by Andrew Field, UK
Macdonald’s command consisted of the II and III Cavalry Corps and the XI and V Infantry Corps. All four corps were well below their established strengths and in total were only just above half the strength of York’s single corps. However, considering only cavalry strengths, the French were stronger: Jürgass, Katzler and Henkel having about 3,300 men, whilst the French II and III Cavalry Corps were about 2140 and 2060 respectively.
[6]
The key difference at La Chaussée was that the Prussian cavalry was concentrated whilst on the French side only the II Cavalry Corps was engaged.
The Prussian cavalry had earned their spurs during the campaign in Germany and particularly at Leipzig where they had played a prominent part in the fighting around Möckern. Their organisation and leadership, and therefore their unit and formation cohesion, were unchanged since the armistice of 1813. They had also gained considerable experience and success as they marched through France and their morale was high from this success and their participation in a popular war against a hated enemy. All commentators of warfare of this time agree that the moral advantage in any fight lies with those on the offensive and in this case it was the Prussians who took the initiative.
Although they had suffered inevitable losses from combat and many months of campaigning the number of recently trained and inexperienced recruits did not result in an appreciable loss of combat effectiveness. The confidence that was drawn from these points generally gave the Prussian cavalry a moral ascendancy over their French counterparts.
Like the rest of the army, the French cavalry had suffered heavy losses in the campaign in Germany in 1813, and their numbers had been further eroded by combat, sickness and desertion since then. In 1814 the French cavalry could be divided into four distinct categories.
The first was the Imperial Guard cavalry; organised into three divisions this was still the impressive and powerful organisation of previous campaigns despite the less experienced units that had been incorporated into it.
The second group was the cavalry formations drawn from Spain. Although they had not appeared in northern France by the time of La Chaussée, when they did make an appearance
their experience and quality was to prove superior to the allied cavalry.
The third group were the new units and formations raised from the conscriptions of the end of 1813. Made up of young and hardly trained conscripts and with small and often inadequate cadres, these were the men that General Delort referred to when he exclaimed; ‘Only a madman would order me to charge with such troops!’ [7]
The final group was the survivors of the 1813 campaign and it was to this group that the members of II Cavalry Corps belonged. When they were raised early in 1813, these regiments consisted of men from several disparate sources. Some were experienced soldiers in squadrons drawn from the regiments in Spain, some were members of depot squadrons and some were new recruits. By the end of the armistice in mid-1813 the II Cavalry Corps had reached a strength of over 7,000.
[8]
The sad remains that fought at La Chaussée were the survivors of the battles of Leipzig and Hanau and the demoralising retreat into France. They did not lack experience in combat and were inured to the rigours of life on campaign. At a time when the French army was suffering from a high level of desertion, they were either motivated enough not to desert, or too scared to do so. These regiments possessed a solid nucleus of old and experienced soldiers in sufficient numbers to absorb the small numbers of conscripts that were arriving this early in the campaign. However, the dramatic reduction in numbers meant that each unit no longer had a viable strength to operate independently. Therefore units were organised into provisional regiments, with each of the former regiments providing a squadron. Although these regiments contained largely veterans it can be no surprise that their level of cohesion and morale was low. General Piré wrote to General Grouchy; ‘It is with the deepest regret that I am
forced to inform you of the level of desertion in my division. Ten hussars of the élite company of the 3rd Hussars and troopers of the 11th and 12th Chasseurs have crossed to the enemy; they were all old soldiers; the troops complain of being badly paid, badly clothed….’ [9]
It is therefore safe to say that there was a considerable difference in morale between the two sides and that this did not auger well for the French in any engagement they were likely to have without a significant change in circumstances.
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 2: 3rd February 1814
Cavalry Combat at La Chaussee Part 1: 3rd February 1814
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