"Vorwarts, Vorwarts, Kinder!"

The Prussian Campaign
in Belgium of 1815
Part I

16th June: Battle of Ligny

by Patrick E.Wilson, UK

The morning of the 16th June found only Zeiten's Corps in position before Sombreffe, though the 2nd and 3rd Corps were on their way and would arrive between 11.00am and 3.00pm giving Blucher a total of 84,000 men with which to oppose Napoleon. Zeiten's initial positions wre behind the natural barrier of the Ligny stream and amongst the various solidly built villages of St Amand la Haye, St Amand, Brye and Ligny. General Pirch II's brigade stood in reserve at Brye with its seven remaining battalions. General Heneckel's 4th brigade held Ligny, supported by six of General Jagow's battalions near the wood of Loup, the rest of the 3rd brigade - the 29th Regiment - held the village of St Amand. General Steinmetz's 1st Brigade had three battalions in Brye, and the other six on the heights behind St Armand La haye and St.Amand, with Jager Companies pushed forward to occupy all the hedges, stone walls and hollow ways between Brye and St Armand La Maye. Zeiten's cavalry reserve under General Roder continued to cover the approaches to Ligny until pressure from Pajol's cavalry forced them to withdraw to the heights above Ligny. Finally Zeiten's reserve artillery under Colonel Lehnmann were positioned on the heights between St Amand La Haye and Ligny, where they could support either position with their fire.

At 10.00am the French began to debouch from the Fleurus wood where they had spent the night. They formed two columns, the left consisting of General Vandamme's 3rd Corps, the right of Pajol's light low and General Exelmann's Dragoons under the Command of Marshal Grouchy. General Vandamme deployed opposite the villages of St.Amand La Haye, Le Hameau St.Amand and St.Amand, where he was joined by General Girard's 7th division of Reille's 2nd Corps. Which had spent the night near Heppignies observing Prussian movements. Grouchy deployed his cavalry astide the Charleroi road in front of Fleurus, where he awaited the arrival of General Gerard's 4th Corps which had been ordered to the battlefield by Napoleon. Though at this moment the French still thought that they had only to sweep away a rearguard.

An hour later General Pirch I's 2nd Prussian Corps began to arrive, much to the relief of Blucher, who had them deploy in support of Zieten along the road between Sombreffe and the tavern of Trois Barettes on the old Roman road. Pirch deployed his Corps as follows; General Tippelskirchen's 5th Brigade at Trois Barettes, General Krafft's 6th Brigade to the rear of Brye with General Brause's 7th Brigade to his left. Colonel Langen's 8th Brigade remained in front of Sombreffe until General Thielimann's 3rd Prussian Corps arrived. The reserve cavalry and artillery were posted to the right of Sombreffe, just behind Brause's Brigade.

The arrival of Pirch I's Corps attracted the attention of both Grouchy and Pajol, who reported to Napoleon, that the enemy instead of retreating actually seemed to be reinforcing and preparing for battle. Napoleon did not believe that Blucher would be so daring as to concentrate his forces within striking distance of his own and rode over to see for himself. Concluding that the Prussians were doing just that he changed his orders for the day and instead of moving to support his left under Marshal Ney, he would support Grouchy in his contest with Blucher. Furthermore, he decided to await Gerard's 4th Corps before beginning the battle, despite the presence of the Imperial Guard and Milhaud's Ciurassier Corps or the fact that General Mouton's 6th Corps was available at Charleroi.

Consequently as Gerard did not arrive before 1.00pm and would require an hour or so more to deploy, General Thielemann was allowed time to arrive and deploy on the Prussian left in front of Sombreffe but behind the Ligny stream and amongst the Villages of Mont Potriaux, Tongrines, Tongrenelle Boignee, Balatre and Botey. Thielemann deployed his forces as follows; General Borcke's 9th Brigade with a battalion and a battery at Mont Potriaux but otherwise to the rear of Sombreffe. Colonel Kampfen's 10th Brigade occupied the heights behind the villages of Tongrines, Tongrenelle, Boignee and Balatre with four battalions and two batteries, besides pushing the remainder of his Brigade to occupy the villages. Colonel Luck's 11th Brigade, with a 12lb battery, occupied a position between Mont Potriaux and Colonel Kampfen's Brigade.

