The weaknesses in the Swedish military system were immediately apparent when the government began to assemble an army in Pomerania. As the existing garrison numbered only 6,000 men, additional forces had to be ferried over to bring it up to the 20,000 required by the alliance with France and Austria. The controversy surrounding the war induced the government to spread the burden of mobilization as evenly as possible by drafting only the fittest men from the Indelta regiments, rather than sending complete units.

This destroyed the chief advantage of the Indelning system by fragmenting the provincial character of the regiments. In addition to 754 men from the mercenary regiments stationed in Sweden, another 10,200 were drawn from 12 Indelta foot regiments along with 4,040 from 6 regiments of horse. A further 935 artillerymen were sent to reinforce the 196 already in Stralsund, while 1,000 of the royal foot guards were also despatched despite the king's protestations to the contrary.

These reinforcements began to arrive in August 1757 to bring the total in Pomerania up to 22,125 men, of whom about 17,000 were of immediate use in the field. Steps were taken to recruit additional light troops locally, but these only got underway in December so that a mere 36 mounted riflemen were available that autumn.

The Pomeranian Theater

Large Map (slow: 127K)
Jumbo Map (very slow: 282K)

Prussian Pomerania lay to the south and east and included the islands of Usedom and Wollin which, together with a narrow strip of land west of the Oder River, had been ceded by Sweden in 1720. The Prussian Electorate of Brandenburg stretched to the south, beginning with the district of Uckermark around Prenzlau. Sandwiched between the Uckermark and Pomerania was the tiny Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, with its much larger neighbor, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, immediately to the west.

Apart from a few hussars serving as mounted police, Strelitz had no troops, and Schwerin only had 1,000 infantry. Both attempted to stay out of the war despite the formal mobilization of the Holy Roman Empire against Prussia, but proximity to Pomerania made this impossible. Both sides regarded Mecklenburg as a source of supplies, money and recruits, which could be demanded as "contributions", on pain of destruction of houses and property. The Prussians were particularly ruthless, but the Swedes took greater care (as they had to as allies of the emperor) and even agreed to the internment of the Schwerin army on Rugen Island from 1759 to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Prussians.

Forested Terrain

The entire area was thickly forested, dotted with lakes and marshes, and cut by narrow but slow moving rivers and water courses. The Peene, for example, was only 50 to 100 paces across between Demin and its mouth, but was bordered by low marshy banks that were 500 to 1,000 paces wide. None of these rivers were fordable except at special crossing points (see map), often approached by long causeways that made them natural bottlenecks. Sergeant Schwarzkugel and 10 Prussians managed to prevent two entire Swedish battalions from crossing the Landgraben at Brook in August 1761.

The Swedes had a single fortified base at Stralsund, while the Prussians had both Stettin and their less well defended capital, Berlin. Since neither side ever assembled a sufficient siege train, both Stralsund and Stettin were virtually invulnerable, provided they were well garrisoned. Berlin, on the other hand, was wide open to attack and indeed was raided twice by the Austrians (October 1757) and the Russians (October 1760); neither time with Swedish support. The city was 200 kilometers from Stralsund, a not too inconsiderable distance and one made greater still by skillful Prussian delaying tactics as well as by the Swedes' own irresolution.

Stettin guarded the mouth of the Oder River and could threaten the only immediate crossing point upstream at Schwedt on the route into eastern Pomerania and towards a potential Russian advance through East Prussia. Stettin was protected from Russian attack by the fortress of Colberg, further east along the coast. This strongpoint did fall to the Russians in December 1761, which was too late in the war to be of any use to the Swedes. In the meantime, the Stettin garrison, however inactive, remained a threat to the left flank of any thrust towards Berlin.

None of the other settlements were heavily fortified. Demin and Anklam were protected by old walls and were of little use to the Prussians since they were on the south side of the Peene River. However, they could serve as useful bridgeheads for the Swedes. Anklam was linked by ferry to Usedom where there was a small redoubt (Anklamer Fahrschanze) to protect the landing spot.

The main work on Usedom was the Peenemunder Schanze located on the north west end of the island near the later day V2 rocket site in WWII. It guarded the western exit from the Oder basin, of Haff, to the Baltic known as the Peene-Oder. It was protected by the winter winds which made a permanent occupation possible, but it lacked secure shelters capable of withstanding a prolonged bombardment. The narrow gap between Usedom and Wollin was secured by the Swinemunder Schanze, while the Swedes had a few old works on Rugen Island.

The Strategic Options

Political imperatives and geography combined to make two strategies possible. Both sides lacked resources and viewed enemy territory (and that of Mecklenburg) as a source of additional supplies. The lie of the rivers meant that it was possible for a relatively small force to close off large areas by blocking all the crossing points. This tended to be the Prussian option in the coming years, especially in the winters when successful counter-attacks enabled them to bottle the Swedes in Stralsund, denying them access to Mecklenburg.

