On Sunday, June 25th 1876 Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer led his regiment, the US 7th Cavalry, to complete defeat at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. This battle is the climax of the Sioux Wars, and the undeniable apex of all Indian Wars on the North American Continent. This battle is also the example supreme in the employment and application of the evolved combat methods of both the US Army and the Sioux. The Army failed, for their method was not yet tailored to protect against the evolved Sioux methods, and astronomical odds. I have covered the operational and logistical efforts required to bring the Sioux to battle. Both Sioux and Army tactical war fighting methods are evidenced In the battle account.

General Terry was unaware of Crook's repulse and continued his operational plan to locate, fix, and engage the Sioux hostiles. From his steamboat and supply base on the Yellowstone River Terry released Custer from his Column to move independently with the 7th Cavalry. Custer's orders were to make a wide sweep to the south and attack the Sioux, thought to be nearly a hundred miles away along the Little Bighorn River. Terry approached the suspected Sioux location from the North with his infantry and Gibbon's Cavalry. Custer closed on the camp after four days of hard riding and approached at mid-day.

Unaware of the size of the Indian concentration, or it's exact location, Custer divided his command. His advance "constituted an 'attack' against a broad geographical region." He sent Captain Frederick Benteen's battalion (three companies of 125 men) along his left flank on a mission of "reconnaissance and attack." Upon encountering Tiyospaye village and about 60 warriors in full flight, Custer sent Major Reno ahead with one Battalion and the Indian Scouts ( 175 soldiers and scouts) to charge and pursue. Custer promised to support Reno with his own battalion (five companies of 220 men) while the pack-train followed with detached troopers and one company in escort (175 men). Reno pursued the fleeing band and crossed the Little Bighorn River. There he found an immense Indian camp of the entire hostile Sioux Nation. All seven tribes were present as well as the Northern Cheyenne (over 10,000 people and possibly 3,000 warriors). Reno charged the Camp but his tiny command stopped 500 yards short. This is where the tactical battle of the Little Bighorn began.

The competent employment of Upton's conventional tactics was not enough to defeat the Sioux, who refused to engage in a conventional manner. The 7th Cavalry was defeated despite their strict adherence to the cavalry doctrine of the day. Reno's battalion dismounted in the Little Big Horn Valley and deployed a skirmish line of about 100 troopers firing at the Sioux camp. As Indian resistance increased, mounted warriors fanned out on Reno's flanks. Some circled to his rear. A few braves rode up and down in front of the skirmish line, daring the soldiers to shoot at them (and also kept them occupied). The cavalry men continued to fire and sent runners to get more carbine ammunition from their saddlebags. Meanwhile, Sioux leaders gathered their ponies and personal followings, encouraging others to join them as they rode to the flanks and rear of the skirmish line.

The right flank of the skirmish line was secure on the riverbank, but to the left stretched wide open terrain. A detail from M Company cleared a copse of trees near the river bank, and the cavalry mounts were secured there. Reno had only lost one man at this point, but fearing encirclement, he ordered a withdrawal. Private Theodore Goldin recounted: ". . . we were forced to face about and endeavor to repel their advances until we could get our horses into the timber, in which attempt several horses were shot, and two or three stampeded. Soon after this we retired into the timber, where we had better protection, and resumed the fight."

Mounted warriors completely encircled Reno's position, some crossing the river to get around him. Others worked their way through the brush and trees infiltrating along the river bank. In the confusion, Reno lost control of his subordinates. He had defended the position for less than 20 minutes when he again, very suddenly, decided to withdraw. He panicked under continual Sioux sniping and infiltration and retreated with only part of his command. Other soldiers saw the retreat and followed, some were left behind. Reno's fragmented withdrawal rapidly degenerated into a route back across the Little Bighorn River.

Reno's rout across the Little Big Horn River was a classic example of the Plains Indians' deadliest tactic, comparable to a buffalo hunt. The Sioux, on fresh horses, were able to catch Reno's retreating forces easily. As the column became extended, troopers were clubbed or shot out of the saddle by warriors who rode close beside them. There was no-rear guard to keep the pursuing enemy at a distance. Captain Moylan and Lieutenant Varnum attempted to halt some of the soldiers, but panic had set in. Every man was for himself as they splashed down the five-foot-tall banks into the Little Big Horn River. This was Sioux tactical effectiveness at its best.