Colonel Stulpnagel's 12th Brigade, with a horse battery, occupied the village of Point du Jour to the rear of Colonel Luck. Thielemann's cavalry reserve under Colonel von der Marwitz received orders to go to Wagnelee to protect Zieten's right flank, although a few squadron's were retained to defend Thielemann's left flank in front of Boley.

Naturally enough, Grouchy's forces found themselves having to deploy in reponse to Thielemann's appearance. Whilst Gerard, when he appeared, found himself having to face two ways. General Vichery's 12th division and General Pecheux's 13th division facing Ligny. General Hulot's 14th division and General Maurin's cavalry facing Mont Potriaux and Tongrenelle. Whilst Grouchy's forces under Pajol and Exelmanns formed the French right and faced the reminder of Thielemann's Corps around Boignee, Balatre and beyond. However the bulk of the French forces remained opposite Zieten's Corps in the Ligny and St.Amand La Haye areas. Indeed, Napoleon's plans was to surround and destroy the Prussian troops in this area, whilst Blucher was expecting Wellington's active support in that area too!

Trusting to the Tirlemont agreement. Wellington himself had visited Blucher that morning at Brye, informing the Prussian that it was quiet on his front at Quatre-Bras and he wound soon have his Reserve Corps from Brussels and some Dutch-Belgian troops assembled there. If not attacked himself, which he considered very unlikely, he would march from Quatre-Bras on Wagnelee and attack the French left and rear. This promise more than made up Blucher's disappointment at General Bulow's delay. Indeed, Blucher was now aware that Bulow could not be at Gembloux before evening on the 16th. In fact, Bulow, once he realised his earlier error, moved heaven and earth to reach the rest of the Army but only succeeded in reaching Baudeset by the night of the 16th, which is about two miles short of Gembloux and eight of the Ligny Battlefield.

At 2.30pm General Jagow's 29th regiment in St.Amand found itself under heavy attack by General Lefol's 8th division of Vandamme's 3rd Corps. Obviously a regiment could not expect to hold eleven battalions very long and the 29th regiment soon found itself ejected from St.Amand. General Steinmetz, observing Lefol's attack, not only pushed forward his sharpshooters but counter-attacked with the whole of his 12th and 24th regiments, who in turn ejected Lefol from St.Amand and once more established a Prussian presense in the village. However, Lefol attacked once more with such fury that Steinmetz had to commit his Westphalian Landwehr to the struggle but such were Steinmetz's casualties, over 2,300men - a third of his strength, that he had to withdraw from the contest. Jagow also withdrew the 29th Regiment to his Brigade's position in the rear of Ligny about this time. Zieten, to cover these withdrawals, turned his 12Ib batteries on St.Amand and made the village practically unobtainable for the French, who responded by attacking through the neighbouring village of St.Amand La Haye. General Girard's 7th division advanced and ejected some of Steinmetz's Jagers from the village but unfortunately ran into General Pirch II's 2nd brigade that Blucher had personally directed to retake the village.

General Girard however held firm in face of Pirch II's assault and the 2nd Brigade like Steinmetz's before it found itself having to withdraw to reform. Fortunately for the Prussians Girard was severely wounded at his moment and the French failed to exploit their opportunity. The Prussians however now swept back into the attack with Blucher himself at their head and quickly took St.Amand La Haye from Girard's leadless and battered division.

On Blucher's orders General Tippelskirchen's 5th Brigade attacked through Wagnelee in support of Pirch II's 2nd Brigade but things did not go as planed. Advancing in battalion column they easily penetrated the village but on arriving on the French side of the village they were assailed by heavy musketry fire that routed the 25th Regiment and its supporting Westphalian Landwehr. Luckily the French did not follow up and they were able to rally beyond Wagnelee under the protection of the 2nd regiment.

