"Vorwarts, Vorwarts, Kinder!"
The Prussian Campaign
in Belgium of 1815
Part II
20th June 1815
by Patrick E. Wilson, UK
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20th June 1815: Operations of the First and Fourth Corps, operations of the Second and Third Corps and the Battle of Namur.Whilst Thielemann's and Pirch I's Corps remained largely inactive for the greater part of the 19th, Blucher's other Corps continued the pursuit of Napoleon's broken Army. Bulow, gathering his Corps together at Genappe, marched for Fontaine L'Eveque where he bivoacked for the night. An advance guard though under General von Sydow was pushed forward along the road to Thuin, whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Schill with the 8th Hussars and some Landwehr cavalry protected Bulow's left flank in the direction of Wavre. Tippelskirchen's 5th Brigade marched with Bulow to Fontaine L'Eveque. Zieten's Corps marched on Charleroi from Mont St.Jean with advance guards toward Marchienne and Chatelet, as well as a detachment towards Fleurus to guard Zieten's Corps rear from any possible attack from Grouchy, whose exact position was unknown at Blucher's Headquarters. 
The following day the Prussian Army crossed the Sambre into France, Bulow was directed to advance on Colleret with his advance guard pushed forward toward Beaufort but Bulow proceeded with caution, firstly reinforcing Sydow with infantry and more cavalry. These troops then secured the bridges at Lobbes and Thuin, then proceeded with care toward Beaufort only reaching Ferriere La Petite as night fell, Bulow with his main body of troops got no further then Montignies near the bridges at Lobbes and Thuin. One cannot blame Bulow's caution for he believed the French would attempt to defend the bridges over the Sambre. In actual fact they were attempting to rally their broken regiments at Phillipville. Zieten meanwhile received orders to march on Beaumont throwing an advance guard forward toward Solie Le Chateau, his route though was encumbered with the debris of Napoleon's Army but Zieten reached Beaumont without incident and pushed forward his 3rd Brigade to Solie Le Chateau as an advance guard. Finally Tippelskirchen's 5th Brigade, having bivacked with Bulow's Corps at Fontaine L'Eveque, directed its march via Binch upon Villers on the road to the fortress of Maubeuge, where it arrived at 5.00pm and was joined by an Hanoverian Hussar regiment. Thus, ended the Belgium campaign for two of Blucher's Corps, though they still had some fighting to do in their advance into France and the second overthrow of the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. The 20th June however still held one more engagement for the other two Corps of Blucher's Army. Though it was not until Thielemann's pursuing cavalry passed through Gembloux that they discovered Grouchy's retreating columns. About three miles from Namur General Vandamme had posted a rearguard at the village of Fallise, engaging this with his artillery Thielemann directed Colonel von der Marwitz to their right and Colonel Lottum to their left and despite a stiff volley drove Vandamme's rearguard from its position. However at that moment another French column, thought to be Gerard's, was reported advancing down the road from Sombreffe to Namur. These troops were in close column and such good order that Thielemann, apart from cannonading them, did not commit his cavalry to attack. Indeed, he considered his men fatigued and withdrew them leaving all further pursuit and action to Pirch I's Corps which was pursuing Gerard's column. General Pirch I had began his at about the same time as Thielemann left St.Achtenrode for Wavre. Lieutenant-Colonel von Sohr led an advance guard of his own Hussar Brigade, the fusileur battalions of the 9th, 14th and 23rd regiments and a horse battery. Pirch I followed with the 6th, 7th and 8th Brigades, together with his Reserve cavalry and artillery. Sohr's first encounter with Gerard's rearguard occured at Temploux about the same time as Thielemann had engaged Vandamme's rearguard at Fallise. Sohr overthrew his opponents with a fine charge by his hussars but by then Gerard's main column had withdrew past a second rearguard at the chateau of Flavinnes. These troops belonged to Vandamme and consisted of a infantry brigade and cavalry regiment and seemed determined to remain there. It was about 4.00pm and Genearl Krafft's 6th Brigade had just joined von Sohr's advance guard. General Pirch I organised an immediate attack. It was organised into three columns, the consisting of three battalions under a major