Prior to the 1876 Campaign and the Little Big Horn battle, cavalry elements of battalion size were able to move offensively about the battlefield uncontested, and with relative impunity. However, by developing their own evolved tactics, the Sioux were able to seriously threaten the soldiers with little risk to themselves. When the Indians perceived any weakness or inferiority, they encircled and overwhelmed isolated elements. Frequently an Army unit would deploy to skirmish or charge, only to have its target evade to the flanks, or flee, and the unit fired upon from concealed Indian sharpshooters. Evolved Sioux tactics made it progressively more difficult to engage them on anything except their own terms.

The Army tried numerous ploys to bring the Indians into contact. An offensively postured unit would pursue a decoy to intentionally spring an ambush just to close with their enemy, bringing their firepower into action. Other tactical options included seizing the Indian pony herd, destroying the villages, and and taking all non-combatants hostage. This was aimed at destroying Sioux war fighting resources, breaking their morale, and forcing the elusive warriors to counterattack or accept defeat. The non-combatants were reportedly Custer's primary targets at the Little Big Horn. Lt. Godfrey understood Custer's expected strategy as: "...attack on the families and the capture of the pony herds were in that event counted upon to strike consternation into the hearts of the warriors, and were elements for success." [1]

Often overlooked are the use of standard cavalry tactics during the later period engagements. In 1874 the implemented the standard Manual of United States Army Cavalry Tactics by Emory Upton. These "battle drills" were the result of a need for a uniformed system and the need to tactically capitalize on the effects of increased firepower. [2]

Recognizing the standard company and battalion tactical formations is imperative to understanding the tactical evolution. The basic unit of troopers was a squad of four mounted men who would not deploy independently. The smallest tactical maneuver element was a platoon. There were normally two platoons to a Company of 60 troopers.

At the Little Big Horn, the under-strength companies (38-44 men) most likely consolidated into one large platoon. The twelve companies of the regiment were grouped into battalions. Each battalion had two, but no more than seven companies. Companies were deployed and numbered in the order of their commander's seniority. Battalions were further divided into two wings--left (even-numbered companies) and right (odd companies). This method insured that whatever task organization was applied, commanders immediately knew their position in the formation. The two senior company commanders became wing commanders. [3]

Skirmish drills, as described in Upton's Manual, were the primary tactic used by the Army to engage the enemy. The mounted charge was, on occasion, attempted when surprising a village or seizing key terrain, but it proved ineffective against the more mobile plains warriors. Skirmishers were simply a line of troopers spread about 5 yards apart, deployed to engage the enemy by firepower. The skirmish drill was used to deploy the various battalions and companies from massed column and line formations into the dispersed skirmish line. Both mounted and dismounted skirmishing were employed. Skirmish drills could be conducted at the halt or on the march with one company of skirmishers advancing ahead of the main body. [4]

The most common tactic was dismounted skirmishing. One man per squad (of four) remained mounted and lead the horses to the rear. When a company deployed they were given the command "To fight on foot...as skirmishers." Each company placed a company-reserve position of several squads to its right rear (doctrinally 150 yards depending on terrain and cover). When a battalion employed the skirmish formation one or more companies could deploy as skirmishers, with one or more in reserve positions. The "held" horses were kept protected or collocated with the battalion reserve position (doctrinally 300 yards to the rear). [5]

The reserve position served to provide protection for the held horses, flanks and rear. The reserve also supported the main line with ammunition, more men, or by "timely charges" to counter any threats. Firepower was the key element of combat power in all of the cavalry tactics.

The increased availability of better weapons significantly enhanced both Army and Indian combat abilities. By 1874, the Army adopted a standard rifle and pistol for all forces. This eased training, logistical, and maintenance burdens. Infantry soldiers carried the breech-loaded .45/55 Caliber Springfield Rifle. Cavalry Troopers carried two standard firearms: the Springfield Carbine (Model 1873) and the .45 Caliber Colt Single Action Revolve (Model 1873). Both were outstanding weapons that were simple, durable, and accurate. Normally, each trooper was issued 100 rounds of carbine ammunition (half of it in his cartridge belt, half in his saddlebags) and 24 rounds of pistol ammunition. [6]

The Springfield has been criticized for its single-shot capacity and alleged jamming. However, archaeological evidence of spent cartridges indicate only a minute percentage of brass casings which had to be "pried" from the rifle. While the Winchester and Henry repeating rifles, most popular with the Indians, had double the Springfield's rate of fire, they had less than half the effective range. The Springfield Carbine and its "Long Tom" Infantry rifle counterpart remained in service for decades without complaint. In 1879 the Army conducted ordinance tests that clearly demonstrated the Springfield Carbine's superiority in accuracy, range, and stopping power. [7] It's only weakness (being a single-shot weapon) was evident during melee, shock, and mounted actions where rapid fire was critical.

In their quest for increased firepower, the Army fielded light artillery pieces and some Gatling Guns. Their weight, size, and cumbersome equipment made them impractical for offensive operations but effective for the defense of supply trains, forts and logistical bases. During his "pre-Little Big Horn" reconnaissance mission, Major Reno took a Gatling gun and crew with him. The terrain was very difficult. The caisson could not keep up and delayed him considerably. It overturned and nearly had to be abandoned. The gun was a liability and its offensive combat effectiveness was dubious. [8]

The Indians never engaged Gatling Guns in a battle; by the time the weapon was fielded, the Sioux had ceased using massed tactics and had adapted to protect themselves against Army firepower.

Indian armament gradually improved over the course of the Sioux Wars. After Red Cloud's War and expansion of the agencies, Indian access to traders escalated. Those that hunted well in the summer and gathered ponies had much to trade for weapons and ammunition. Government agencies and traders denied responsibility for increased Indian firearm and ammunition procurement, but modern repeaters abounded. This access to weaponry increased the warriors' ability to kill as opposed to "counting coups" (striking). Superior firearms also endangered him more when he did make non-lethal acts of bravery.

Rifles and pistols were an item of great prestige for warriors, but they were considered the least honorable tool for combat. In addition to edged and blunt weapons, many warriors carried a bow and some carried a lance. The repeaters and revolvers were ideal for the type of mounted skirmishing at which they excelled. An increased ability to use their firepower while mounted enabled the Sioux and Cheyenne to capitalize on their equestrian skills which were far superior to the U. S. Army. Custer's Chief of Scouts, reported of Major Reno's retreat at the Little Big Horn battle: "When we came out of the woods there were a great many Indians scampering along with their rifles across the saddle, working their Winchesters on the column." [9]

By 1876 Sioux and Cheyenne warriors were at their peak level of personal armament. Archaeology shows over 30 different types of firearms present on the Little Big Horn battlefield and documents the use of everything from muzzle loaders and pistols to modern repeaters such as .44 caliber Henry and Winchester rifles. The ratio of firearms to total warriors was very high, probably one in three. With an estimated 2,000 warriors, archaeological data suggests 200 or more repeaters and over twice as many other cartridge-fired weapons. [10] It was this increased level of individual firepower that enabled the Sioux to adopt a newer, more lethal, evolved tactic.

Footnotes