Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee
3rd February 1814
Part 2: Conclusion
by Andrew Field, UK
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La Chaussée was actually only a minor tactical action but it illustrates how something that was little more than a skirmish can have considerable strategic importance. In this case the strategic significance was the subsequent French abandonment, virtually without a fight, of the important town of Châlons. But if it was a strategic victory for the Prussians, at the tactical level it was a far more even affair, despite the serious French shortcomings detailed above. There can be no disputing the merits and success of the initial Prussian charge, but this part of the action can have lasted only a very short time; certainly considerably less than an hour. Thereafter, the French were able to rally, regain their cohesion and then carry out a well coordinated withdrawal, in good order, which lasted for the rest of the day. Weil’s detailed account concentrates on the success of the Prussian charge and it is clear that he does so in order to highlight the tactical lessons for the employment of cavalry for the education of his readers. His account is almost totally dependent on Prussian sources that only give us a single perspective. These inevitably concentrate on their considerable initial success and deal only cursorily with events that filled the majority of the day and which were generally more to the credit of the French. But the real value of studying this combat is in the actions and decisions of the first few minutes following the initial contact. In this respect French leadership and tactics proved woefully inadequate. In his ‘Recollections’ Macdonald has little to say on the events of this day, merely saying that he was ‘very feebly’ attacked!
[27]
It seems fair to say that the Prussian cavalry owed its success at La Chaussée to the observation and application of the classic French cavalry principles that the French themselves seemed to have forgotten. It was the poor decisions and dispositions taken by the French generals which above all brought about their defeat rather than the inferior quality or quantity of their cavalry. Weil concludes;
‘They seem to have forgotten that the attack of the ‘arme blanche’ is the essence of cavalry tactics, that movement is the first requirement for success and that cavalry that remains stationary, instead of moving to meet that which charges it, is already half beaten and only awaits the opportunity or pretext to turn bridle before the shock of contact.
[28]
It is thus to the vigour of the Prussian cavalry that falls the honour of having prevented the movement of Macdonald on Vitry, and to the ‘feebleness and faults’ of the French leaders which falls the responsibility for the defeat at La Chaussée and the subsequent loss of Châlons.
One final vignette from this action comes from the biography of Gen von Sohr who commanded the Brandenberg Hussars. It perhaps adds little to the tactical debate but is still interesting:
‘At the moment the gallop was sounded; Count von der S, a lieutenant who had recently joined from the Saxon cavalry, wishing to distinguish himself, raised his sabre calling ‘follow me, follow me’ and spurred his horse from the gallop to the charge. The second squadron, to which he belonged, began to follow him off line. Noticing this, Sohr immediately ordered the trot to be sounded, and then waited until the whole regiment was reformed before recommencing the charge. At the end of the engagement, Sohr called the officers around him and addressing himself to Lieutenant von S, said, ‘You conducted yourself bravely and I like officers with heart. But I am no ‘one arm’ [a polite, literal translation!] and if you forget yourself again as you did today, and wish to give the orders in my place, you strongly risk me gratifying you with a sabre blow’. [29]
Von Sohr subsequently commanded a Prussian Hussar brigade that was almost destroyed at Roquencourt on the 1st July 1815 by the cavalry of Generals Exelmans and Piré. Sohr was badly wounded and made prisoner. ‘He was,’ said Exelmans, ‘enraged like all the devils and refused to surrender’. [30]
And so it seems that Exelmans finally got his revenge.
[1] Quoted in Weil,Vol II, La Campagne de 1814. p.146.
Recollections of Marshal Macdonald.
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 2: 3rd February 1814
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 1: 3rd February 1814
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