To the left of Wagnelee, General Wahlen-Jurgass assembled the Hussars of Lientenant-Colonel von Sohr and Uhlans of Colonel von der Marwitz with orders to protect Tippelskirchen's right and keep open the road on which Wellington was expected to appear. He was also given command of all troops in that sector. Meanwhile General Brause's 7th Brigade replaced Tippelskirchen at Trois-Barettes on that vital road with Quatre-Bras.

The French having repulsed the attack from Wagnelee now renewed the contest for St.Amand La Haye, ejecting Pirch II and the 2nd Brigade a second time and forcing Blucher to oppose them with a hastily assembled force made up of a battalion of the 23rd regiment of the 8th Brigade and a battalion of the 9th regiment and the whole of the 26th regiment of General Krafft's 6th Brigade. However before these troops could reach St.Amand La Haye the French had established themselves.

Whilst the combat for the St.Amand villages raged General Gerard's divisions engaged in a similiar fight for Ligny, though the Prussians seem to be deploying more troops than was necessary and taking severe casualities as a result. The attack on Ligny had began simultaneously with that on St.Amand, the artilery of both sides opening a furious cannonade on each other, both Ligny and St.Amand became particular targets for Gerard's batteries. His infantry columns were at first repulsed with heavy loss by General Henckel's Brigade, despite the close support of their artillery. Gerard changed his method of attack, concentrating on the Prussian left he secured a foothold in the churchyard forcing Henckel's infantry back but then Jagow intervened with four battalions of his 3rd Brigade.

Coming up against the French columns attempting to turn Ligny on the left, he got caught in furious firefight that forced him to retire. At which stage, Blucher, though concerned with events about the St.Amand's, ordered five battalions of Krafft's 6th Brigade to retake Ligny. Whilst, he had several batteries of artillery placed near the wood of Loop to support Ligny and thwart Gerard's manuoevre, he also had Pirch's 2nd Corps reserve artillery replace Zieten's now exhausted batteries between St.Amand and Ligny.

But despite Krafft's intervention at Ligny and the support of fresh artillery batteries, Gerard's divsions under Pecheux and Vichery were establishing themselves within Ligny and even gaining the upper hand. Colonel Langen's 8th Brigade was therefore ordered into the mailstorm of Ligny whilst Colonel Stulpnagel's 12th Brigade replaced the 8th Brigade in front of Sombreffe. Colonel Langen's Brigade now made at least six determined attacks in an effort to dislodge the French from their foothold in the southern part of Ligny, but despite the fury and obstinacy of Langen's regiments, particularly the 21st, the French would not be moved. Pecheux and Vichery with only eighteen battalions had successfully fought four Prussian Brigades, with twice their number of men, to a standstill in the Ligny area and it seemed the battle was about to come to a conclusion in that area.

The Prussian left, where General Thielemann's 3rd Corps stood, faced Marshal Grouchy's cavalry and General Hulot's division of infantry, in comparsion with the Prussian right and centre, remained rather quiet apart from the occasional cannonade and Hulot's attempt's to capture Boignee and later Tongrines, though the French cavalry did do some rather skillfull manoeuvring.

However, by 6.00pm Hulot had began to gain some ground toward Tongrines, forcing Colonel Kampfen to commit some battalions from his reserve and fortunately for Kampfen. Colonel Luck came to his support with the whole of his 11th Brigade and Hulot was repulsed with relative ease. Thielemann then attempted to follow up this success with his remaining cavalry by attacking down the Charleroi road. This was a mistake. For not only was Colonel Count Luttom's cavalry badly beaten but its accompanying artillery were badly cut up by General Burthe's 5th and 13th Dragoons and it took the intervention of General Borcke's 9th Brigade to halt the victorious horsemen. Borcke then took up a position at Mont Potriaux, which covered the Charleroi road and acted as a link with Ligny. Colonel Stuplnagel brought his Brigade forward to the heights between the wood of Loop and Sombreffe, pushing forward several battalions in skirmish order to cover the Ligny stream between Ligny and Sombreffe. Thus, these two officers stablised the Prussian front line and repaired Thielemann's blunder.

