalo meat and robes found in the camp. The warriors followed Reynolds and managed to recapture most of their herd. The Sioux and Cheyenne survivors of the Powder River fight were without protection from the extreme cold. After several days of exposure they combined with Crazy Horse's camp. The Sioux were encouraged by their repulse of the soldiers and the recapture of their ponies.

News of the raid spread amongst all the Indians and served as a clear warning that the Army was intent on waging total war. As the spring grass came, the various bands began to join together for protection in the coming war. After the exhausted Army columns return to Fort Fetterman on 26 March, Crook brought court martial charges on Reynolds and two subordinates for their failure at the Powder River. It would be two months before Crook could refit his forces for another offensive. Crook's winter attack had failed; a summer campaign would be necessary.

General Sheridan did not name an overall field commander for the 1876 campaign, nor did he give instructions for tactical coordination between the two departments. Brigadier Generals Crook and Terry were to considered "co-equal" Department Commanders heading "independent columns." This apparent violation of the principle of war: Unity of Command, was a result of personality rifts between leaders and their professionally bred overconfidence. Sheridan firmly believed that any one of the independent columns would have ample combat power to defeat even the largest concentrations of the evasive hostiles. Even after the frustrating experience at the Powder River, the opinion prevailed. Sheridan's own records demonstrate that his focus was more to "fix the enemy" than concerting efforts:

"General Terry was further informed that the operation of himself and General Crook would be made without concert, as the Indian villages are movable and no objective point could be fixed upon, but that, if they should come to any understanding about concerted movements there would be no objective at division headquarters." Sheridan's decision not to unify tactical and operational command divulges his disregard for Sioux combat potential. This decision also shows one of the timeless perils of command structure: seniority and personality conflicting with mission accomplishment. Terry, a former lawyer, was the senior officer, but Crook was the more experienced Indian fighter.

The overbearing and energetic Brigadier General George Crook was recently transferred to command the Platte Department. He was awarded his star in 1873 after his highly successful anti guerrilla war against the Apaches in Arizona. Crook was expected to make things happen in this theater and wanted an independent command. He had been a Cavalry Division Commander in the Civil War, and headed the Army of West Virginia during Sheridan's Shenandoah Campaign. He also graduated from West Point in 1852, one year ahead of his friend, Phil Sheridan. Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry was not a West Pointer. He was a 49 year old veteran of Civil War accomplishment. He rose from regimental to corps command, Brevet Major General, during the War. For his 1865 success in capturing Fort Fisher, Wilmington, North Carolina, congress awarded Terry a brigadier's commission in the Regular Army. He was described as the "gentleman soldier," "humanitarian," and "self sacrificing," noted for his diplomatic ability in dealing with fellow soldiers and with the Indians.

Subordinate to Terry was Colonel John Gibbon, 49 year-old commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment and the District of Montana. Gibbon's 34 years of service included Mexican and Seminole conflicts, writing the Artillerists' Manual, forming and commanding the famous Iron Brigade, two corps commands, and two serious wounds during the Civil War (Fredericksburg and Gettysburg). For unknown reasons, Terry (not yet Gibbon's senior) reportedly refused to serve under him in the XXIV Corps in 1865.

Misunderstood Capabilities

While most lower level Army leaders respected Sioux combat effectiveness, others at higher levels misunderstood their capabilities. Many Army leaders were ignorant of how to combat the heavily armed, isolated and martially skilled Sioux. Roger Darling faults General Alfred Terry (Custer's immediate superior) for the disastrous Little Big Horn Campaign of 1876, emphasizing the importance of decisive leadership and its effect on tactical and operational warfare. Army leaders were terribly inept in their tactical, operational and strategic comprehension. As Darling exposes in one typical situation:

The concept of [Colonel] Gibbon "guarding" the Yellowstone [River] therefore symbolized a basic fallacy in the Army's and [General] Terry's strategic thinking. Both Gibbon and Terry misunderstood actual Army capabilities in this regard, suffering the consequences of one additional misconception about Indian Warfare. The reality was that the Indians could not be contained or controlled anywhere.... The Indians could not be brought to battle unless they chose to do so or were effectively surprised. As long as routes were available for diffused flight, the Indians could and would use them. It was a basic principle of unconventional warfare.

Gibbon viewed the plains Indian as "the best horseman in the world" and respected their fighting abilities. He is on record as describing the government mismanagement of the Indian affairs as "a foul blot on the American people and a disgrace to the age and the country." He felt that the overly expensive Indian wars could be avoided by altering policy.