As the Indian pursuit dissapated, the remnants of Reno's battalion met with Benteen's men on a hilltop. Reno's casualties (from 140 troopers and 35 scouts) included 40 dead, including 3 officers, 13 wounded, and 37 missing. Of the missing, 17 were left in the woods during the retreat, and linked up later. The two battalions did not move again for over 90 minutes allowing the Sioux to concentrate on Custer.

The hostile warriors halted their pursuit, and headed north to engage Custer, a few dozen tarried behind, sniping at the hilltop position. The Sioux and Cheyenne leaders were successful in diverting most of their braves from this engagement to meet another threat downstream. [see map 2] Custer did not cross the river behind Reno, but continued north, approaching the Indian Camp at the first ford (Medicine Tail) encountered. Custer's troopers did not attack the camp there, but fired volleys across the river and then withdrew in a standard skirmish line. Mad Wolf, a Cheyenne warrior at Medicine Tail ford told his fellow warriors there "No one should charge yet, the soldiers are too many!" Warriors began arriving after Reno's flight, having been diverted by numerous Akcita and Tiyospaye leaders seeking to meet the new threat. When the troopers withdrew toward the high ground, the Sioux crossed the Little Bighorn River. Some groups shifted to the south of Calhoun Hill, and massed behind the Greasy Grass Ridge. They crossed and fanned out to the coulees and ravines to the left and right, keeping their distance from Custer's withdrawing skirmish lines. The Sioux encirclement tactics had begun.

After a brief foray to the north with his left wing (two companies) Custer deployed two wings of his battalion on two ends of a north south ridge (Battle Ridge). The left wing deployed at Cemetery Ridge, near Custer hill. The right wing (three companies) under Captain Keogh occupied Calhoun hill deployed about 3/4 of a mile along a narrow ridge to the south.

After the Reno fight, Crazy Horse spent up to 20 minutes conducting a spiritual ritual, and sprinkling dust from a prairie dog mound over himself. The warriors with him grew impatient, but when they galloped through to the north end of the camp more warriors flocked to follow his band. Crazy Horse and his mounted following crossed the Little Big Horn River at the mouth of the Deep Ravine, just north of the village. They ascended up through the Deep Ravine and crossed the mile-long "Battle Ridge" far to the to north of Custer's left wing. Crazy Horse's band took covered positions in the ravines along the east side of the ridge and began to infiltrate towards the right wing. With Gall approaching Calhoun Hill from the south, the Cheyenne leader Lame White Man to the west, and Crazy Horse now to the east, the encirclement was complete.

Custer's left wing deployed in a doctrinal skirmish formation with E Company taking up a position near Custer Hill and F company just below it. Indian aggressiveness intensified as their numbers rapidly multiplied. They began to close in from all directions. Cheyenne war chief Two Moons and Runs the Enemy attempted to stampede the gray horses (E Co.) near cemetery ridge, but were deterred by carbine fire. The skirmishing continued for 20 or more minutes, as the hostiles continued to infiltrate. Kate Bighead a Sioux woman recounted "The Indians all around were gradually creeping closer to the soldiers. . . At this stage, the fighting was slow and few were killed as both sides remained hidden."

Captain Keogh, Custer's right wing commander, had deployed three companies on Calhoun Hill in the standard U.S. Cavalry textbook-formation. Lt. Calhoun's L Company formed a semicircle skirmish line on the forward (southwestern) slopes of Calhoun Hill. Their horse holders beyond the crest. C and I Companies were deployed in reserve on the reverse slope. The fire from L company skirmishers was temporarily sufficient at keeping the accumulating warriors away or concealed. Some dashed about on horseback daring to ride close to the soldiers, while others crept in as close as they could.

As warriors continued to arrive from the Reno fight, L company became more heavily engaged from the west and south. The horses were in jeopardy, and their holders were taking fire from Calhoun Coulee. This provoked a reaction on Keogh's part and he dispatched C Company, led by Lt. Harington, to charge west into Calhoun Coulee, and dislodge a small group of warriors who were threatening the horses and men. The charge failed. The troopers were exposed to intense fire when they came into range of Greasy Grass Ridge and other positions. The survivors fled back to Calhoun Hill and were immediately pursued by mounted warriors led by Cheyenne Chief Lame White Man. Their fresh ponies enabled the warriors to react and counter-attack quickly. Company L, under Captain Calhoun, shifted their skirmish line to the right to cover C company's hasty retreat.

