Part I: George Washington and Jumonville Glen
Part II: Reaping the Whirlwind: Fort Necessity

On February 19, 1755, Braddock arrived in America with his small task force. Within a week, Washington was writing a letter to Robert Orme of Braddock's staff indicating a willingness to serve as an unpaid volunteer in the forthcoming campaign. Apparently the life of a Virginia planter as not sufficient to a person of Washington's ambitions.

Orme's response was most favorable:

"The General having been informed that you exprest some desire to make the Campaigne, but that you declind it upon some disagreeableness that you thought might arise from the Regulation of Command, has orderd me to acquaint you that he will be very glad of your Company in his Family, by which all inconveniences of that kind will be obviated.

"I shall think myself very happy to form an acquaintance with a person so universally esteem'd and shall use every opportunity of assuring you how much I am Sir Your most Obedt Servant &[ca.]" [6]

Washington must have received this response with euphoria. In a nearly illegible response, despite all the many revisions made on the original copy, he replied:

"Sir,

"I was not favourd with your polite Letter (of the 2d) Ins[t] untill Yesterday; acquainting me with the notice his Excellency Genl Braddoc[k] is pleased to honour me with, by kindly inviting me to become one of his Family the ensuing campayn. It is true Sir that I have, ever since I declind my late command, expressd an Inclination to serve the Ensueing Campaigne as a Volunteer; and this inclination is not a little encreasd since it is likely to be conducted by a Gentleman of the Generals Experien[ce]:

"But, beside this, and the laudable desire I may have to serve (with my best abilitys) my King & Country, I must be ingenuou[s] enough to confess, that I am not a little biassd by selfish, considerat[ns.] To explain, Sir, I wish earnestly, to attain some knowledge on the Military Profession and, believeing a more favourable opportunity cannot offer, than to serve under a Gentleman of Generl Braddock[`s] abilities and experience, it does as you may reasonably suppose, not a little contribute to influence my choice." [7]

Washington continued in a similar vein of disinterested self-sacrifice in a letter, dated April 20 1755, to Carter Burwell, a politically well connected member of Virginia's House of Burgesses:

"I am just ready to embark a 2d time in the Service of my Country; to merit whose approbation & esteem, is the sole motive that enduces me to make this Campaigne; for I can very truly say I have no views, either of profitting by it or rising in the Service as I go a Volunteer witht Pay, & am certain it is not in Genl Braddocks power to give a Comn that I wd accept; I might further add - that so far from being serviceable, I am thoroughly convinced it will prove very detrimental to my private Affairs, as I shall leave a Family scarcely Settled, & in gt disorder; but however prejudicial this may be, it shall not stop me from going... " [8]

On the 23rd of April Washington set out from Mount Vernon for Wills Creek, where he expected to meet General Braddock for the first time.

By the time he reached Bullskin Plantation, he had already had one of his four horses die and the other three rendered unfit for further use. [9]

Things were not getting off to a good start.

It appears that Washington made a good impression on General Braddock, as his letters would indicate that he got along quite well with him. At the time, Braddock was contemplating two routes westward in his campaign against Fort Duquesne. One was through Virginia and the other would have extended through Maryland. Washington lost no time in pointing out the advantages of the Virginia route:

"I Overtook the General at Frederick Town in Maryland and proceeded with him by way of Winchester to this place [Fort Cumberland]; which gave him a good opportunity to see the absurdity of the Rout, and of Damning it very heartily." [10]

In a letter dated the same day, he also shared with his brother, Augustine, that he was being "...treated with freedom not inconsistent with respect, by the General and his Family..." [11]

Clearly, Washington had succeeded in charming the general.

To Braddock, Washington's previous experiences against the French must have been regarded with respect, as was his knowledge of the land through which the army was to march. Washington was one of the few men on the expedition who had already traveled as far as Fort Duquesne and beyond. Clearly Washington's opinions carried great weight with the General, as we shall see.

As Braddock's expedition began to shape up, it came to include a veritable who's who of men whose actions would have an impact on the development of what would eventually become the United States. In addition to Braddock and Washington himself, the body of men included Major Thomas Gage, who would command the British in North America at the time of the outbreak of the American Revolution, Horatio Gates, captain of one of four New York independent companies, whose army would defeat and capture an invading British army in 1777, thus insuring French recognition of the young republic, and an eccentric lieutenant named Charles Lee, who would nearly lose the battle of Monmouth for Washington in 1778. Before the battle was joined, they would also be joined by the trader and frontier scout and diplomat, George Croghan, as well as by Christopher Gist, Washington's companion from his 1753 mission to the French. Working as teamsters in the little army were two men named Daniel: Daniel Morgan of future Morgan's Rifles fame and a young man named Daniel Boone.

Much to Washington's satisfaction, Braddock chose as his route the southerly road toward Fort Duquesne. This would have important repercussions for Virginia in as much as it would open up the conquered territory to settlers from Virginia and the Virginia based Ohio Company and tend to exclude their rivals from Maryland and Pennsylvania.

Washington and Braddock were on such familiar terms that our youthful protagonist was even comfortable disagreeing with the elder general as to the qualities of the average colonial fighting man. Nettled by the reluctance of Virginia and the other colonies to provide him with proper logistical support for the intended campaign, Braddock felt free to hold forth in negative tones for all who would hear as to the martial qualities of the colonists and their governments.

