"Vorwarts, Vorwarts, Kinder!"

The Prussian Campaign
in Belgium of 1815
Part I

17th June: Retreat to Wavre

by Patrick E.Wilson, UK

The early hours of the 17th June found a battered Blucher, reunited with his Chief of Staff Gniesenau and his Chief of the General Staff von Grolmann , debating what to do next at Mellery on the road to Wavre. Blucher was still full of fight and wished to stand by Wellington, Gniesenau reminding them of Wellington's failure to come as promised just hours before urged caution. Grolmann however, pointed to the positive advantages of a retreat on Wavre. For it not only offered an opportunity for the whole army to concentrate well away from the scene of their recent defeat but had the advantage of allowing the Prussian Army the option to either support Wellington or fall back on the Rhine via Louvain.

Furthermore by abandoning their current line of communication and establishing a new one in the North, they may deceive the French, who would surely take it for granted that they would retreat on their communications via Gembloux and Liege. Thus, perhaps, allowing them 36 to 48 hours to reassemble their Army into an effective fighting force once again. Such reasoning helped persuade Gniesenau to except the proposal and allowed Blucher to retain his sense of honour, since he could easily support Wellington if the opportunity arose. The early hours therefore found couriers departing for Zieten, Pirch I, Thielemann and Bulow with orders to concentrate on the town of Wavre.

The order to retreat on Wavre found Zieten and Pirch I in the vicinity of Tilly and Gentinnes with detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr and General Jagow still close to the Village of Brye. Zieten and Pirch I were to retire on Bierge and Aisemont respectively via Mont St.Guibert. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr's Hussar Brigade would form their rearguard and hold Tilly and Gentinnes until pressed by the enemy or until Zieten and Pirch I were established in their positions around Wavre. General Jagow with two battalions of the 9th infantry regiment, a Westphalian Landwehr battalion and a 12Ib battery, retired indepentently via Sombreffe and Gembloux and continuing his retreat with Thielemann's Corps until he was able to direct these troops to their respective Brigades in the 1st and 2nd Corps.

Thielemann and Bulow were in the vicinity of Gembloux when they received their orders to march on La Barette and Dion-Le-Mont respectively. They were to march via Walhain and Corbeux and Bulow was required to have his main rearguard (the 14th Brigade) at Vieux Sart, as well as a detachment of a cavalry regiment, two battalions and section of guns at Mont St.Guibert in support of von Sohr and later as rearguard when von Sohr rejoined his Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel Ledebur was therefore despatched there with the 10th Hussars, the Fusileurs of the 11th regiment and the 1st Pommeranian Landwehr regiment and a section of guns from horse battery No.12.

Zieten and Pirch I retired as ordered via Mont St.Guibert, arriving at the Dyle about midday, Zieten crossed and took up his position at Bierge, whilst Pirch I established his position around the village of Aisemont opposite Wavre itself. Both then proceeded to reorganise their men and rest them, Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr retired safely to Mont St.Guibert, reporting that the French Army appeared to be moving along the from Marbais in the direction of Quatre-Bras against Wellington's forces. However, until about 5.00pm neither Zieten nor Pirch I had any news of their reserve supplies of ammunition, which Colonel von Rohl had despatched along the road to Gembloux on the 16th June. It's reappearance easied much anxiety about the future of operations, since without ammunition the 1st and 2nd Corps would be virtually useless but the re-supply of the battalions and batteries after 5.00pm once again meant that the Corps would be battle worthy despite the heavy losses of the 16th June.

Bulow as soon as he received his orders at about 10.30am, wrote to Thielemann to say he was moving off immediately and therefore not to delay and be wary of straggling, Bulow's march went off without incident and he arrived at Dion-Le-Mont in the afternoon with his first units, the majority of his Corps was concentrated there by ten o'clock that night. Thielemann however,delayed his march until 2.30pm and thus, not only put himself in danger of being overrun but also separating himself from Bulow. Indeed, it was only through luck that he was not detected in his exposed position by Marshal Grouchy's cavalry under Pajol and Exelmanns, the former encountered and captured the 14th horse artillery on the road to Namur as well as dispersing a squadron of the 7th Uhlans.

Pajol was also deceived by a horde of deserters into thinking that the Prussians had retreated on Namur. These deserters were from the newly acquired provinces and were therefore totally unreliable, and yet! They performed a valuable service for their new country by their very desertion. For Grouchy detached Pajol' s cavalry together with General Teste's infantry division in pursuit of what he thought to be the Prussian Army, a fruitless pursuit that cost valuable hours. General Exelmanns however revealed the truth some hours later, when he reported Thielemann's movement towards Walhain and Corbeux.

But with just 3,000 Dragoons he was unable to do other than observe a corps of 20,000 men moving across his front and by the time Grouchy had gotten Gerard and Vandamme up to Gembloux. Thielemann was well on the way to La Barette, where he eventually arrived in the early hours of the 18th June. He had been very lucky, for had not the French been deceived by the deserters on the Namur road or delayed by the heavy rain of that afternoon, Thielemann would have found himself attacked and quite possibly destroyed by Grouchy's forces.

Towards midnight on the 17th Blucher's liaison officer with Wellington's Army reported that the Duke had taken up a position between Braine-La-Lend and La Haye and was preparing to give battle if he could count on the support of a single Prussian Corps.

The situation of the Prussian Army was unusual in view of a number of factors: the condition of the Army, the potential of their allies and information regarding the strength of the enemy which had pursued them. Both Blucher and Gniesenau wished to defeat Napoleon, yet there was still some suspicion of Wellington's intentions, concern over their own supply of ammunition and the fact that their troops were both exhausted and hungary.

Nevertheless orders went out to General Bulow instructing him to march from Dion-Le-Mont at daybreak through Wavre toward Chapelle - St. Lambert to attack the enemy's right flank, but only if Wellington was fully engaged, if not to remain at Chapelle - St. Lambert. General Pirch I at Aisemont received orders to follow Bulow and lend all support necessary. The 1st and 3rd Corps ( Zieten and Thielemann) were to hold themselves in readiness to follow, should the need arise.

Whilst these orders were being prepared Blucher wrote to his Liaison officer at Wellington's Headquarters instructing him to say, that ill as he was he would put himself at the head of his troops and come to Wellington's aid but if Napoleon should not attack that day they should make a combined attack upon him the following day. General Gniesenau, however addressed a covering letter that requested the liaison officer to make absolutely sure that Wellington was firm in his resolution to do battle and not merely engaging in a show that would be of grave consequence to the Prussian Army. Only the thunder of cannon towards the wood of Soignes eased Gniesenau's mind on the morning of the 18th June 1815 . . .

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