Warriors to the south, some following Gall seized the opportunity. They rushed up the southern approaches to Calhoun Hill in an intense blaze of repeating rifle fire. This sudden shock triggered a collapse of the position as a few troopers panicked and attempted to flee, encouraging many more warriors to surge forward. They charged in, mounted and on foot, from several directions engaging in ferocious hand-to-hand combat. This is where the fighting was the most intense, and the most Indian casualties were inflicted here, including Lame White Man. Yellow Nose, a Cheyenne warrior, dashed forward and snatched the L Company Guidon.

Some soldiers were cut down fleeing, others began to group together in small perimeters and made easy targets for the those warriors with bows. Lt. Calhoun was killed in one of these small groups. Some of the soldiers on horseback fled the 600 yards toward Keogh's position, most of those on foot were ridden down. Runs-the-Enemy said "Another [Indian] charge was made and they retreated along the line of the ridge. It looked like a stampede of buffalo." As Calhoun's' Company collapsed, engulfed from all sides by Sioux and Cheyenne Warriors, Keogh's I Company deployed to engage the pursuing warriors. They were unable to react fast enough, and were shaken by the sudden turn of events. When the survivors fled towards I Company, tactical cohesion disintegrated there also. Crazy Horse and his following were encroaching from the ravine northeast of Keogh, and in perfect position to attack from that direction. They swept in on all three companies from the east, as the other warriors pursued C and L Companies from the south and west. The entire element was surrounded and cut to pieces.

The left wing was also under some pressure as the hostiles closed in. Pinned, and out of supporting fire range, Custer must have watched in horror as the events rapidly unfolded before him, less than a mile down the ridge. There was little opportunity to react, for within a matter of minutes, the right wing had disintegrated. Absolute chaos reigned as more frenzied warriors surged forward with a blood-lust, and terrified troopers frantically tried to flee. More soldiers bunched together and resisted before being killed or forced to run away. Captain Keogh was killed with a small group of his men on the eastern slope of the ridge. It became a moving fight along the ridge from Calhoun Hill to Custer Hill. Many of the soldiers were dismounted, with more dead horses found in this area than anywhere else on the battlefield.

Only a handful of survivors managed to break through to the temporary safety of the left wing. Three company guidons were now being carried about the battlefield as coup-sticks. The dead were stripped of their weapons and trophies, and the wounded were dispatched, while the shocked survivors on Custer Hill looked on. Over half the battalion was gone, the remainder surrounded and outnumbered. The infiltration had escalated to pursuit, and then shifted back again to infiltration.

Leaders were able to maintain tactical cohesion as they deployed to received about 20 left wing fugitives. A skirmish line from E company delivered fire, checking the warriors' advance along the ridge. With barely over 100 soldiers left in the command, E and F companies were surrounded near Cemetery Ridge and Custer Hill. They were now outnumbered by as many as 15 or 20-to-one. Both companies made their way toward the top of the hill. It was an poor position, with thousands of warriors moving in for the final attack. Exposed troopers were picked off, while groups of mounted warriors stampeded many of the Army horses. The Sioux managed to concentrate on the weakest points. They continued to attack by fire to pin and suppress.

The surviving members of Custer's command hunkered down behind dead horses as Indians further encroached on their position. Ammunition shortages could not have been a critical concern, for most Indian accounts testify that captured cartridge belts had ample rounds still on them. Custer may have been shot at this point, for a mounted foray was attempted without him. With the greater threat coming from the direction of Calhoun Hill to the north, E Company mounted what horses were still available, and made a dash toward the west. The E Company Commander was left behind, dead or wounded on the hill. Whether intended to escape, or to drive off enfilading snipers, the maneuver failed. Thousands of warriors diverted their movement into the Deep Ravine. The mounted troopers were fired on from all directions, warriors mounted their ponies and converged upon them.

There were relatively few Indian casualties in this portion of the battle. Tactical disorganization and the broken terrain allowed the warriors to overwhelm E Company. Most were killed in, or near, the ravine, where 30-40 were buried after the battle. About 50 men (F company and right wing survivors) remained on Custer Hill. The numbers dwindled as Indian firepower took its toll. Finally a group of 15-20 dismounted soldiers desperately attempted to flee toward E Company, still fighting in the Deep Ravine. Troopers from that last group were quickly shot or ridden down.