On this subject, Washington was to write: 

"The General, by frequent breaches of contract, has lost all degree of patience, and for want of that consideration and moderation which should be used by a man of sense upon these occasions, will, I fear, represent us in a light we little deserve; for, instead of blaming the individuals as he ought, he charges all his disappointments to a public supineness, and looks upon the country, I believe, as void of both honor and honesty. We have frequent disputes on this head, which are maintained with warmth on both sides, especially on his, who is incapable of arguing without it, or Diving up any point he asserts, let it be ever so incompatible with reason." [12]

Fortunately for Braddock's ill-temper and his soldiers' well being, Pennsylvania, at the behest of Benjamin Franklin, came to the relief of the army by sending a large convoy of 150 of the much-needed supply wagons and as many horses. [13]

Peace reigned once again at army headquarters and the expedition continued on its way. For once, things seemed to be going Washington's way.

Then Washington became ill. Dysentery, that nemesis of all pre-antibiotic armies, appears to have paid a call on our hero. In an almost incoherent letter to John Augustine Washington written between June 28th and July 2nd, he describes himself as being seized with violent fevers and pains. These were so intense that he was unable to ride a horse and had to be carried in a wagon. Presently, the joltings of the wagon became too much for him and he had to remained camped along the road with a guard posted nearby until he recovered enough to be able to travel. In the same letter, Washington describes of a fateful council of war:

"The Genl before they met in Council askd my prive Opinn concerning the Expn; I urgd it in the warmest terms I was able to push forward; if we even did it with a small but chosn Band, with such Artillery and light Stores as were absolutely necessary; leavg the heavy Artilly Baggage &ca with the rear division of the Army, to follw by slow and easy Marches, which they might do safely while we were advanced in Front.

As one Reason to support this Opinion, I urged that if we cd credt our Intelligence, the French were weak at the Forks at present but hourly expectd reinfs wch to my certain knowledge coud not arrive with Provns or any supplys durg the continuance of the Droughth which we were then experiencing - as the Buffaloe River (River le beauf) down which was their only commn to Venango, must be as Dry as we now fd the gt xing of the Yaughe; wch may be passd dry shod. "This advice prevailed, & it was detd that the Genl, with 1200 Chosen Men and Officers from all the differt Corps, under the following Field Officer's (vizt Sr Peter Halkett who acts as Brigadier, Lt Colo. Gage Lt C: Burton, and Majr Sparke, with such a certain number of Waggons as the Train wd absolutely require, shoud March as soon as things coud be got in readiness for them; which was completed, and we on our March by the 19th, leaving Colo. Dunbar & Majr Chapman with the residue of the two Regts, some Indept Companys most of the Women and in short every thing not absolutely necessary behind: carrying our Provision's & other necessarys upon Horses.

"We set out with less than 30 Carriages (Inclg those that transported the Ammunition for the Howetzers, 12 prs, 6 prs, &ca) & all of them strongly Horsed; which was a prospect that conveyd infinite delight to my mind, tho' I was excessively ill at the time. But this prospect was soon clouded, & my hopes brought very low indeed when I found, that instead of pushing on with vigour, without regarding a little rough Road, they were halting to Level every Mold Hill, & to erect Brides over every brook; by which means we were 4 Days gettg 12 Miles..." [14]

The decision to divide the army was and is a subject of controversy. The slow pace of the army's advance was a major factor in this decision. A report received on June 16th that a large body of French troops was on the way to reinforce Fort Duquesne was another. It was thought that by paring down the number of troops and their baggage, a faster rate of march would result for the advance guard of the army. Unfortunately, this also resulted in leaving Dunbar's division ultimately out of supporting range of that of Braddock. As we shall see, Dunbar was not a highly motivated commander, however, if his division had been in closer proximity, or even up with, Braddock's division, the resulting battle of the Monongahela may not have had to have been fought, or at least might have had different results.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to take a look at the army as it was now constituted as well as an appraisal of the task set out before it. The advanced division was under the command of General Braddock and was organized as follows: First, there was a vanguard consisting of 400-450 officers and men under the command of Colonel Gage. This included a small unit of five mounted Virginia cavalry as well as Captain Waggoner's and Captain Peronie's companies of Virginia Rangers, and Captain Poison's company of Virginia Carpenters, backed up by Captain Gates's New York Independent company, and 150-200 men from the 44th and 48th regiments.

The main body, consisting of 750-800 officers and men, was under the direct control of General Braddock himself This consisted of the senior grenadier companies of the two above mentioned regiments and an additional 500-550 men from these regiments. Also marching with this body were the detachment of seamen under Lieutenant Spencer and an additional 18 Virginia cavalrymen. The provisions were loaded on horses and three or four provision wagons. Some thirty carriages followed. These included the ammunition carts, tool wagons, the three or four provision wagons, and a wagon filled with gifts for the Indians. As to artillery, Braddock brought along all four of his 8-inch howitzers, his four 12pounders, two of his four 6-pounders, and three of the eleven Coehorn mortars.

Colonel Dunbar's division consisted of some 800 men, around 150 wagons, and 300 packloads of bread flower and bacon. However, he only had enough horses to haul two-thirds of the flower wagons at one time and only enough for the balance of the supplies that he could only haul a total of half of his supplies in any given march, Thus he was obliged to march his division in stages, doubling back with the horses at night in order to retrieve the remainder of his baggage. Needless to say, this delay, coupled with the exhausting of his horses, caused his division to fall further and further behind Braddock's division, so that he was eventually placed at least three day's march behind the advanced division. [15]