"Vorwarts, Vorwarts, Kinder!"
The Prussian Campaign
in Belgium of 1815
Part I
15th June: Zeiten's Withdrawl
Battle of Gilly
by Patrick E.Wilson, UK
 |
The morning of the 15th dawned thick and sultry, it was going to be another hot day after the morning mists had cleared. It was a day which would see General Zieten's reports and concerns confirmed as the French offensive began. The first exchange of fire occurred between General Steinmetz's 1st Prussian brigade and General Rielle's 2nd French Corps when the pickets of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr were driven in near the village of Lobbes. However the French were making for Thuin and therefore didn't follow the 1st Westphalians as they fell back on Fontaine L'Eveque. Thuin was held by the third battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr who put up a stiff resistance until compelled to retreat by the shear weight of numbers. Retreating on Marchienne au Pont they were overtaken by General Rielle's cavalry and severly cut up. Meanwhile reports of these attacks reached General Zieten and convinced him of the need to implement his instructions under the Tirlemont Agreement, and thus Steinmetz was ordered to retire to Gosselies via Courcelles. General Pirch II's 2nd Brigade was to defend the three bridges over the Sambre at Marchianne au Pont, Charleroi and Chatelet, which would allow sufficient time for Steinmetz's retreat on Gosselies, after which Pirch II was to retreat to a defensive position at Gilly. General Rielle's leading regiment the 2nd Legere, soon forced the 2nd battalion of the Prussian 6th Regiment from Marcheinne au Pont. This battalion then fell back on Daupreny, picking up the 1st battalion of the 2nd Westphalian en route and retiring to a defensive position at Gilly. While Rielle's troops were occupied at Marchienne, General Pajol's light cavalry advanced on Charleroi, a brigade of this cavalry under General Dommanget caught a company of the 28th Regiment near the village of Couillet and forced it to surrender. Following this up, Dommanget seized the village of Marcinelles, which lead to the all important bridge at Charleroi. But here General Dommanget encountered Prussian skirmishers, whose accurate fire from behind hedges, barricades and rooftops soon halted his triumphant advance. Charleroi, itself was occupied by the 1st battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment, who had thoroughly prepared it for defence. Pajol now impatiently awaited the arrival of the French infantry to force the Prussians out, the time lost at Charleroi benefitted Zeiten's plans, as his troops hurriedly concentrated at Fleurus and Gilly. And it was not until eleven thirty that French infantry appeared before Charleroi, these were the Sappers and Marines of the Imperial Guard who had pushed themselves ahead of General Vandamme's delayed 3rd Corps. Quickly these veterans arranged a combined assault upon the bridge at Charleroi and forced it after a stiff fight with its defenders. The 1st battalion of the Prussian 6th Regiment retired before the French onslaught on Gilly, where it was able to rejoin General Pirch II's now assembled 2nd brigade, which had deployed for battle there.
Rielle upon recieving reports of a Prussian presence at Gosselies pushed ahead Girard's 7th Division as well as elements of his own cavalry. These units not only drove back the 6th Uhlans but also succeeded in ejecting the 29th regiment from Gosselies. Steinmetz having noticed the increasing strength of the French toward Gosselies, redirected his march to the north west towards Heppignies, where he already had some infantry. And though successful in reaching Heppignies he had to fight off at least two determined attacks from Girard's very active division, night ended the fighting with Steinmetz deployed around Heppignies with Girard facing him south east of Heppignies. Meanwhile at Gilly, General Pirch II had arranged his brigade in defensive positions, occupying a ridge that ran between the Abbey of Soleilmont and the village of Chatelneau near the bridge over the Sambre at Chatelet. A little rivulet also ran in front of this ridge providing additional strength to the position, a small wood stood in front of Soleilmont Abbey whilst the village of Gilly stood at the intersection between Charleroi to Fleurus road and the road which passed the Sambre at Chatelet from Phillipville. Pirch II's troops were deployed thus: the fusilier battalion of the 6th Prussian regiment occupied the small wood, the brigade artillery deployed across the Fleurus road, the first and second battalions of the 28th regiment and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 2nd Westphalian landwehr occupied the ridge itself. The fusilier battalion of the 28th