1757

Political considerations and logistical difficulties delayed the Swedish attack until September 13th. Even then, the commander, Field Marshall Mathias Alexander von Ungern-Sternberg, was still in Stockholm so that the initial assault was led by Lt. General Count Hamilton. Part of the 17,000 strong force was ferried over to Usedom, covered by four galleys attached to the army; seizing Anklamer Fahrschanze and Peenemunde. One galley blocked the Swinemunde channel to cover an amphibious assault by barge from Usedom to Wollin.

The main force drove in the weak Prussian posts along the Peene to sieze Pasewalk and Prenzlau. This was as far as it got, as nothing could be arranged with Sweden's allies before news of Rossbach ruled out cooperation with the French. Ungern-Sternberg withdrew across the Peene on November 12th, two weeks ahead of the arrival of Lehwaldt's army from East Prussia

The Stettin garrison sortied, recovering Wollin, while Usedom was abandoned due to the onset of winter. The Peenemunder Schanze held out until March 13th when a Prussian shell exploded the powder magazine, forcing the 200 man Swedish garrison to surrender. Lehwaldt blockaded Stralsund and levied contributions in Mecklenburg. Fearing the worst, Ungern-Sternberg resigned before news of his formal dismissal arrived from Stockholm.

1758

The winter hit the Swedes hard and by the time the Prussians lifted their blockade on June 18, 1758, they had lost 1,000 men in addition to those killed or captured in the Autumn. An additional 6,000 men were sick. Nonetheless, the government resolved to make a fresh effort, signing a new agreement with France for additional financial aid and despatching 5,600 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, along with 661 artillerists as reinforcements to Pomerania The field army was reorganized, concentrating on improving the artillery, light troops and grenadiers. The latter were detached from their parent units and formed into two battalions (increased to 5 btns. in 1761) of 400 men, while the Nylands Regiment was seconded as assistants to the artillery.

The artillery was now reorganized into 8 brigades with 36 heavy and 60 light cannon. The hussar squadrons raised at the end of 1757 were expanded into a regiment of 1,000 men and the Jager were increased to 300 by December. A free battalion was formed from 300 foreign deserters in April, rising to twice that number by the end of the year. Though representing a great improvement, none of these units was yet the equal of their Prussian counterparts.

The appearance of the Russians on Prussia's eastern frontier prompted the withdrawal of the field force in June, reducing the force opposing the Swedes to the Stettin garrison alone. With the way clear, Count Hamiliton led 16,000 Swedes across the Peene in July, while General Hessenstein landed on Usedom with 2,000 more, seizing the Peenemunde and Swinemunde works. Urged on by his government, which desperately needed a success to quell protests against the war, Hamilton advanced on Berlin, reaching Neu Ruppin on September 22nd. The Stettin garrison harried his left flanlc, but they could not prevent a Swedish raid from destroying a Prussian munitions factory at Zehdenick.

Realizing that something had to be done, Frederick despatched General Wedell with 6,000 men from the main army, then in Saxony. Though a Russian cavalry detachment reached Schwedt, they made no effort to cooperate with Hamilton whose force had decreased to 14,100 effectives. Faced by further sorties from the Stettin garrison on his flank, and by Wedell's arrival north of Berlin, Hamiliton withdrew at the end of September, resigning command in disgust over the lack of logistical support from his government.

Though further Prussian reinforcements appeared under Dohna, hesitant leadership allowed the new Swedish commander, Lt. General Baron von Lantinghausen, to pull back into Stralsund. Three infantry regiments were abandoned in Demin and Anldam and these units surrendered to the advancing Prussians in January 1759, bringing total Swedish losses to 4,000 men and 60 canon. Peenemunde also surrendered to the Prussians on April 11th and it was demolished.

1759

This time the government failed to send reinforcements, leaving Lantinghausen with only 12,000 effectives. The remnants of the three captured regiments were regrouped into a single battalion and used partly to garrison Wolgast, and partly as marines on the galley detachment which was increased to 14 ships. Other unfit men were weeded out from the field units and combined as a garrison battalion in Stralsund. Other new recruits were found locally to replace part of the previous year's losses.