He was an outstanding field commander, but was lacking in his reputable aggressiveness during the critical early phases of the Little Big Horn Campaign. Gibbon's "Montana Column" departed Fort Ellis, Montana on 1 April 1876. His orders were to patrol along the Yellowstone River, prevent hostile passage to the north, locate and attack if possible. From 21 April to 9 May, near the Big Horn, he was ordered to halt until his movements could be coordinated with the other columns. General Terry had commanded the Dakota Department since 1973, but this would be his first campaign in 11 years, and his first fighting Indians. Terry was originally expected to delegate command of the Dakota Column of the expedition to a more experienced field commander. Because of political concerns Terry Commanded the Column and Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment as the main strike force of the Campaign.

Custer was a seasoned battlefield commander with a phenomenal Civil War record. Although he had experienced much difficulty and only limited success with Indian fighting in 1867-68, he was still considered one of the most knowledgeable and skilled Indian fighters in the US Army. The lessons Custer derived from his life on the plains are evident in his writings. He observed that the lightly armed hostiles could not stand up to the soldier's firepower. He recognized that the hostiles had historically preyed upon the whites in small raids or ambushes, and fled at the sign of a larger force. Custer also wrote in one article that to flee in the face of the highly mobile hostiles was to invite death. During the next eight years, prior to his final battle on the Little Bighorn,

Custer's experiences repeatedly reinforced the tactics and lessons learned from the '67-68 campaigns. He became a believer that the Indians were committed to guerrilla tactics, most vulnerable when attacked in their camps, only willing to raid or fight in defense of their families, and most likely to flee rather than fight a pitched battle with a significant force of federal troops. Most professional military officers of the 1870's held these assumptions to be "fundamental truths when fighting Indians."

By 11 June 1876 Crook had established a permanent supply camp on Goose Creek (present day Sheridan Wyoming) Crook's attack force, with over 1000 cavalry and infantrymen, augmented with 80 armed civilians and 260 Crow and Shoshone allies, departed from the Goose Creek camp on 16 June. Crook's movement was monitored by a band of warriors led by the Cheyenne Little Hawk. Little Hawk quickly reported the news of the approaching soldiers to the main congregation of hostiles, camped near the Little Bighorn River on Reno Creek.

During a spirited inter-tribal council meeting, the anxious young war chiefs decided on to attack an surprise Crook on the march (a spoiling attack). Crazy Horse was designated as one of the shirt wearers (tactical leaders) for the coming battle. He advised the warriors to fight to kill as the white soldiers did, instead of counting coups and competing for prestige amongst each other. That same day between 750 and 1,500 Sioux and Northern Cheyenne warriors departed from various camps to attack Crook's column. During the night march "Dog-Soldier" societies served as outriders for the advanced elements of Indian movement, keeping groups of impetuous warriors from riding ahead and spoiling the surprise. A group of Cheyenne from a smaller camp also moved toward Crook, with several groups taking various routes and arriving throughout the next day.

Battle of the Rosebud

On the morning of 17 June Crook's force was on the move by 0300 but halted after sunrise along a bend in the Rosebud creek to rest the animals and make coffee. At 0830 hundreds of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, under the field leadership of Crazy Horse, attacked sweeping in from the north across the rolling hills and steep ravines. The column was initially surprised, but with the help the Indian allies, managed to fight them to a stalemate.

One description of the Rosebud battle describes the tactics: "When necessary, they charged home on the soldier's flanks, engaging in ferocious hand-to-hand combat. They attacked by fire to pin and suppress concentrated forces. They isolated and pursued smaller detachments and fled from the larger ones. The warriors remained mounted and mobile, but were able to rapidly dismount and snipe at stationary enemies." These same tactics were to prove effective 8 days later on the Little Big Horn. Crook sent a mounted force to threaten what he erroneously guessed was a nearby village, but recalled him when the main body became threatened.

The Battle of The Rosebud concluded with the Warriors breaking contact and returning to their village. There were 10 soldiers killed and 21 wounded, Indian casualties are estimated at less than 100. Crook was unprepared for the Indians' aggressiveness, or such numbers. On 18 June, his entire column returned to the Goose Creek Camp to await reinforcements. Crook's withdrawal removed his significant force from the field for over 7 weeks. With the climax of the Sioux War at hand, the Department of the Platte, and nearly half of the theater's combat power was effectively out of the campaign. The stage was set for a decisive Battle.

More Sioux Wars

Part 1: Introduction: Warfare on the Great Plains
Part 2: Collision Courses: The American and Sioux Empires
Part 3: Strategic and Operational Crisis
Part 4: Military Acculturation and Tactical Evolution
Part 5: The Tactical Acculturation Model: The Evolved Sioux Tactics
Part 6a: The Great Sioux War of 1876
Part 6b: Battle of Little Big Horn
Part 7: Conclusion: Demise of the Plains Warriors
Part 7: Bibliography: Primary, Secondary, and Government Sources