"Vorwarts, Vorwarts, Kinder!"
The Prussian Campaign
in Belgium of 1815
Part I
Introduction
by Patrick E.Wilson, UK
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Having read many accounts of the Waterloo campaign over the years I have always been struck by the role of the Prussian army and its under representation in British accounts. What follows therefore is my interpretation and attempt to write about the Waterloo campaign from the Prussian perspective, ignoring actions they were not involved in from the dates of 15th to 20th June 1815.
The idea for this volume is that it should follow the general movements of the Prussian army from that sultry morning of the 15th, which saw Zieten driven back to the woods of Fleurus to the closing light of the 20th June, that witnessed Grouchy's columns disappearing over the horizon towards Dinant. In addition it is hoped that the reader will be able to see how flexible and adaptible the Prussian corps and brigade system of this period had become following the reforms of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. As Blucher expressed it on the 2nd June:'My army is in the best of shape and the morale is all that can be wished for.'
The main texts from which I have drawn my material are Captain Sibourne's "History of the Campaigns", David Hamiltion Williams "Waterloo: New Perspectives", Lord Chlafonts "Waterloo: Battle of Three Armies" and David G.Chandler's "The Hundred Days. These books of course are supplemented by many others which will appear in my bibliography at the end of part II.
In June 1812 the Prussian Army contributed a body of troops to Napoleon's Grande Armee de Russe, serving under Marshal Jacques Macdonald, they conducted themselves at the siege of Riga witha professionalism that earned them the praise of even Napoleon's headquarters. But following Napoleon's diastrous retreat, the Prussians commanded by General von Yorck concluded the convention of Tauroggen in December 1812 and thus precipitated the rising of Germany, which became known as the Wars of Liberation.
The Wars of Liberation were vital to the resurgance of Prussia's military prowess, for they establised her as one of the foremost military powers in Europe and give her much moral bargaining power at the congress of Vienna in 1815.
Almost from the start, the Prussian Army had thrown itself into the wars body and soul, Napoleon himself, after the battle of Lutzen remarking that, "these animals had learnt something". The battles of 1813 also bought a succession of Prussian victories as their Generals showed themselves better soldiers then many of Napoleon's famed marshalate. The Prussian contribution to the great battle of Liepzig also proved significant, for approximately a third of the troops they committed became casualities perhaps two fifths of the total allied loss. Indeed, General von Yorck's and General von Kliest's Corps had to be amalgamated after the battle, such were their losses.
The campaign of 1814 that followed brought equal committment, the Prussians crossing the Rhine despite the ice and the freezing weather, and despite heavy defeats in February at Cheateau-Thierry and Vauchamps, they rallied to attack again within days and even succeeded in defeating Napoleon himself at Laon before entering Paris a month later.
The Prussian army emerged from these campaigns a much more mobile, flexible and experienced force then it had been in 1806. Having learnt the hard way, it now possessed a resiliance that enabled it to recover quickly after defeat, a command structure that give it considerable advantage over prospective opponents and an organisation second to none (having mastered and perfected the French Corps system to meet its own needs).
The congress of Vienna met to reshape Europe following the defeat of Napoleon in early 1815. Prussia benefitted not only through the return of her western provinces and Polish possessions but also through the annexation of the Grand Duchy of Berg, Swedish Pommerania and half of Saxony. However there were tobe disputes over the rest of Saxony and more importantly Poland, which very nearly led to war between the former allies this was until Napoleon re-appeared in France that March and the final episode of the Napoleonic wars began. A episode in which the Prussian Army was designed to play a full part despite the difficulties it was experiencing through the enlargement and reorganisation of its armed forces.
The Prussian Army of June 1815, although containing some excellent regiments that had fought in the 1813-14 campaigns, found itself with two major disadvantages when compared to its adversary. Firstly it was in the process of incorporating many units which came from lands that had previously been allied with the French, secondly the Prussian cavalry was in the middle of re-organisation and many regiments found themselves under strength and commanded by officers they did not know when Napoleon returned to France.
The effect of this upon operational units of the Prussian Army is best examplified if we examine Lieutenant -General Zieten's 1st Corps d'Armee, a unit which was to find itself in the thick of the fighting that June. Of his eleven infantry regiments, only five were "old" units of the 1813-14 campaigns, whilst six were wholly from the newly acquired territories to the west of the Eble. Many of these men had formerly fought against the Prussians for Napoleon and therefore hardly fitted into the Prussian Army, indeed many would desert after the battle of Ligny and head for home.
Zieten's cavalry too presented a lamentable picture, General von Roder's cavalry reserve although consisting of thirty two squadrons, had only 1,925 effectives which represents about sixty men to a squadron ! Still they were to fight valiantly in the coming campaign. The artillery presented a similiar picture with only 1,019 men to serve eighty eight field pieces and would find themselves reinforced by infantrymen during the battles of that summer.
Such were the problems experienced by Blucher's Army during this period. Though it is also important to realise that a large proporation of the Prussian Army at this time were Militia, a largelt consripted and ill equipped force. Nevertheless their moral was high, especially those units from Prussia proper, like the regiments of General Bulow's 4th Corps. This Corps boasted no less then eight infantry, seven cavalry and one horse artillery militia unit. And yet, Bulow's long march from Liege to the fields of Mont St.Jean and his subsequent battle with the French 6th Corps and elements of the Imperial Guard provided a fitting epitaph to these militia regiments' committment and professionalism.
It had been hoped that every Prussian Brigade would consist of a regular, a militia and a unit from the newly acquired areas, thus each Brigade would have a regular regiment to emulate but this was not possible in the limited time available. Consequently Bulow's Corps had no none Prussian units whilst others lacked regular regiments. Thielemann's 3rd Corps for example had but one regular regiment, although his two former Russo-German Legion regiments proved solid enough.
