Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee
3rd February 1814
Part 2: Leadership
by Andrew Field, UK
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The French Weil is damning of the French leadership at La Chaussée, writing of ‘the lack of cohesion that was evident, particularly in some of the leadership’ and that it was to ‘the feebleness and faults of the leaders of the French cavalry which falls all of the responsibility’. [10]
Many famous generals have been credited with saying that there are no bad soldiers, only bad officers. Whilst a rather sweeping statement, it is essentially true. It seems fair to say that it does not matter how good your soldiers are; if their commanders put them in an impossible position they are likely to be beaten. The system of command in Napoleonic armies often allowed little opportunity for the use of initiative by the chain of command. So whilst many junior French officers, and even troopers, may have foreseen the disaster about to descend upon them by the orders, or lack of them, from their superiors, there was little or nothing they could do about it.
So we must now look at the key French commanders at La Chaussée and identify if it really is they who were responsible for the failure of French arms on that day. It would then be useful to contrast this with the performance of the Prussian chain of command.
Macdonald was the only one of Napoleon’s marshals who was promoted to this exalted rank on the battlefield (after his controversial column broke the Austrian centre at Wagram in 1809. [11]
However, his performance in high command since then had not been consistently high, particularly in independent command. His time in Spain from 1810 to 1812 did little to tarnish his reputation as it did to so many of his contemporaries, but did nothing to enhance it either. During the campaign in Russia he commanded the X Corps, protecting Napoleon’s northern flank and conducting the successful siege of Riga. Ironically, his corps included the Prussian contingent commanded by General York whose troops he faced at La Chaussée. In 1813 he became commander of the XI Corps and saw action in the major battles early in that campaign without particularly distinguishing himself. He was then given the independent command of the Army of the Bober for the push on Berlin that resulted in his rout at the Katzbach; a rout he later rather shamefully blamed on his cavalry commanders (one of whom was Exelmans). He later fought at Leipzig and Hanau.
By the time the campaign moved into France it seems his morale was as low as that of much of the country. On the 21st Jan he wrote to Gen Maison; ‘What an awful situation and what is the chance of saving us! It is said that the morale of the capital is terrible and it is the same in most big towns. What has become of French energy? Everyone has their head down, although our resources are not exhausted…I have a broken heart and a broken soul’. [12]
The lack of energy of the French people of which he complained reflected his own performance during the early months of 1814. He had reacted without determination to Napoleon’s orders to march towards the main French army and with almost indifference to the early contacts with York’s corps. Having declared his intention to attack he had missed the opportunity to strike a telling blow against
York when the latter’s forces were dispersed. Then, despite the advantage of being in friendly territory, he failed to acquire any significant intelligence on the Prussian strengths, dispositions or indications of their intentions that would have offered him considerable freedom of action. His dispositions of the evening of the 2nd were clearly defensive betraying his stated plan of attack.
In the circumstances it is worth noting that at least fifty percent of his cavalry (III Cav Corps) were dispersed and took no part in the fighting. This hardly reflects a plan for a determined offensive and contrasts starkly with the Prussian detailed reconnaissance by a headquarters staff officer and the subsequent concentration of a large majority of their available cavalry on the basis of his recommendations.
Given this failure, it is no surprise that Macdonald did not motivate his cavalry, or their leaders, to a more determined resistance. His lack of confidence in the whole enterprise is clearly evident in his midday correspondence with Kellerman (reporting the loss of La Chaussée and his retrograde movement on Pongy), and his apparent lack of battlefield leadership. These were hardly the actions of a man
determined to repair the damage of the initial encounter. One of the demands of a commander is to set an example of energy, motivation, determination and confidence to those under his command. In this he clearly failed.
Général de division Exelmans was an experienced cavalry commander who had spent his formative years as ADC to Marshal Murat and two years in the Imperial Guard. He had been present at many of the major battles of the Empire, including Austerlitz, Eylau, Friedland, Borodino and Leipzig. By the time of this latter battle he commanded a division of light cavalry and continued to do so during the retreat into France. He succeeded to the command of II Cavalry Corps as strategic consumption diminished its numbers to the point where St Germain, the corps commander, was re-assigned to General Headquarters as the strength of the corps no longer justified the presence of someone so senior. Thus Exelmans inherited the command of the corps.
Due to the considerable time he spent working for Murat, it is perhaps unsurprising that he had a reputation for recklessness, although it is also clear that he was an excellent regimental commander. However, his performance as a divisional commander during 1813 had not been distinguished and his division had been routed at the Battle of the Katzbach. Here, although his men had fought bravely, much of the blame for their rout is levelled at his authoritarian style of command which left his brigade commanders reluctant to use their initiative without the presence of their commander, even when they faced impending disaster.