On the Prussian right Tippelskirchen again received orders to retake St.Amand La Haye and a group of buildings beyond the village called Le Hameau St.Amand. Advancing from behind Wagnelee, two of his battalions successfully stormed Le Hameau St.Amand, while another four led by the Pommeranians of the 2nd regiment fought their way into St.Amand La Haye. The struggle for this village became furious as the 2nd Pommeranians found themselves forced out but then fought themselves in again on at least four occasions.

Genearal Wahlen-Jurgass, the officer commandering in this sector, witnessing Tippelskirchen's mounting losses and tiredness, and realising he would soon have to withdraw and replaced by a fresh force. Pushed forward a nearby battery to Tippelskirchen's right and brought forward a number of battalions from Krafft's Brigade which had just arrived in his sector. General Brauze and his 7th Brigade was also ordered form Trois-Barettes. This able officer, leaving four of his battalions as a reserve at Trois-Barettes, rapidly led the other five forward and even picked up a stray battalion of the celebrated "Kolberg" regiment. Brauze was just in time, for Tippelskirchen's Brigade was near exhaustion and beginning to give way to the fierce attacks of the French.

Adding other battalions from Krafft's Brigade that Wahlen-Jurgass had already brought forward to his command, making ten battalions in all, Brauze led them forward, first to cover Tippelskirchen's withdrawal and then to counterattack the French in St.Amand La Haye and Le Hameau St.Amand. Brauze thus continued the fight for this area of the field with an intensity that had always characterised the battles between the French and the Prussians during the last years of the Napoleonic wars.

However, with the commitment of Brauze's Brigade, Blucher had now practically no reserves left, even Borcke and Stulpnagel had been sucked into maintaining the main battle line. Blucher therefore began to look more and more upon the promised support of Wellington's reserve from Quatre-Bras. Indeed, Blucher had already received a report from one of his patrols about a column of 20,000 men approaching the village of Wagnelee along the old Roman road and naturally assumed this to be Wellington's promised support. The French themselves seemed to be reacting to this new threat and it was evident that Vandamme's valiant soldiers were beginning to fall back. Blucher and his Chief of Staff Gniesenau therefore decided to take advantage of this and make one more effort on the French left.

Collecting all the troops they could find, Blucher and Gniesenau led the Prussian right against the village of St.Amand and drove Vandamme's men out but fortunately for the French. General Duhesme's Young Guard division arrived at that very moment and halted the victorious Prussian advance. Counter-attacking, these guardsmen soon retook St.Amand from Blucher's exhausted men, though at a cost of 800 casualties.

But what probably astonished Blucher and Gniesenau more was the fact that the column they had attacked in support of appeared to be withdrawing back along the road it had came. And now having committed their very last reserves in an effort to break the French left, they now found themselves unable to halt any new French attack on their position at St.Amand or Ligny.

Around 7.00pm 60 guns of Gerard's Corps and the Old Guard bombarded the ruined village of Ligny, reducing its rubble to even smaller pieces and relieving many wounded soldiers of their pain forever. This massive cannonade was followed by an assault of columns, each led by units of the Old Guard and supported by cavalry. The left column stormed through Ligny itself, while the right column smashed the Prussian line to the left of Ligny before pushing toward Sombreffe to isolate Thielemann. Gerard meanwhile led his own battered divisions to attack the Prussians that still held the St.Amand villages.