Schmidt, the centre of five battalions under Krafft's personnal command and the right of the three fusileur battalions of the advance guard. But the attack seemed to coincide with a French withdrawal to Namur as only token resistance was offered as Krafft's battalions advanced with the bayonet. Reaching the suburbs of Namur they were received with a murderous volley from its defenders. General Teste, who had been placed in Namur to hold the Prussians at bay whilst Grouchy got the rest of his command savely across the Sambre. Teste had barricaded all the gates and lined all the walls facing the Prussian advance with troops ready to make the most valiant efforts in carrying out their duty. Consequently, Krafft's first onslaught was repulsed with great loss but his second in command, Colonel Zastrow, wished to force the gates and made another attack. The attack was carried out with great bravery by Krafft's troops but they were repulsed once more with great loss of life, among the dead was Zastrow. After this repulse, Pirch I ordered Krafft just to observe the French behind their gallantly defended walls and gates, also he that they must soon retreat and therefore saw no sense in taking any more needless casualties. Furthermore he ordered up General Brauze's 7th Brigade to relieve Krafft's now exhausted troops, Brauze had his advance guard of fusileur battalions observe the gates of Porte De Fer and St.Nicolas for any opportunity favourable to gaining an entrance, whilst sensibly keeping the remainder of his Brigade to rear. The commander of the fusileur battalion of the 22nd regiment, Major Jochens whilst in conversion with Brauze, noticed such an opportunity shortly after his arrival before the Porte De Fer. Brauze ordered him forward and though unable to force the gate Jochens gained an entrance via the windows of adjoining houses and led his men triumphantly into the streets of Namur. Unfortunately, Teste had withdrawn the majority of his men across the Sambre by this time, barricading the bridge as he did so and denying Jochen's men the change to storm all of Namur. A fight for the bridge followed and though Jochens was reinforced by battalions of the 9th regiment and 2nd Eble Landwehr he could not force a passage. Indeed, their efforts were further frustrated by the fact that Teste had the gate on the southern bank of the Namur set on fire, a fire that quickly spread to the adjacent street as he finally retreated from Namur for Dinant and Phillipeville. Thus, it was not until after 9.00pm that the Prussians were in full possession of Namur, again von Sohr headed the pursuit but the French had so hindered his march with barricades and other obstructions that he was unable to catch or overtake their rearguard and eventually had to give up when Blucher ordered the 2nd and 3rd Corps to rejoin the rest of the Prussian Army further to the west. Eventually Pirch I would rejoin his 5th Brigade in reducing frontier fortresses while Thielemann's 3rd Corps joined the 1st and 4th Corps in their advance into France. The night of the 20th June saw Pirch I's 2nd Corps partly at Namur and partly at Temploux, Thielemann's 3rd Corps assembled at Gembloux with his cavalry Reserve at Temploux, and thus ended the Belgium campaign for the other half of Blucher's Army. The 21st June would see them ordered westward to Thuin and Charleroi respectively to rejoin the rest of the Prussian Army. ConclusionThe Belium campaign for the Prussian Army of 1815 crowned their achievements of 1813-14. Though they had a close shave at Ligny, which could have resulted in another Jena-Auerstadt had the French managed to co-ordinate their various Corps better. General Zieten's retreat to the sombreffe position was conducted with great skill, both General Pirch II and General Steinmetz extracting themselves from difficult positions during the day and the bold front shown by Pirch II at Gilly merits the highest praise. Again at St.Amand and Ligny, Zieten's and Pirch I's Corps fought with immense bravery and the tactical flexibility of their Brigades showed how much had been learnt since 1806. The presense of General Bulow's 4th Corps or a Corps of Wellington's may arguably have brought victory, instead Gniesenau like Napoleon himself mistook General d'Erlon's migratory Corps for Wellington and committed his last reserve. This benefitted Napoleon, though he was later to throw away the fruits of his victory by not unleasing the type of pursuit he had done at Jena-Auerstadt. The Prussian cavalry, particularly General Roder's 32 Squadron's, not only saved the 1st and 2nd Corps but