The Prussians continued to blockade Stralsund with 23,850 men until May 15th, when news of the Russian advance compelled the majority of this force to move eastwards. Major General von Kleist was left with 5,130 men and 22 guns to watch the Swedes from the south bank of the Peene. These too were recalled after Kunersdorf, finally prompting Lantinghausen to emerge from hibernation on August 13th.

As he led 10,000 troops towards Pasewalk, General Count Fersen and his 3-4,000 men attacked the two Oder islands, landing on Usedom on August 18th. The Prussian galley flotilla made valiant efforts to hinder this, attempting to block the Peene-Oder channel by Anklam, but was forced back into the Haff where it was attacked and captured on September 10th near Neuwarp.

Fersen's troops, meanwhile, seized both islands, taking three Prussian battalions there prisoner after a stiff fight. Some of the captured Prussian sailors took control of the Swedish ship carrying them to Karlskrona and steered it back to Colberg, where it served as the nucleus for the reconstruction of the flotilla in 1760. A sortie from the Stettin garrison against Lantinghausen's main force was beaten back at Pasewalk and the Swedish advance guard pushed on to Prenzlau, levying contributions in the Uckermark.

Reinforcements

By this time the situation elsewhere had clarified after the Battle of Kunersdorf and Frederick was able to send Lt. General Manteuffel with a rag bag of reinforcements consisting of the Hussar battalion Belling, Dragoon Regiment Meinicke, Frei-regiment Hordt and 3,000 infantry reconvalescents who were grouped into seven ad hoc battalions. Manteuffel reached Pasewalk by mid September just as the Swedes were withdrawing towards the Peene.

Major von Knobelsdorff led 100 of the Belling Hussars and one battalion of the Hordt regiment on a daring raid deep into enemy-held territory, bursting into Demmin on October 21 to seize the Swedish army records and its almost empty military chest, before escaping to Malchin under hot pursuit. This coup discouraged the Swedes, who began a full retreat over the Peene. They abandoned Demmin, Anklam and both Oder islands in November to regroup at Greifswald. There matters remained until August 1760, apart from a single counter attack by Lantinghausen on the night of January 27th, when he appeared in force outside Anklam. The Swedes were thrown back, but only after heavy street fighting in which Manteuffel was wounded and taken prisoner.

1760

Though the Swedes had failed to retain a hold on Prussian territory, they had ended the year in full possession of their own part of Pomerania, having inflicted heavy losses on their opponents. Unfortunately, no reinforcements were forthcoming from the homeland and while some additional recruits were found, Lantinghausen only mustered 15,000 men in some 20 battalions and 38 squadrons by early August to face Major General Stutterheim (who replaced Manteuffel) and the Prussian field force of 6,500. Bevern held an additional 6,000 infantry in the Stettin garrison.

Lantinghausen began the customary offensive with a feint attack towards the east while crossing in force to the west. The Prussians fell back to Zehdenick to cover Berlin as Lantinghausen occupied Prenzlau with 12-13,000 men, placing General Ehrensvard and 34,000 others in Pasewalk to cover his left against Stettin. It was during the constant skirmishing of these months that the Swedish hussar ensign and future Prussian field marshal, Blucher, was taken prisoner.

So matters remained until the end of September when Frederick sent Prince Fredrich Eugen von Wurttemberg to take command. He arrived with one battalion of reinforcements while General Werner and another 3,500 appeared near Pasewalk, from Colberg. Both sides had planned major attacks for October 3rd, but faulty intelligence and transmission of orders caused these to be aborted. Only Werner attacked Ehrensvard's detachment and though driven off, the engagement proved sufficient to induce Lantinghausen to retire to Pasewalk.