But at the moment of French success Blucher surged forward with General Roder's reserve cavalry of Zieten's Corps and as these cavalry had suffered from artillery fire they were burning for revenge. Charging furiously at the heads of the attacking columns, they were met with well aimed volleys or taken in the flank by General Milhaud's supporting Ciurassiers. Blucher himself had his horse shot from under him and dissappeared in the throng of battle, only to be found again and lead away half-conscious by a faithful aide-de-camp. Minutes later, General von Treskow II , led a second series of charges against the attack columns and Milhaud's Ciurassiers, again the Prussian cavalry met well aimed volleys and were driven off by Milhaud's fine cavalry. Nevertheless these gallant charges gained time for other units to disengage and retreat relatively unmolested from the vicinity of Ligny and St.Amand, besides doing great honour to the courage and reputation of the Prussian cavalry.

With Blucher's disappearance, General Gniesenau had assumed command. Ordering a retreat, he had Jagow and Krafft retire on Brye from Ligny where they would be protected by Pirch II's rallied Brigade. Rapidly jioned by the 12Ib battery No.6, 6Ib battery No.34 and the Westphalian Landwehr cavalry regiment, Pirch II was assigned the duty of protecting all troops that withdrew via Brye by Gniesenau's assistant General Grolmann. At Sombreffe Grolmann had organised another rearguard of the 9th infantry regiment, a Westphalian Landwehr battalion and another 12Ib battery to cover the withdrawal of Steinmetz's battered 1st Brigade and Henckel's reduced 4th Brigade. Who had been ordered to fall back on Tilly. Meanwhile Borcke and Stulpnagel occupied Sombrieffe to cover Thielemann's anticipated retreat on Gembloux.

In the St.Amand sector, Wahlen-Jurgass received orders to effect a retreat by way of the old Roman road and Marbais. Wahlen-Jurgass started Tippelskirchen first and then all the infantry under Brauze that could be assembled in the rear of St.Amand. These battered battalions, perhaps 13 in all, were covered by the battalions Brauze had left at Trois-Barettes, who were able to put a halt to the pursuit of Domon, de Colbert and Jacquinot. Wahlen-Jurgass himself brought forward all his available cavalry to cover these withdrawals and got himself shot in the arm in the ensuing fighting. But Wahlen-Jurgass' cavalry effectively saved the infantry of Brauze and Tippelskirchen by their sacrifices on the old Roman road.

As the battered troops of Ziethen's and Pirch I's Corps fell back via Brye, Marbais and Tilly. Thielemann's Corps still presented a solid front between Sombreffe and Balatre and did not commence a retreat until 3.00am on the 17th. By then their comrades were full retreat on Tilly and Marbais. The presense of Thielemann's Corps contributed not a little to the degree of French caution during the night of the 16th. Indeed, the French did not begin their pursuit proper until the morning of the 17th and by then contact was broken. Admittedly the French had other concerns, notably what had happened on their left where Marshal Ney had been opposed by Wellington's forces at Quatre-Bras. Though a vigourous pursuit of the Prussians with Grouchy's cavalry alone could have and should have been undertaken, had they forgotten Jena-Auerstadt ?

The Prussians certainly hadn't. Grouchy had, it must be said, requested such orders but had been sent away until morning by Napoleon himself. Surely a great opportunity had been missed by the French on this Occasion. The remaining turbulent hours of the 16th June found the Prussian Army trudging wearily towards Marbais, Tilly, Sombreffe and Gembloux. Gniesenau temporarily in command, found himself having to decide upon the next movements of the Army. At first he favoured rallying the Corps of Zieten and Pirch I at Tilly before jioning the Corps of Thielemann and Bulow at Gembloux and retreating upon his communications via Liege, and in view of Wellington's apparent failure to produce the promised support at Ligny and St.Amand, give up all further thoughts of co-operation with the Anglo-Dutch Army.

However Lieutenant-Colonel von Rieche, Ziethen's Chief of Staff, found that in the fading light Tilly was not the easiest of places to find on the map and therefore it would be better to retreat on a place more easily found, Wavre was such a place. To this Gniesenau agreed and thus, a decision of great significance was taken, it was to have profound influence on later events.

Battle of Ligny Large Maps (very slow: 296K)

Battle of Ligny Jumbo Maps (extremely slow: 629K)

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