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Prussians in June 1815 came from the remnants of the Saxon Army. Some of Prussia's newly acquired territories had been formerly part of Saxony and thus part of the Saxon Army was required to join the Prussian Army. This many Saxons not unnaturally objected to. In May 1815 an incident occurred that resulted not only in the Saxon Army being sent home but also the disbandment of the 32nd infantry regiment (it had been full of disaffected Saxons) and the execution of seven Saxon officers. The incident in question had been a demonstration by the Saxons at Blucher's Headquarters in Liege, which had got out of hand with stones being thrown and threats issued. Eventually it took the intervention of a Prussian infantry regiment to restore order. Nevertheless the Prussian response can be seen as an intended lesson to other troops from the newly acquired western provinces, though it can hardly be seen as a moral booster. It did however deprive the Prussian Army of the services of 14,000 well trained and equiped soldiers, and demonstrates some of the problems that existed within the Prussian Army of June 1815.
The organisation of the Prussian Army in 1815 however presented a much better picture, incorporating many of the lessons it had learnt the hard way during the campaigns of 1806-07. Under the title of Army of the Lower Rhine, Blucher's forces comprised four first line Corps, each of four infantry Brigades, two to three cavalry Brigades and an artillery reserve. Each Corps was therefore a miniature army in itself, combining a force of all arms, about 30,000 men under a capable general, it could, if handled well delay a larger enemy force for a considerable period. The Belgium campaign of 1815 witnessed two notable incidents of this, firstly Ziethen's fighting withdrawal on the 15th June and secondly, Thielemann's battle along the Dyle on the 18-19th June.
Prussian Corp System
The Prussian Corps system also had a great deal of tactical reasoning behind it, a Corps being used in three main battle elements comprising of a feint, a main attack and a reserve. Laid down in the Instruction of 10th August 1813. One element was to attack the enemy's flank to draw his attention. The reserve artillery would be concentrated at the point of the main attack, which would then be made by the main battle element. A fourth element would be held in reserve and used where necessary.
At Brigade level the formation adopted depended largely upon its role inthe forecoming battle. The Brigade designated for the feint attack would probably adopt line formations, sending their skirmishers forward to start a fire-fight, battalions could then support or replace each other as the situation developed. Those Brigades involved in the main attack would normally deploy their light battalions in skirmish order but would keep the main strength of their forces formed in close order ready to advance with the bayonet when the enemy showed signs of wavering. The reserve Brigade tended to be use all its battalions in close order columns ready to exploit the success of the main attack.
Thus, this new method of fighting, the feint, main attack and the reserve contained many of the lessons learnt from the bitter experiences of 1806-07. A Prussian Brigade, to say nothing of a Corps, could now be a lot more troublesome for the French then their own formations had been in the earlier campaigns. Indeed, the Prussian Army as a whole was becoming more and more a match for the once all conquering French and they were aided in this, to no small degree, by the emergence of a refined and increasingly able Prussian General Staff.
The architects of this transformation were Generals Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, as experienced staff officers and generals they recognised the need for highly trained and reliable staff officers to support general officers in the field. Thus, all officers of the General Staff were obliged to learn logistics, modern theories, strategy and planning. In addition, an officer appointed to be Chief of Staff to an Army Corps or Army had to advise his commanding officer on strategy, movement and planning of attacks. Indeed, he held equal authority with that officer and could counter-mand anything he thought detrimental to the welfare of the forces under his care. This of course was a radical departure from contemporary methods of command but the fact that Scharnhorst and then Gniesenau had been Blucher's Chief of Staff during the 1813-14 campaigns contributed significantly to the Prussian successes. Indeed, the position of Chief of Staff had become synonymous with the rank of second-in-command and Gniesenau had found himself in command at Laon in 1814 and would again find himself in that position at Ligny after Blucher had been temporarily rendered hors de combat. Other staff officers in the 1815 campaign also made vital decisions that were to have great influence upon events, Lieutenant-Colonel Rieche's at Ligny and General Muffling at Mont St.Jean are but two examples.
On the 3rd May 1815, Wellington and Blucher met at Tirlemont to agree to a joint plan of operations should Napoleon attack them before the great Allied advance against France that summer began. It was decided that whilst Wellington concentrated on his left towards Nivelles, Quatre Bras and Frasnes, Blucher would concentrate on his right around Ligny, Sombreffe and Gembloux. Thus, not only would they draw themselves near each other but could also cover the main roads to the Belguim capital. Furthermore, it was probably agreed that Napoleon ought to be fought as he crossed the Sambre, which would not only catch him at a distinct disadvantage but would practically guarantee victory.
As this plan depended on the joint co-operation of Wellington's and Blucher's forces, liaison officers were sent to each other's Headquarters. Blucher's appointee, General von Muffling, a good soldier with proven battle experience, though had been instructed by General Gniesenau to be wary of Wellington. The suspicion implied here was real enough, for earlier that year at the Congress of Vienna it had been secretly agreed between Britain, France and Austria to go to war if necessary against Prussia and Russia over the future of Saxony and Poland. Napoleon's reappearance had put an end to such thoughts. But the reaction of many Prussian officers to this revelation, especially after the part played by Prussia in the 1813-14 campaigns, was one of much bitterness, particularly towards the British, who were seen to have let them down badly over the settlement of Saxony. Fortunately though, Blucher cared little about politics and would be prepared to fight side by side with Wellington if it meant the defeat of the French and revenge for all that she had inflicted upon his country since 1806.
More Vorwarts
More Vorwarts Part II
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