regiment together with Lt Col Worsley's Dragoon squadrons were pushed forward towards the Chatelet bridge and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 6th regiment remained in reserve behind the main position. Opposed to these forces were initially only General Pajol's light cavalry, who had mistook Pirch II's forces for a whole corps of 20,000 men! It was not until the arrival of General Vandamme's 3rd Corps that the French felt strong enough to attack and yet they still delayed. Apparently a dispute had arisen between Vandamme and Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy, which ultimately needed Napoleon's personal intervention, thus it wasn't until 6.00pm that the delayed assault began. By which time Zeiten had ordered Pirch II to withdraw to Fleurus to rejoin the new assembled 1st Prussian corps. Seeing the withdrawal, Napoleon threw his duty squadrons of the Imperial Guard against the retiring Prussian columns and although the fusilier battalion of the 2nd regiment was swept away by General Letort's furious charge. Pirch II's 2nd brigade reached the safety of the Fleurus wood, his skirmishers detering the more determined of the French cavalry from entry into the woods. General Letort himself was mortally wounded in one of these exchanges of fire. And yet the French did not give up, following up Pirch II's retreating columns they again tried to disrupt his retreat near the village of Lambusart but were decisively repulsed by Zeiten's reserve cavalry, which intervened at just the right moment. Allowing Zeiten to withdraw his battered 2nd Brigade behind the Ligny stream during the night, where it reunited with the rest of his 1st Corps, which were positioned between the villages of St.Amand and Ligny. Zeiten's First Corps fought well on the 15th of June and lost perhaps 1,500 men. It had withdrawn in the face of an aggressive enemy, concentrated itself at a pre-arranged point but most importantly, permitted the concentration of their colleagues in in the 2nd and 3rd Prussian Corps near Sombreffe. Although, sadly the 4th Corps failed to carry out its concentration and thus would not be available until the 17th June. This was to have grave consequences for the 16th, however the Prussian high command were as yet unaware of this particular development. The Prussian concentration of the 15 th June had been planned as early as the 3rd of May, when Blucher and Wellington had agreed at Tirlemont to concentrate their armies in the event of an attack upon Napoleon and destroy him as he attempted to cross the Sambre. Thus on the night of the 15th of June Blucher's concentration was well under way, Zeiten's 1st Corps were at St Amand and Ligny. Pirch I's 2nd Corps were at Mazy on the road to Sombreffe, whilst Thielemann's 3rd Corps were around Namur but would arrive at Sombreffe in the afternoon of the 16th of June. Unfortunately though, Bulow's 4th Corps were not at Hannut as they should have been, instead they remained around Liege, though at least they had concentrated. The reasons for this was that Bulow was under the impression that the main army would assemble at Hannot and he was not aware of the start of hostilities, the sultry nature of the weather preventing any sound of the battle from reaching him. He had assumed that the army was concentrating as a response to the French military build up, which he had himself observed on the other side of the border. However, his leisurely movements of the 15th meant that his 4th Corps were unable to support Blucher on the 16th as the latter had hoped. Instead Blucher would have to rely on Wellington concentrating his forces and coming to his assistance on the 16th. More Vorwarts
Prussian 1815 Campaign: 15th June 1815 Prussian 1815 Campaign: 16th June 1815 Prussian 1815 Campaign: 17th June 1815 More Vorwarts Part II
Related Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #43 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
Unfortunately, the loss of Charleroi by the Prussians had also opened the road to Gosselies to the French, and as they fanned out from Charleroi, Pajol directed Colonel Clary's 1st Hussars in that direction. Such a move cleary endangered Steinmetz's brigade as it marched via Courcelles for Gosselies to a flank attack. Zeiten realised the danger and ordered General Jagow's 3rd Brigade to secure Gosselies. They were just in time, as the 29th Prussian Regiment occupied the town, the 6th Uhlans under Lt Col Lutzow had to repulse an attack by Clary's Hussars. This movement also had other consequences, for Clary's repulse recieved not only the support of General Lefebure-Doesnoettoes light cavalry division of the Imperial Guard but also General Girard's 7th Division of General Rielle's 2nd Corps advancing from Marchienne au Pont.