However, this policy necessitated scattering what were weak forces, leaving individual outposts vulnerable to attack, whilst a successful crossing at one end of a river generally meant its entire line had to be abandoned.

The other option was to capture one of the major bases and this was the strategy generally adopted by the Swedes. Of the two key Prussian cities, Stettin was initially preferred because it was closer to Stralsund and would secure a line of communications with the Russians. The presence of a French liason officer in 1757 encouraged the Swedes to aim for Berlin instead, with the vague intention of joining the French under Richelieu, who was then advancing with his army through western Germany. Therefore, Berlin became the formal objective because the Swedish Senate felt it was imperative that the army achieve a symbolic success to justify the war to an increasingly disgruntled population.

Occupation of the river lines was relatively easy for the Swedes, given their generally superior numbers versus the Prussians, but they used this strategy on the defensive, desperately trying to hold onto at least some Prussian territory before winter halted all operations. Seizure of Usedom and Wollin was valuable in securing the flank of any southward move, but of little use during a retreat as there was not much on either island beyond sand dunes.

A Prussian attack on Stralsund was usually beyond the capacity of the weak forces normally assigned to watch the Swedes. Frederick or Prince Henry generally despatched reinforcements if the Swedes got too close to Berlin, but these were often recalled once the threat had passed. Moreover, from May 1758 the Prussians suffered from divided command as the general in charge of the field forces lost direct control over the Stettin garrison, which passed to the command of the Prince von Bevern.

Always conscious of the Russian threat to the east, Bevern proved reluctant to release much of the meagre garrison for service in the west. In any case, an attack on Stralsund was only feasible between November and February when the coast froze over, preventing intervention from the Swedish navy and making it possible for the Prussians to cross the ice to Rugen Island without boats.

Prussian Preparations

The Prussians had not been expecting Swedish intervention until news leaked out in July 1757 that Stockholm was negotiating with France. Responding to an initiative from the local authorities, Frederick authorized the formation of a special Provincial Militia to protect his northern territories from the Swedes and Russians. Ten battalions, each 500 men strong, were formed in the Uckermark from former soldiers and new recruits, along with a smal1 hussar carps and Jager detachment. The Militia essentially acted as a depot for the main Prussian armies elsewhere, training men who were then drafted to bring other regiments up to strength after major battles.

Apart from the occasional sortie, they remained in Stettin, though from August 1758, a special field company was attached to each battalion, while the best recruits were grouped into Grenadier Battalion Ingersleben and two free companies. These changes, together with other losses, reduced the militia to six battalions by 1760, and two of these were stationed in Colberg.

Another unit of reservists, the Land (or Neue Garnisons) Regiment Stockhausen, formed the core of the garrison. Numbering 1,505 men, it initially had seven fleld companies, but was reorganized into two battalions of five companies in May 1758, contributing its best men to Grenadier Battalion Ingersleben. There was also one company of garrison artillery in Stettin.

Prussian field forces fell into two groups, reflecting their divided command. Apart from the field companies of the militia units, the core of the Stettin group was comprised of Infantry Regiments Bevern (IR 7) and Furst Moritz (IR 22) which were sent there to recuperate after the battle of Kolin. These absorbed three battalions of impressed Saxons, while a fourth unit of more servicable Saxons, Grenadier Battalion Koller, was permanently attached to the force.

The second group comprised troops sent later as reinforcements. In 1757 these did not appear until the beginning of December when Field Marshall Lehwaldt arrived with the 28,400 men who had been fighting the Russians in East Prussia. He left two battalions of Garrison Regiment Puttkamer (No. 1) when he moved eastwards again in January 1758, but these were captured in 1759 on the Oder Islands. Further reinforcements continued to arrive periodically, changing the composition of the second force considerably. A steady core was provided from April 1758 by the formation of Frei Battalion No. 9 by Count Johann Ludwig von Hordt, a former Swedish officer who escaped to Prussia after the abortive royalist coup of 1756. A second unit appeared in 1760 when Colonel Belling arrived with his Hussar Regiment (HR 9).

At the same time as ordering the formation of the militia, Frederick instructed the Stettin commandant to establish a small galley flotilla to protect the mouth of the Oder. Consisting initially of 10 vessels in 1758, two more were added the following year along with 9 others in 1760, though many had been lost in the meantime. The largest were two frigates built in 1760, each armed with 20 cannon, while the rest were small galleys or converted fishing boats. The crews were mixed, combining 442 trained seamen and 173 militiamen under Captain Schmidt, assisted by Daniel Schultze, a local government official who played an important role in the fleet's short life.

More 7YW Swedish Army

Swedish Politics and Armed Forces
Appendix A: Swedish Army in 1756
Appendix B: Swedish Navy in 1756
Swedish Mobilization and Strategy
Campaign in Pomerania, 1757-1762
Swedish Jager Units
Prussian Navy vs. the Swedes
Swedish Army Organization

This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com