According to Big-Beaver "15 or 20 soldiers. . . jumped up and started to run towards the river down the [Deep] ravine. [They] did not fire back and mounted Indians killed them." Their bodies were scattered in a line from the hill to the upper portions of the ravine. (Helping to create an illusion that troops - from various companies - had deployed in a skirmish line between Custer Hill and Deep Ravine.)

The final event was an anti-climax to the battle. Those soldiers on Custer Hill who were, wounded or did not attempt to flee, were over-run by the victorious Sioux and Cheyenne. It is doubtful any of Custer's group were left standing as Warriors closed-in to finish them off, especially in light of the superior firepower and numbers they faced. There was some resistance, and a few warriors were killed in the final hand to hand melee. Runs-the-Enemy observed that "Soldiers were piled one on top of another, dead, and here and there an Indian among the soldiers." Custer's 210 man battalion was wiped out, and the warriors turned again to engage Reno and Benteen.

The surviving battalions of Custer's command dug-in on a hilltop and were besieged for two days by the Sioux. With a larger contingent in protected positions, and ample ammunition Reno and Benteen were able to keep the Indians a bay. The Sioux were unable, or unwilling to finish them off. When Terry's smaller and slower Infantry column was sighted approaching from the north the Sioux prepared to depart. The rival factions in the camp became contentious. "Both wanted to be head chief." Rain-in-the-Face recounted, "I didn't care, I was my own chief and had my own war party of bad young men; we would not obey either of them unless we wanted to, and they feared us....I was sick of fighting. I'd had enough. I wanted to dance. " Although the Indians were militarily capable of annihilating both Reno and Terry's exposed forces, they did not risk additional casualties. The Indians withdrew voluntarily, splitting into two major groups. The Army temporarily withdrew from Sioux territory.

Authority and Resources

After Crook's repulse at the Rosebud Battle and Custer's destruction at the Little Bighorn, both a direct result of Indian tactical evolution, the Army was given authority, and adequate resources to fully implement its own new methods. The US Congress authorized General Sheridan to impose military rule on the reservations, disarming, dismounting and subjugating all of the agency Indians. The roamers were no longer able to count on agency Indian support. The Black Hills, the "unceded territory," and much of the Sioux Reservation was also appropriated through sale or outright forfeiture.

The Army launched several extensively resourced winter campaigns and increased their use of armed Indian allies and scouts. Winter expeditions under Colonel's Nelson A. Miles and R. S. Mackenzie attacked smaller camps into the winter and relentlessly pursued the Sioux and Cheyenne roamers. By the spring of 1877, with insufficient resources, and the Army closing in, the roamers were forced to return to the reservation in great numbers. On 6 May 1877 Crazy Horse surrendered with 1,100 followers. Crazy Horse proved to be too unruly for "confined conditions." A few months later, while under arrest, he was bayoneted and killed.

There were still hold-outs who would not submit. Sitting Bull's remaining 400 Hunkpapas fled north across the border into Canada. Spotted Eagle and the Sans Arc Sioux followed. As Rain-in-the-Face put it, "We moved camp north. They followed many days 'til we crossed the line [into Canada]. I stayed over there 'til Sitting Bull came back and I came back with him." With the buffalo diminishing, and Miles' troopers patrolling the border, the exiled warriors were eventually starved or deprived into submission. Gall, Crow King and numerous other leaders came in with their bands. In July 1881 Sitting Bull and a tiny remnant of his once massive following came to Fort Buford on the Missouri River. He said to the post commander: "I wish it to be remembered that I was the last man of my tribe to surrender my rifle." The Great Sioux Wars were over, the evolved Sioux tactics had given them several significant tactical victories, but the Army's relentless new strategy resulted in eventual operational and strategic success. This success was not just tactical, but also, as Keegan mentioned, success in "...a moral conflict. It requires, if it is to take place, a mutual and sustained act of will by two contending parties, and if it is to result in a decision, the moral collapse of one of them." When these well armed and defiant Sioux war chiefs surrendered, the moral collapse was complete.

More Sioux Wars

Part 1: Introduction: Warfare on the Great Plains
Part 2: Collision Courses: The American and Sioux Empires
Part 3: Strategic and Operational Crisis
Part 4: Military Acculturation and Tactical Evolution
Part 5: The Tactical Acculturation Model: The Evolved Sioux Tactics
Part 6a: The Great Sioux War of 1876
Part 6b: Battle of Little Big Horn
Part 7: Conclusion: Demise of the Plains Warriors
Part 7: Bibliography: Primary, Secondary, and Government Sources