Prince Friedrich Eugen was recalled with Stutterheim's corps, leaving Belling and Werner with just 2,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry at Prenzalau to watch the Swedes, who still numbered 15,000. Belling raided Mecklenburg, causing such havock that Lantinghausen was convinced he possessed a much larger force and so retreated with his entire army behind the Peene on October 27th.

1761

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Jumbo Map (very slow 180K)

As Lantinghausen also resigned in July, command now passed to Ehrensvard who accepted on the condition that he was given a free hand to determine operations. Particular attention was paid to improving the light troops and a new mounted free corps was formed under Major (later Lt. Col.) Sprengtporten, combining 480 volunteers from the regular cavalry with new recruits.

A foot detachment was also formed by drawing 400 men from various infantry regiments and these were organized into four companies, each with two 3 pound cannon. These units were combined with the Hussar Regiment and existing free corps as a single light division of 2,500 men under Sprengtporten. They were joined by additional cavalry in October when the hussars were reorganized into two regiments of 800 men each.

Though the Prussian field force had increased to 13,700 men uring the winter, most of these were withdrawn in the spring to protect Colberg from renewed Russian attack. Belling was left with his 1,300 hussars and the 1,000 men of Free Regiment Hordt plus 5 cannon as the so1e Prussian field force in Pomerania. However, under Belling's skillful leadership, this force proved to be more than adequate to delay the Swedish offensive for a month.

Advancing on July 13th, Ehrensvard was still stuck by the Landgraben four weeks later, although Belling had been reinforced by two squadrons of militia hussars and two free companies from the Stettin garrison. Three additional weak grenadier battalions (only 3 companies each) arrived at the beginning of September while other small detachments occupied the line of the Ucker.

Meanwhile, the Swedes pushed forward after heavy fighting near Neu Brandenburg, forcing Belling back to Woldeck. Stutterheim reappeared with four more weak battalions, causing Ehrensvard to withdraw over the Landgraben and concentrate at Boldekow. Having despatched Hessenstein and 3,000 men to take Wollin, Ehrensvard now had only 11,000 troops, but he decided to attack after he learned that Stutterheim had been redirected towards Colberg.

Engagement

What follows was one of the most interesting engagements of the war and is worth describing in detail. Ehrensvard launched a twopronged attack over the Landgraben on September 16th, intending to defeat Belling's main force which now occupied Jatzke, to the south. While General Lybecker advanced over the Cavel Pass with 7 battalions and 2 cavalry regiments, Sprengtporten crossed with the light division further east to cut Belling off from the Stettin garrison.

As Lybecker's cavalry emerged from the woods north of latzke, Belling counter attacked with his hussars, and threw them back on their (Swedish) infantry. Lybecker proceded to deploy along the edge of the wood from where he drove off Belling's repeated attacks, until darkness forced the Prussians to retreat to Cosabroma.

Meanwhile, Sprengtporten drove in the Prussian post at Ferdinandshof, which had been held by Knobelsdorff with two free companies. This force was driven back to Pasewalk. Sending a battalion to cover his right flank at Rotemuhl, Sprengtporten attacked Torgelow on the Ucker, which was held by one of the Stettin garrison grenadier battalions, on September 17th, but failed to take it.

Leaving Lt. Colonel Golz at Cosabroma with 2 hussar squadrons and 2 companies of Free Regiment Hordt to hold off Lybecker, Belling hastened on the 17th to relieve his detachments further east. Knobelsdorf was called up from Pasewalk with his 2 companies and Grenadier Battalion Ingersleben, which had been posted there from the Stettin garrison. Reinforced by part of Belling's detachment, Knobelsdorf advanced on Rotemuhl through the woods to the east on the 18th, while the rest of Belling's men attacked the village from the south. Sprengtporten's battalion successfully held the village while his main force now arrived through the woods.

This time, the Swedish light troops proved superior, catching the Prussians disordered amongst the trees, killing or wounding over 200 and taking another 300 prisoner. As Lybecker had simultaneously evicted Goltz from Cosabroma, Belling had no choice but to retreat to Pasewalk.

