George Washington and the Seven Years War

Part III: Into the Fire:
The Braddock Campaign

by James J. Mitchell


Part I: George Washington and Jumonville Glen
Part II: Reaping the Whirlwind: Fort Necessity

Commission Resigned

In the last installment of our story of George Washington's experiences during the Seven Years War, we left him at the time of the surrender of Fort Necessity, an event whose repercussions were to cause him no end of vexation and personal embarrassment. One of the first things that the victorious French did upon the surrender of Washington's force was to claim that they had found his own personal journal among the possessions left behind.

An alleged translation of this was published throughout Europe in 1756 under the title of Memoire contenant le precis des faits, avec leurs pieces justificatives pour servir de reponse aux observations envoyees par les ministres d Angleterre, dons les tours de l'Europe.

This was done with the clear intent of showing the British as being the aggressors in the as of yet undeclared war. In 1757 a copy of the above pamphlet was captured on board a captured French ship. It was translated and published by Hugh Gaine in New York under the title of A Memorial Containing a Summary View of Facts with Their Authorities, in Answer to the Observations Sent by the English Ministry to the Courts of Europe.

The actual existence of Washington's journal has long been a subject of debate, as the original has never been found. Washington himself denied the existence of a journal as such in a letter to an unknown recipient that appears to date from 1757:

"I am really sorry, that I have it not in my power to answer your request in a more satisfactory manner. If you had favored me with the journal a few days sooner, I would have examined it carefully, and endeavoured to point out such errors as might conduce to your use, my advantage, and the public satisfaction; but now it is out of my power.

"I had no time to make any remarks upon that piece, which is called my journal. The enclosed are observations on the French notes. They are of no use to me separated, nor will they, I believe, be of any to you; yet I send them unconnected and incoherent as they were taken, for I have no opportunity to correct them.

"In regard to the journal, I can only observe in general, that I kept no regular one during that expedition; rough minutes of occurrences I certainly took, and find them as certainly and strangely metamorphosed; some parts left out, which I remember were entered, and many things added that never were thought of, the names of men and things egregiously miscalled; and the whole of what I saw Englished is very incorrect and nonsensical; yet, I will not pretend to say that the little body, who brought it to me, has not made a literal translation, and a good one.

"Short as my time is, I cannot help remarking on Villiers' account of the battle of, and transactions at, the Meadows, as it is very extraordinary, and not less erroneous than inconsistent. He says the French received the first fire. It is well known, that we received it at six hundred paces' distance. He also says, our fears obliged us to retreat in a most disorderly manner after the capitulation. How is this consistent with his other account? He acknowledges, that we sustained the attack warmly from ten in the morning until dark, and that he called first to parley, which strongly indicates that we were not totally absorbed in fear. If the gentleman in his account had adhered to the truth, he must have confessed, that we looked upon his offer to parley as an artifice to get into and examine our trenches, and refused on this account, until they desired an officer might be sent to them, and gave their parole for his safe return. He might also, if he had been as great a lover of the truth as he was of vainglory, have said, that we absolutely refused their first and second proposals, and would consent to capitulate on no other terms than such as we obtained.

"That we were wilfully, or ignorantly, deceived by our interpreter in regard to the word assassination, I do aver, and will to my dying moment; so will every officer that was present. The interpreter was a Dutchman, little acquainted with the English tongue, therefore might not advert to the tone and meaning of the word in English; but, whatever his motives were for so doing, certain it is, he called it the death, or the loss, of the Sieur Jumonville. So we received and so we understood it, until, to our great surprise and mortification, we found it otherwise in a literal translation.

"That we left our baggage and horses at the Meadows is certain; that there was not even a possibility to bring them away is equally certain, as we had every horse belonging to the camp killed or taken away during the action; so that it was impracticable to bring any thing off, that our shoulders were not able to bear; and to wait there was impossible, for we had scarce three days' provisions, and were seventy miles from a supply; yet, to say we came off precipitately is absolutely false; notwithstanding they did, contrary to articles, suffer their Indians to pillage our baggage, and commit all kinds of irregularity, we were with them until ten o'clock the next day; we destroyed our powder and other stores, nay, even our private baggage, to prevent its falling into their hands, as we could not bring it off.

"When we had got about a mile from the place of action, we missed two or three of the wounded, and sent a party back to bring them up; this is the party he speaks of We brought them all safe off and encamped within three miles of the Meadows. These are circumstances, I think, that make it evidently clear, that we were not very apprehensive of danger. The colors he speaks of as left were a large flag of immense size and weight; our regimental colors were brought off and are now in my possession. Their gasconades, and boasted clemency, must appear in the most ludicrous light to every considerate person, who reads Villiers' journal; such preparations for an attack, such vigor and intrepidity as he pretends to have conducted his march with, such revenge as by his own account appeared in his attack, considered, it will hardly be thought that compassion was his motive for calling a parley. But to sum up the whole, Mr. Villiers pays himself no great compliment in saying, we were struck with a panic when matters were adjusted. We surely could not be afraid without cause, and if we had cause after capitulation, it was a reflection upon himself.

"I do not doubt, but your good nature will excuse the badness of my paper, and the incoherence of my writing; think you see me in a public house in a crowd, surrounded with noise, and you hit my case. You do me particular honor in offering your friendship; I wish I may be so happy as always to merit it, and deserve your correspondence, which I should be glad to cultivate."

"Williamsburg, 2 March, 1755" [1]

Washington had certainly done nothing to enhance his military reputation among those in the know. On the heels of Washington's surrender, the British ambassador to France, Lord Albemarle, wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, "Washington and many such may have courage and resolution, but they have no knowledge or experience in our profession. Consequently, there can be no dependence on them." [2]

Nor was the Half King sparing in his criticisms of Washington's military acumen:

"(Washington) would by no means take Advice from the Indians... he lay at one Place from one full Moon to the other and made no Fortifications at all, but that little thing upon the Meadow, where he thought the French would come up to him in open Field; ... had he taken the Half King's advice and made such Fortifications as the Half King advised him to make he would certainly have beat the French off, ...the French had acted as great Cowards, and the English as Fools in that Engagement; ... he (the Half King) had carried off his Wife and Children, so did other Indians before the Battle begun, because Col. Washington would never listen to them, but was always driving them on to fight by his directions." [3]

Even his own soldiers had shown a lack of respect for his authority by breaking into the liquor during the height of the engagement. Nevertheless, if many of those in positions of influence regarded Washington with ill-concealed contempt, he was nevertheless a hero to his neighbors. Governor Dinwiddie, despite distancing himself from the debacle, nevertheless kept Washington in command and confirmed his commission as colonel of the Virginia Regiment.

As to Washington's movements subsequent to his surrender, he returned with the Virginia regiment to Williamsburg via Wills Creek. Here he was united with Colonel James Innes, whose own regiment of North Carolina troops had virtually disbanded for want of pay and provisions. Here also were the two Independent companies from New York and the one from South Carolina. Governor Dinwiddie, despite Washington's defeat, was still bent on taking an aggressive stance.

On the first of August he wrote to Washington:

"The Council met Yesterday & considering the present State of our Forces, & reason to think the French will be strongly reinforc'd next Spring - It was resolv'd that the Forces shou'd immediately march over the Allegany Mountains, either to dispossess the French of their Fort, or build a Fort in a proper Place that may be fix'd on by a Council of War - Col. Innes has my Orders for the executing the above Affair - I am therefore now to order You to get Your regiment completed to 300 Men & I have no doubt but You will be able to enlist what You are defficient of Yr Number very soon, & march directly to Wills's Creek to join the other Forces - And that there may be no Delay, I order You to march what Companies You have compleat; & leave orders with the Officers remaining to follow You as soon as they have enlisted Men sufficient to make up their Compas.

"You know the Season of the Year calls for Dispatch; I depend on Yr former & usual Diligence, & Spirit, to engage Yr People to be active on this Occasion. Consult with Majr Carlyle what Ammunition may be wanting that I may send it up immediately: I trust much on Your Diligence & Dispatch in getting Your regiment to Wills's Creek as soon as possible - Colo. Innes will consult You in the appointing of Officers in Yr regiment - Pray consider if possible or practicable to send a Party of Indians &ca to destroy the Corn at the Fort & Logstown this would be of great Service, & a very great Disappointment to the Enemy. I can say no more but to press Dispatch of Yr Regiment to Wills's Creek, & that Success may attend our Arms & just Expedition is the sincere Desire of Sr Yr very hble Serv. Robt Dinwiddie" [4]

Washington, who knew the true state of things regarding the strength and morale of his regiment, was understandably shocked. On the 11th of August, he wrote a letter to William Fairfax in which he described Dinwiddie's projected campaign as "morally impossible."

He also wrote Governor Dinwiddie, however, indicating his willingness to obey his orders but expressing his reservations in somewhat milder terms. In the event, the Governor's Council rejected a supply bill by the House of Burgesses on which the Governor's plan depended, owing to some unacceptable stipulations on how the money was to be spent. The governor prorogued the assembly until October, and the campaign was postponed.

Upon the promotion of Lieutenant Governor Horation Sharpe of Maryland to the rank of lieutenant colonel and commander-in-chief of British American forces to be sent against the French, the various colonial governors authorized Sharpe to raise a body of seven hundred colonials to march against the French in the Spring of 1755. Dinwiddie now decided to solve the prickly questions of rank and authority in his own troops by disbanding the Virginia regiment and replacing it with at least ten independent companies of regulars, such as had been commanded by Major Mackay, Washington's old nemesis. He felt that by doing this he would put an end to the "disputes between the regulars and the officers appointed by me."

Since all of his officers would carry the King's commission and there was to be no officer above a captain, he felt that this would put an end to disputes about rank.

Washington, who was quite jealous of the privileges due to his rank, refused to have any part of this new system. In late October, he resigned his commission and retired from the profession of arms. This retirement was to be short lived.

In November of 1754, Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland authorized a letter to be sent to Washington via William Fitzhugh, Sharpe's second in command, in which he was urged to accept the command of a company of Virginia troops. Sharpe's plan was to keep Washington on a separate assignment so that he would not find himself being commanded by anyone who would have formerly been commanded by Washington. Washington would have none of this. In a lengthy letter he rebuffed this offer, stating:

"You make mention in your letter of my continuing in the Service, and retaining my Colo.'s Commission, This idea has filled me with surprise: for if you think me capable of holding a Commission that has neither rank or emolument annexed to it; you must entertain a very contemptible opinion of my weakness, and believe me to be more empty than the commission itself ... every Captain, bearing the King's Commission; every half-pay Officer, or other, appearing with such commission, would rank before me..." Nevertheless, he left the door open ever so slightly by stating: "My inclinations are strongly bent to arms." [5]

As Washington prepared to settle down as a gentleman planter at Mount Vernon, which upon the death of his sister-in-law's only daughter Sarah, appeared more and more likely to become his own, events were taking place in England that would have important consequences on his future. There the war party, led by William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland and the second surviving son of George II, had asserted its authority over the more pacific policies of Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle.

It was determined that two British regiments would be sent to America to bolster the colonists and respond to the perceived French aggression. They were to be commanded by Major General Edward Braddock, late of the Coldstream Guards and more recently of the 14th Regiment stationed at Gibraltar.


Part I: George Washington and Jumonville Glen
Part II: Reaping the Whirlwind: Fort Necessity

George Washington and the Seven Years War Part III: Into the Fire: The Braddock Campaign


Back to Seven Years War Asso. Journal Vol. XIII No. 4 Table of Contents
Back to Seven Years War Asso. Journal List of Issues
Back to Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2005 by James J. Mitchell

This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com