Quatre Bras and Ligny
Did Wellington Really Deceive
the Prussians at Brye
on 16th June 1815?
by Neil Carey and Peter Hofschröer in debate!
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The most contentious allegation made in Peter Hofschröer's excellent "1815 - The Waterloo Campaign" is that the Duke of Wellington made an insincere promise to support the Prussians at Ligny later that afternoon. I have pointed out (FE 41) that in tying down some 21,000 French and distracting another Corps, Wellington provided his allies with ample support in this dual battle. Phil Lawrence (FE 42) feels that this is "missing the point", since in his view there was no way the Duke could have marched 20,000 men to Ligny that afternoon, even had Ney not attacked him. I think my point is entirely relevant, but will do Phil, and by association Peter, the courtesy of addressing that argument head on.
The facts demonstrate that had he not been attacked, Wellington could have got a column of 20,000 men, excluding artillery and support units, to Brye, on the right of the Prussian position between 4.30 and 5.15 p.m. that afternoon, three hours after, by some accounts, he made the alleged promise.
Peter Hofschröer shows that the witnesses of Wellington's promise are divided as to what he actually said. However, three say that he gave a specific time of arrival.
The Bavarian Prince Thurn und Taxis says that the Duke "promised to send 20,000 men from his army by 3 o'clock". Since the promise was only made at 1:30 p.m. and an infantry march of some two hours would have been required this can only mean that 3 p.m. was the time the troops would set off from Quatre Bras.
Clausewitz, Chief of staff of the Prussian III Corps quoted Wellington as saying "At four o'clock I will be here". (This appears almost consistent with Thurn und Taxis).
Grolman, the Prussian Quartermaster-General, also cites 4 p.m., but in the context of Wellington advancing south to Frasnes to arrive on Napoleon's left flank and rear. The other accounts suggest that this route was Wellington's original preference, but that it was overturned at Gneisenau's insistence in favour of a direct march south-east to join the Prussians at Brye.
All allied forces en route for Ligny would have had to pass through the strategic crossroads at Quatre Bras. The best source for the arrival of Allied forces in the Quatre Bras area are the Waterloo letters collected by the elder Siborne and used as source material for his "History of the Waterloo Campaign". It provides the data for the table at the foot of this page.
The distance from the crossroads at Quatre Bras to the hamlet of Brye in the Prussian position at Ligny is some 8,500 metres, or at the risk of appearing Anglocentric, 5 English miles. The road was good and straight; assuming a forced march rate of 2-3 mph, (frequently sustained over moderate distances), Wellington's column would have debouched onto the Prussian flank behind Brye, (cavalry leading) between 4:30 and 5:15 in the afternoon. Napoleon would have had to react to its approach even earlier.
At the risk of being finicky and of applying 21st Century standards of command and control to the Napoleonic era, we may wonder why Wellington would have been an hour "late" at Brye. Did by 4 p.m. Wellington mean the time he would have taken to reach the roman road south of Frasnes to take Napoleon in flank and rear? This is the implication of the accounts of Muffling and Grolman and since the distance from Quatre Bras is 6 km rather than the 9 km to Brye the timings are just right. Did Clausewitz and Thurn und Taxis misapply the timing of Wellington's first "southward" proposal to their own counter-proposal? It seems one way of reconciling otherwise inconsistent accounts.
An advance of 20,000 men from Quatre Bras to Ligny would have left Quatre Bras undefended for a couple of hours until the arrival of 6,000 men under Halkett and Kielmansegge, followed by the Guards and the cavalry in the evening. Would Wellington have willingly risked separating his army? It is impossible to be conclusive, but if patrols south had suggested it were safe to join an ally in combat with the mass of enemy forces, I think the answer is probably yes.
My conclusion is that whatever the inconsistencies between later accounts of the disposition of Wellington's forces, their actual movements on the day are consistent with the Duke's alleged "promise" of support to his allies.
It was a pleasure to read Neil's well presented and argued paper. However, I think he is still missing the main point here, which is had the Duke of Wellington given Blücher correct information on his positions, movements and intentions on 15 and 16 June 1815, then there was every chance that the Prussians would have staged only a rearguard action at Ligny, leaving Wellington to face the bulk of Napoleon's forces with his own troops scattered across Belgium. The Duke had a very good reason for being somewhat economical with the truth.