Swedish success was shortlived, because news that Stutterheim had doubled back induced Ehrensvard to start a retreat, continuing despite fresh royal orders redirecting the poor Prussian general away from Pomerania, this time to Saxony. Belling followed the Swedes to the Peene where he was 3oined by Prince Friedrich Eugen and 4,500 shattered survivors from the force fighting around Colberg. This raised the Prussian field force to 7,300 effectives. The Oder islands were abandoned to the Prussians in the middle of December, leaving just the detachment holding Demin as the only post on Prussian soil.

The Prince decided to attack Springtporten, who had been sent to protect Mecklenburg by capturing Malchin. The Prussians bombarded the town through January 1, 1762, but Ehrensvard arrived with 8,000 men to rescue Sprengtporten the next day. The Swedes then pulled back into their part of Pomerania, effectively ending the war in this theater of operations.

Negotiations

Aware that the Russians were negotiating with Prussia, the Swedes moved swiftly to extricate themselves from the disasterous conflict. The peace was signed at Hamburg on May 22, 1762, restoring the pre-war status quo. Though Frederick had contemplated annexing Swedish Pomerania, this remained impossible given the general military situation and he was aware that such a move would cost him credit amongst the German Protestant territories. Sweden was left in possession of its toehold on northern Germany until the post-Napoleonic settlement of 1815, while the domestic crisis caused by the war resulted in a royalist coup in 1772, which in turn lead to a series of political reforms.

Considering its chronic underfunding and poor equipment, the Swedish army fought well, particular1y during the latter stages of the war, but had been consistently let down by hesitant leadership. Frequently, the Swedes simply handed the initiative to the Prussians by their own inaction, while poor liaison with their allies robbed them of several opportunities for decisive combined operations, notably during the two raids on Berlin in 1757 and 1760. Despite later reforms, Sweden's armed forces remained incapable of sustaining its remaining imperial ambitions and Finland was lost to Russia in 1808.

Bibliography and Additional Information

There is nothing substantial on the Pomeranian campaigns in English, but uniforms of the Swedish army are well covered in the pamphlets published by R.D. Pengel in the 1980's. Sweden has a rich tradition of military history, including regimental histories, campaign accounts, and biographies of key officers. Linguistic difficulties mean that this is inaccessable to most of our readers, but for those who are interested, all the relevant material is listed and summarized by Klaus-Richard Bohme in B. Kroener (ed.), Europa im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen (Munich, 1989), pages 193-212.

For those with German, Swedish operations are summarized by Hauptmann Arnold, "Schwedens Teilnahme am Siebenjahrigen Kriege", Beihefte zum Militarwochenblatt, 12 (1908), pages 453-482. This essentially provides a shorter version of what is in the great German General Staff history of the Seven Years War, but covers the carnpaigns of 1760-61 which were never included in the more detailed, but unflnished larger work.

The Prussian dimension, including the wartime militia formations, is best approached through Curt Jany's Geschichte der Preussischen Armee, vol. 11 (Osnabruck, 1967). The naval aspects are well covered by the Swedish naval historian Jan Glete, whose work is available in English: "Bridge and Bulwark. The Swedish Navy in the Baltic 1500-1809" in G. Rystad (ed.), The Baltic in Power Politics 1500-1990, vol. I (Stockholm, 1994), pages 9-59 (with extensive references to specialist literature in Swedish) and his Navies and Nations. Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America 1500-1860, (2 vols, Stockholm, 1993).

Finally, there is a special musuem devoted to Swedish military history with a collection of 20,000 flat figures: Tennfigur Museum, Hjortnas, 793 00 Leksand, Swede. The main army museum in Stockholm has, I believe, now reopened after refurbishment.

More 7YW Swedish Army

Swedish Politics and Armed Forces
Appendix A: Swedish Army in 1756
Appendix B: Swedish Navy in 1756
Swedish Mobilization and Strategy
Campaign in Pomerania, 1757-1762
Swedish Jager Units
Prussian Navy vs. the Swedes
Swedish Army Organization

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