Despite his failure at La Chaussée, shortly afterwards he was promoted to the command of the 3rd Cavalry Division of the Imperial Guard. In this post he played a distinguished part in many of the main actions of the rest of the 1814 campaign. Given my comments on Macdonald’s contribution to the failure at La Chaussée, it may be felt that Exelmans was put in an impossible position by the incompetence of his superior. Although this may be true, it is only partly the case. Like any other commander, he must take responsibility for the battle readiness and battlefield performance of his troops. De Brack is quite clear that the strength of character and quality of the leader can overcome many disadvantages including the apparent ‘moral ascendancy’ of the opposition. He goes on to argue that; ‘The confidence inspired by a commander can cancel out the effect of a surprise or an undesirable event on a unit’s morale’. [13]
Whilst he cannot be held to account for the general state that the French cavalry had declined to, the morale, deployment and tactics of the corps were clearly Exelmans’ responsibility. As discussed above, and in contrast to the Prussians, neither Exelmans nor Macdonald seem to have made any effort to gain any information on the Prussian’s strength, dispositions or intentions. If this had happened it is inconceivable that Exelmans would have deployed his troops on the terrain he did, nor used the tactics that he did. This then is the major fault of Exelmans.
On the morning of the engagement he was well placed immediately behind his front line and we have seen him giving instructions to the provisional heavy cavalry regiment. [14]
We must assume that there were troops forward of the main French line providing security and early warning as this was such a routine procedure that we must not doubt that it was so. In no account is there is any suggestion that the French were caught completely by surprise. What seems to have surprised the French was the alacrity and aggression with which the Prussians launched their attack. The responsibility for this lack of preparedness must lie at Exelmans’ door.
Before we move on it is only fair to give this French general some credit. The Prussian attack was launched at first light and resulted in the overthrow of the French cavalry. However, the fighting continued for the rest of the day and although there is little description of the majority of this time it is clear that the French cavalry did rally and then conduct a lengthy, but successful and orderly retreat, helping to cover the infantry. The co-ordination of such an operation is considerable, especially after a reverse, and some credit for this must devolve upon their commander. It is ironic that one of the weaknesses of the French position, the terrain on which they deployed, subsequently aided their escape.
The Prussians
The two key Prussian commanders were Generalmajors von Jürgass and von Katzler. Both had commanded cavalry brigades in the fledgling Prussian Army that had been hastily organised after their defection from the French cause that followed the debâcle in Russia. They had both been present as brigade commanders at Lützen and Bautzen, although these were predominantly infantry battles. During the reorganisation of the Prussian army during the armistice they were finally brought together in York’s I Prussian Corps. Jürgass was appointed to command the corps’ cavalry reserve with the then Oberst Katzler as one of his brigade commanders.
During the autumn campaign Katzler was generally found commanding the corps advance or rear guard. It was at Leipzig that both commanders really made a mark, as the I Corps cavalry conducted a series of very successful charges in the fighting around Möckern. By the time of the invasion of France, Katzler was also a Generalmajor and these two commanders had clearly forged a close and trusting
working relationship.
The Prussian command system at La Chaussée is an interesting contrast to that of the French. I Corps Orders of Battle show Jürgass as the commander of the Corps Reserve Cavalry and Katzler and Henkel as brigade or abteilung
[15] commanders. Although Jürgass and Katzler were the same rank there was no question of who was in command. However, during the fighting Jürgass held not only the overall command but also directly commanded an abteilung; which incidentally was smaller than that of Katzler’s. It must have been very difficult for Jürgass to command his own abteilung whilst trying to direct the overall battle, and in particular the almost independent, but supporting command, given to Henkel. It seems clear from the movements of the three groups that they worked virtually independently of each other but with a common purpose. The fact that the combat went so successfully is a testament to the strength of this unusual command relationship and suggests that each subordinate commander knew Jürgass’ intent and
how he was to support it without having to be given detailed and continuous orders.
The Prussian commanders, from the moment when the two sides found themselves in each other’s presence, did not waste a second. The least hesitation could have compromised them and given the French the time to complete their deployment, bring their batteries into action and thereby deny the Prussian squadrons the opportunity to charge with success. Jürgass and Katzler immediately sized up the situation, but guarded against rushing. They knew that order was the guarantee of success and carried their squadrons forward, the first when the deployment in two lines was complete; the second, in echelon of regiments. They were able to support their first line with the second where the need was greatest. Their seizing of the initiative is in stark contrast with the apathy of the French commanders. Being the first to act offers a commander significant advantages: firstly, this forces the enemy into a reaction rather than being able to carry out their own plans, and also hands his forces the considerable psychological advantage of the attacker.
Finally, the Prussian generals, not content with having foiled the French plans by seizing the initiative, hastened to organise an effective pursuit in an attempt to turn a victory into a rout. However, in this they were unsuccessful: the double defile that no doubt contributed to the initial breakthrough, then proved too difficult an obstacle for their unsupported cavalry to launch an immediate pursuit, allowing the French cavalry time to rally. By the time some of the squadrons passed through La Chaussée, and the rest by-passed the village, the opportunity had been lost, although no blame for this
should lie with the Prussian commanders. They gained one final success on the banks of the Moivre by breaking some French cavalry which, sacrificing itself to cover the retreat, attempted a final counter attack. However, this final flourish from the French cavalry gave their compatriots the time to prepare for the destruction of the bridge that effected an end to the engagement.
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 2: 3rd February 1814
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 1: 3rd February 1814
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