One could dispute certain details of timings and movements given in Neil's paper, but that is not the issue. The issue is if Wellington deceived the Prussians or not. Did he knowingly provide them with false information, and did that information play a role in the decision to fight at Ligny? The answer to both questions has to be a resounding yes.
From the meeting at Tirlemont on 3 May 1815 onwards, the two allied commanders had agreed in the event of an attack on the other, to move to their support. The details of how this was to be done were confirmed in the coming days and weeks. On 14 June 1815, Wellington told Blücher's envoy Oberst von Pfuel that he would be 'able to concentrate at Nivelles or at Quatre Bras 22 hours after the first cannon shot', that is by 2.30 a.m. on 16 June.
That he did not even attempt to accomplish. At 7 p.m. on 15 June, Wellington had Müffling write to Blücher that 'As soon as the moon rises, the Reserve will march off, and if the enemy does not attack Nivelles immediately, then the Duke will be in the area of Nivelles with his entire army tomorrow from where he can support Your Highness...' At the time Wellington had Müffling write that letter, the set of orders Wellington had just issued were for his army to concentrate. He had not and did not issue any such movement orders. Thus, he deliberately misinformed Blücher. About midnight on 15/16 June, Wellington had Müffling write to Blücher that his army would be 'concentrated within twelve hours' and he would have '20,000 men at Quatre Bras by 10 a.m.' At the time in question, Wellington had yet to decide to move a single man to Quatre Bras.
On the contrary, he had ordered his troops there to abandon it. Again, he deliberately misinformed Blücher. It did not stop there. Wellington next sent the Prince of Orange back to the front with information to pass on to the Prussians, that 'within the next three hours [i.e. by 9.30 a.m. on 16 June], the entire Belgian army and the bulk of the English army can be concentrated at Nivelles.' There was no way this was possible, and Wellington knew it. Having used Müffling and the Prince of Orange for conduits of erroneous information, Wellington then wrote the highly misleading 'Frasnes Letter' to Blücher at 10.30 a.m. on 16 June. Among the several points of false information in that letter was the claim that 'The Reserve is on the march from Waterloo to Genappe where it will arrive at midday.' Wellington had ridden past his Reserve earlier that morning and knew it could not be at Genappe by midday.
Nevertheless, I consider it most unlikely that Wellington was deliberately putting the Prussians in a position where they would suffer a defeat. After all, at the time this deception began, at 7 p.m. on 15 June, the Duke was acting in the belief that all four of the Prussian army corps would be in position the next day and would be able to look after themselves until 17 June when his entire force would be concentrated. He only heard that Bülow would not be arriving at Ligny on 16 June during his meeting with Blücher at Brye that afternoon.
Furthermore, I believe he had every intention of providing the Prussians with some direct support that day - albeit knowingly not in the numbers and not within the time he promised. However, Wellington failed to look further than Frasnes in his inspection of the French positions that morning and, despite his experience in Peninsular War, considered that a lack of French movement early in the morning indicated they would not be moving at that point for the whole day. Thus, he misjudged the French intentions, an error that a soldier of Wellington's experience should not have made.
The record shows that Blücher made the final decision to stand and fight at Ligny with all his available forces that day only during the meeting with Wellington. Had Wellington told Blücher the truth, then the chances are that the counsels of Grolman and Gneisenau would have prevailed. Wellington was well aware of that, so the truth was a casualty here. Thus, the question is not 'did Wellington really deceive the Prussians on 16 June 1815', as Neil suggests, but actually how many times. To answer my first question, between 14 and 16 June, my research has established that Wellington deceived the Prussians on at least six occasions.
Postscript following Peter's reply: I have enjoyed this debate. In the end Peter and I disagree mainly because we address different questions. He focuses on his meticulous documentary evidence and I focus on what I see as the strategic implications. He highlights the misinformation and I ask how much it mattered. As to the new material Peter brings to the table, ....I feel another debate coming on! NC
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