recovered some of the reputation lost in 1806. The subsequent retreat to Wavre was conducted in a most professional manner, with the possible exception of General Thielemann who endangered his 3rd Corps on the 17th June. Indeed, it is possible that only the rain saved him from annihilation at the hands of Marshal Grouchy at Gembloux just as it had saved Wellington at Genappe. General Bulow though merits praise for the way he hustled his Corps forward once he realised the seriousness of the position around Sombreffe on the 16th and for the way he over came difficult conditions on the march to Mont St.Jean on the 18th. Again both his Corps and elements of the 1st and 2nd Corps fought with immense bravery for Plancenoit and elsewhere, Steinmetz's advance being possibly one of the deciding factors in the Allied victory. Whilst at Wavre General Thielemann made amends for his preformance on the 17th by a most skillful defensive action against a vastly superior force, though he was ultimately defeated and forced to fall back but by then victory had been achieved over Napoleon at Mont St.Jean. The pursuit carried out by Zieten's, Bulow's and elements of Pirch I's Corps merit the highest praise when we take into account the fatigued nature of their troops and the lack of supplies during the forty-eight hours that had passed since Ligny. Jena-Auerstadt was certainly avenged that night, though concern about Grouchy's whereabouts seems to have added substance to a certain amount of caution until it was known that he had retreated via Namur. This, of course, was not helped by the performance of either Pirch I or Thielemann on the 19th. Both had good reason for their inactivity that day, Pirch I's men were exhausted after marching to Mont St.Jean, helping capture Plancenoit and then marching through the night to Mellery. Whilst Thielemann's command had been fighting well into the night of the 18th as well as the morning of the 19th and had been driven in retreat upon St.Achtenrode. But they could have been more alert to the possible activities of the French to their front, General Gerard's and General Pajol's Corps marched across Pirch I's front in the late afternoon and evening of the 19th, he missed an excellent opportunity of destroying their commands. Thielemann found himself fooled by Gerard's and Vandamme's bold use of rearguards, even General Borcke's report at 5.00pm on the 19th that Grouchy was in retreat did not get him to move before 5.00am on the following day. Consequently Grouchy gained a further twelve hours to those he had already. thus he was able to escape with his entire command via Namur. The attacks of Thielemann and Pirch I probably came too late in the day to have any influence on the fact that Grouchy's wing of the French Army had extracted itself from a difficult position with utmost skill and speed. General Krafft's assault on Namur was a waste of life and Pirch I may be praised for bringing it to an end. The Belgium campaign of 1815 demonstrated that not only had the Prussian Army recovered its reputation, which had been destroyed at Jena-Auerstadt and in the subsequent retreat, but had also learnt many of the lessons of the Napoleonic Wars. Intelligent use of the Corps system, the tactical versatility of the Brigades were but part of a larger picture, Gniesenau and his staff officers played a equally important part. Colonel von Rieche's intervention during the retreat from Ligny and General Muffling's presence at Mont St.Jean had a profound effect upon the outcome of the campaign. Though success would have scarcely been possible without the sheer determination of the rank and file and the formidable presence of their 73 year old Field-Marshal Gebhard Lebercht von Blucher. BibliographyChalfont, Lord (ed.) Waterloo: Battle of three Armies (London: Sedgwick and Jackson, 1979). Special NoteThis extended essay was written before the author had read Andrew Uffindel's excellent books: The Eagle's Last Triumph: Napoleon's Victory at Ligny and On the Fields of Glory: The Battlefields of the 1815 Campaign. And therefore the author was without the details surplied by these volumes, nonetheless the essay represents the author's attempt to see the Belgium Campaign of 1815 from a purely Prussian point of view within the limits of the volumes actually consulted. I hope that this has been achieved within the paragraphs above. 
More Vorwarts Part II
Prussian 1815 Campaign: 19th June 1815 Prussian 1815 Campaign: 20th June 1815 Related Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #44 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |